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Drawing on 53 in depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers/decision 
makers and civil society representatives, this study examines varying levels of 
Europeanization of civil society across different policy fields in Turkey. It analyses 
multifaceted processes of the EU impact on civil society development, focusing on 
three principled issue areas, women, environment and human rights. Suggesting that 
complex interactions between the EU and domestic politics exist, it argues that 
historical legacies-inherited characteristics of the past-have shaped the 
Europeanization outcomes of civil society. Through a structured comparative 
analysis, on the one hand, it shows that a stronger degree of Europeanization will be 
accomplished when the EU meets with facilitating historical legacies. On the other 
hand, it demonstrates that the Europeanization of civil society is less likely where 
historical legacies function as a constraining condition for the EU impact and 
transformation. Based on rich empirical evidence across different sectors of civil 
society, the study finally discusses the nature, potential and limits of the EU impact 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The slogan was “there is no other tomorrow!” (Başka Yarın Yok!). 
“Traditional Turkish coffee was pictured almost spilling over, with the caption: ‘We 
are about to be too late.’ ” (Altınay 2005:111). Cars with “European Movement 2002” 
stickers were all over neighborhoods in İstanbul1. On 1 August 2002, the European 
Movement 2002 placed a huge clock in front of the Çankaya Gate of Parliament 
running backwards. “The clock is ticking” symbolizing the importance of time, 
counting down for the Copenhagen Summit and reminding everyone that there was 
132 days until the summit. The European Movement 2002 was a civil society 
initiative founded on 9 May, Europe Day, to support Turkey’s EU vocation and 
emphasizing that Turkey was at a crossroads and that urgent reforms were required to 
meet candidacy obligations and to show Turkey’s willingness to join the EU  (Altınay 
2005:110-111). 
Similarly, from the women’s movement campaign to reform the 
discriminatory Civil and Penal Code, to the environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) lobby through their counterparts in European countries and 
directly with the EU institutions against worrying “Nature and Biodiversity 
Conservation” draft law, to the formation and rapid dissolution of the Human Rights 
Consultation Board between the government and human rights NGOs, Turkey has 
vivid and diverse images of civil society groups during the EU accession process. 
 In the intensive reform process, civil society has become more visible in the 
political landscape as a driver of the Europeanization processes. Since then, 
Europeanization has become one of the central concepts to understand the relationship 
between the EU and civil society during accession negotiations. Turkey is the longest-
waiting country on the EU’s accession list; its European aspirations date back to the 
                                                        
1
 These examples are extracted from Altınay 2005:110-111. 
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Ottoman Empire, and were revitalized in 1999 when Turkey was given the status of 
membership candidate country in the Helsinki European Council. Recognition of her 
candidacy status sparked extensive constitutional reforms and subsequent democratic 
reform packages extended fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey. 
Parallel to these developments, civil society has become more active in the 
political arena. Particularly during the intensive reform process, civil society 
organizations mobilized around EU related issues and pressured the government to 
adopt political reforms. More critically, legal changes have altered the political and 
societal spaces available for the operation of civil society actors. The number of civil 
society organizations has increased rapidly (Interview Head of the Department of 
Associations 2011). According to recent figures, the number of active associations has 
increased by 64 per cent following the official announcement of Turkey’s candidacy 
to the EU (Zihnioğlu 2013:2). In this period, the EU exercised a transformative power 
over civil society development in Turkey. 
While the 1999-2005 period has been recognized as the heyday of 
Europeanization, and stimulating legal changes and democratic reform packages, the 
post-2005 period has been identified as a deadlock in EU-Turkey relations and 
turning away from the EU. The stalemate in the EU-Turkey relationship was coupled 
with a domestically volatile period (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). Within this context, 
Europeanization of civil society seems to exhibit variations over time and across issue 
areas. The EU impact has not been uniform on different sectors of civil society. The 
relationship between the EU and Turkey and the differential impact of the EU on civil 
society is puzzling and needs to be unpacked and supported by a theoretical 
framework and rich empirical evidence. Turkey is an illustrative case for examining 
the nature, potential and limits of the Europeanization processes. 
The Europeanization of civil society is understood in a variety of ways (For a 
detailed discussion see Chapter 2). In this thesis, I define Europeanization of civil 
society as “processes that enhance the autonomy and independence of NGOs from the 
state and develop the NGOs’ institutional capacities and networks in a way that 
enables their effective contribution to policymaking in Turkey and in Europe” 
(Rumelili and Boşnak 2015: 131). Interaction between domestic civil society, 
international counterparts and the state is the backbone of Europeanization. A 
Europeanized civil society establishes both internal and external networks between 
actors yet at the same time remains independent from the state and the market. While 
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the internal network refers to interaction between domestic civil society as well as the 
state and society, external networks denote cooperation between domestic civil 
society and their international counterparts. In this particular understanding, civil 
society has been a partner with the state and other actors and a key actor in the 
policymaking. 
This thesis explores the role of the EU in shaping civil society development in 
Turkey. It examines in detail how the EU used its accession context and conditions to 
exercise an influence on civil society, analyzes mechanisms of the EU influence and 
interaction between the EU and domestic factors, and re-assesses the EU’s 
transformative power on civil society. Therefore, the thesis comprises the following 
elements: the EU context or condition, the mechanisms triggered by the EU, impacts 
of these mechanisms and an explanation of the EU impact on civil society. 
I argue that outcomes of Europeanization have not been uniform across the 
different sectors of civil society in Turkey. The impact of the EU on civil society 
seems to exhibit variation and a legacy-based explanation accounts for varying 
degrees of the EU impact. The EU impact on civil society, transformation and 
processes that were triggered by the EU is an interactive and dynamic process. Thus, 
Europeanization is not imposed above as a one-way street; on the contrary, domestic 
civil society actors, political culture and traditions re-interpret the EU influence at the 
domestic level and reciprocally influence and shape Europeanization outcomes. 
Differentiated outcome of Europeanization is puzzling in the light of existing 
approaches about the relationship between the EU and civil society, because diverse 
outcomes and legacy-based domestic conditions have not been taken into account. 
Analyses of the Europeanization of civil society in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) have shown that “Europeanization mainly empowered civil society 
actors that already had sufficient capacities” (Sedelmeier 2011:20) without 
considering how domestic factors such as capacities or levels of societal mobilization 
interlinked to historical legacies  (Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a,b; 
Carmin and Fagan 2010; Fagan 2010). I argue that a legacy-based explanation 
complements these studies, because contemporary domestic conditions such as 
capacities, levels of societal mobilization or state-society relations can be traced back 
to past periods and to a large extent shaped by history. 
The relationship between the EU and civil society is one of the enduring 
subjects of inquiry for Europeanization scholars. The continuing interest in the study 
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of Europeanization of civil society can be justified in at least two ways. The EU 
frequently emphasizes the role of civil society in the accession process (Ketola 2013; 
Zihnioğlu 2013) therefore understanding the relationship between the EU and civil 
society is important for perceiving how the EU influences civil society. Second, in a 
liberal tradition, the commitment to democracy requires an active civil society, which 
therefore reinforces the normative appeal of democracy (Putnam et al.1994; Putnam 
1995). If the EU empowers civil society development, it implies that civil society 
activities can contribute to a more participatory and dynamic democratic society. Yet 
the third reason for the scholarly attention on civil society is the ongoing enlargement 
process. The EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has intensified 
discussions on the power and growth of civil society, its role in democratization and 
reform process and the Europeanization of civil society as a condition of the EU 
membership. The enlargement rounds of 2004/2007 also added new opportunities and 
challenges, especially in relation to the question of the Europeanization of civil 
society. In Turkey, the research agenda on the Europeanization of civil society has 
grown exponentially across different types and sectors of civil society. Yet, empirical 
studies in Turkey fail to show the EU impact on different sectors of civil society 
through a structured analysis and explanation of the EU impact. 
In this thesis I argue that the EU has a differential impact on civil society and 
a principle reason for the observed diversity in empirical research is the role of 
historical trajectories. The fundamental premise of my argument is that the 
relationship between the EU and civil society cannot be properly understood without 
analyzing the dynamic interactions between the EU and reactions of the civil society 
actors in Turkey. Europeanization is perceived as a two way process in which 
domestic factors together with the EU factors influence each other and shape 
Europeanization outcomes. Historical legacies both play facilitating and constraining 
roles in the explanations of the EU impact. I argue that a stronger degree of 
Europeanization of civil society succeeds when the EU interacts with facilitating 
historical legacies. Thus, whether the Europeanization outcome corresponds to 
stronger or limited EU influence to a large extent depends on the legacies of the past. 
My theoretical framework and supporting evidence presented in this research 
have significant implications for understanding the dynamics of civil society and how 
the EU impacts civil society in general. The omission of a structured comparative 
study, which characterizes most of the literature on the Europeanization of civil 
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society to date, results in incomplete conclusions about how the EU impacts civil 
society. The inherited characteristics of civil society shape their responses to 
processes of EU influence; therefore, it is vital to take into account legacies of the 
past when analyzing the Europeanization of civil society. The concept of historical 
legacy in broader terms understood as “inherited aspects of the past relevant to the 
present” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010). Following this definition, in Chapter 4 
I identify “which past matters the most” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010). In 
particular, three aspects of the past matter the most for the diverse Europeanization 
outcomes. First, historically, the presence of a dynamic civil society and a good level 
of mobilization facilitate the EU impact. In contrast, the absence of strong civil 
society, and divisions hinder the EU influence on civil society. Second, the existence 
of mechanisms that foster collaboration between the state and civil society promotes 
the EU’s effect. On the contrary, the lack of mechanisms that actively promote state 
society cooperation impede the EU’s impact. Third, the presence and use of 
transnational networks trigger the EU influence. Conversely, the dearth of 
transnational networks inhibits the EU’s impact. The empirical chapters investigate 
implications of this argument. 
 
1.1. Civil Society, Enlargement and Europeanization 
 
 Civil society has its strong historical roots in the European integration process. 
At the outset, civil society was promoted to participate in policymaking and to 
enhance the legitimacy of European institutions. Democratic transitions and accession 
of Southern European countries brought attention to the importance of stable 
democratic regimes to the fore and the transformative power of the European 
Community (EC). Yet, civil society only emerged as a key feature in the EU’s 
enlargement policy during the accession of CEECs. The debate on the role of civil 
society in democratization became prominent among EU institutions and member 
states. 
The EU’s active civil society promotion strategy in CEECs also spurred 
scholarly interest in the civil society. The state of the art in the Europeanization of 
civil society literature, deriving from democracy promotion and governance literature 
and the wider literature on the “generations of Europeanization” perspectives define, 
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assess and measure the Europeanization of civil society in CEE and Turkey within the 
context of the enlargement. 
Traditional scholarship from democracy promotion has examined the 
relationship between the EU and civil society from a variety of angles. Some studies 
have revealed that the EU financial assistance has created a particular type of civil 
society as “grant-seeking professional organizations” which have become 
disconnected from their constituencies (McMahon 2001; Mandelson and Glenn 2002; 
Fagan 2004; 2005). Others have argued the EU has facilitated a new type of 
politically oriented activism known as “transactional activism” that is based on 
transactions (Císař 2010; Fagan 2011; Císař 2013). 
The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in CEE has also 
scrutinized the extent to which the EU empowered civil society in the different areas 
of public policy. Studies have yielded mixed results. On the one hand, there is 
evidence that the EU has provided diverse opportunities to domestic civil societies 
and empowered  them through the EU’s pre-accession instruments, policy rights, civil 
society funding and transnational networks in the context of EU conditionality. Yet, 
on the other hand, research has shown that weak governance capacities of both state 
and non-state actors have limited the Europeanization outcomes (Börzel 2009; Börzel 
2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a, b; Grosse 2010). 
The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has grown 
rapidly in recent years. Research has shown that the EU has exercised a considerable 
transformative power on civil society in Turkey, but they differ in outcomes of the EU 
impact. There is broad agreement that, through conditionality, the EU has imposed a 
transformative change in the domestic legal framework in governing the operation of 
civil society in Turkey (Diez et al. 2005; İçduygu 2007; Öner 2012; Rumelili and 
Boşnak 2015). Furthermore, research has found that the EU has shaped agendas of 
civil society, diffused a project culture and accelerated professionalism through EU 
financial assistance (Ergun 2010 ;Kuzmanovic 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The 
EU has also legitimized the activities of civil society and empowered these 
organizations. 
Thus, existing literature on the Europeanization of civil society both in the 
context of CEE and Turkey reveal that the EU’s impact is “transforming”, 
“strengthening” or “weaking” civil society. Both literatures are chatacterized by 
multiple understandings of civil society, Europeanization processes and outcomes. 
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Yet, the dichotomy between the “first generation” and “second generation” of 
Europeanization studies
2
 has monopolized the research agenda and has left the 
exploration of the domestic factors in a vacuum (An exception is Alpan and Diez 
2014 and Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). The present study seeks to contribute 
Europeanization field by addressing this vacuum in the current academic research. 
My theoretical framework, based on a pathway model, was originally 
developed to study the impact of the EU on border conflicts (Diez et al.2006; 2008). 
The pathway model of EU impact introduces different mechanisms of the EU 
influence that is theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological institutionalism 
in the wider literature. The categories of compulsory, enabling and connective 
pathways in the model indicate different but interconnected forms of the EU influence 
and allow me to analyze the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU 
involvement. I applied this model to civil society and used analytical categories to 
examine the EU impact on civil society in Turkey. As the review of the academic 
debates in Chapter 2 will show in detail, scholars tend to concentrate on the 
compulsory or enabling pathway of the EU impact, down-playing the connective 
pathway. During the course of my research it has become clear that the connective 
pathway is widely and indirectly mentioned, but not yet extensively and 
systematically studied in the current literature. I argue and in empirical chapters 
(Chapters 5, 6, and 7) I show that the connective pathway of the EU influence is 
innovative to understand the interactions between actors and the differential impact of 
the EU on civil society. 
Empirical chapters  have three main sections. First, I start by explaining major 
developments and sector specific characteristics of civil society before 1999. Second, 
I show mechanisms and outcomes of the EU impact after 1999. In this section, I do 
not separate mechanisms and outcomes of the EU impact; initially I start with a 
summary of outcomes  followed by an in-depth examination of the EU pathways and 
outcomes. The main reason for desigining it in this way is to demonstrate in detail 
how particular EU pathways lead to specific outcomes and capture the dynamic 
interaction between them. Lastly, I provide a legacy-based explanation to account for 
diverse Europeanization outcomes of civil society. My objective is twofold. On the 
                                                        
2
 The “first generation” of Europeanization research conceived Europeanization as a top-down process, 
where EU pressure from above influences the domestic reactions. The “second generation” of 
Europeanization research perceived Europeanization both as a top-down and bottom-up process, where 
pressures from below also shape the outcomes. 
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one hand, an in-depth examination of the EU impact across different sectors of civil 
society enables me to show how the EU influences civil society by examining 
simultaneous processes and the interplay between the EU and domestic-level factors. 
On the other hand I will provide an explanation for the EU impact on civil society.  
 Such a critical engagement is of paramount importance and provides a more 
accurate and comprehensive understanding of the EU impact on civil society. 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to the empirical and theoretical debates in the 
Europeanization of civil society in two major ways. On the one hand, it contributes 
towards creating a theoretically innovative and comprehensive account for 
understanding the EU effect on civil society. I introduce a new theoretical framework 
that builds on the pathway model of the EU impact and incorporates the concept of 
historical legacies. I argue that the EU and civil society have an interactive and 
dynamic relationship and the impact of the EU is moulded by the reactions, 
understandings, and traditions of civil society organizations. Therefore, any 
assessment that does not take into account domestic explanations tend to focus on 
more simplistic explanations. My theoretical framework highlights the interaction of 
EU and legacy-related domestic factors. While the EU aspect accentuates complex 
mechansims of the EU impact in multiple levels, the domestic aspect underscores that 
historical legacies have played a decisive role in Europeanization processes. 
 On the other hand, my thesis, through a concrete structured comparative 
analysis across different sectors of civil society, provides rich empirical findings. The  
53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers 
and civil society representatives alongside the European Commission’s annual 
Progress Reports illuminate the Europeanization processes. Previous research has 
analyzed the EU impact through an examination of single areas, therefore, 
comparability between cases and in-depth qualitative assessment is a crucial 
contribution to studies on the Europeanization of civil society. When assessing EU 
impact, studies have either focused on civil society in general or only on specific 
types of actors. Although Turkish civil society actors share important characteristics, 
the EU impact differs across issue areas. In line with other studies, the provision of 
financial and legal opportunities have a uniform influence across different sectors of 
civil society. Similarly, all civil society actors have used the EU as a legitimization 
device. However, the EU has had a diverse impact on state-society relations, 
cooperation among domestic civil society actors and relationship with external 
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networks across different segments of the civil society. This is a significant finding, 
because in contrast to other studies in the field it shows that the EU has a differential 
impact on civil society. 
 
1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
 
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce a 
model to study the impact of the EU on civil society development. My model is based 
on the pathway model that has been utilized to study the influence of the EU on 
border conflicts (Diez et al. 2006; 2008). I illustrate that an attention to connective 
pathway regarding how EU influence interactions between various actors and its 
outcome and incorporation of a key variable in the model can significantly improve 
our understanding of the relationship between the EU and civil society. I derive the 
empirical implications of my analytical framework on three levels- women’s, 
environmental and human rights NGOs- which I examine in the empirical chapters in 
5, 6 and 7. 
Chapter 3 presents the EU’s approach to civil society to show how the EU’s 
understanding reflected to an enlargement context. I examine approaches that lay at 
the center of EU civil society policy. Overall, I find that the EU follows a twin-track 
approach to civil society. In this approach, civil society is an instrument of democracy 
promotion and a partner in European governance. In addition, I show that although 
the EU’s policy towards civil society is conceptualized in a particular way, EU 
member states are molded by different understandings and traditions of civil society. 
In Chapter 4 through long-term analysis I trace the development of civil 
society in Turkey. I examine the development of civil society to point out historical 
legacies that matter for civil society. Empirically I focus on several legislative 
frameworks since the Ottoman modernization program (Tanzimat) and secondary 
literature on different aspects of civil society. I show that there are six vital legacies in 
relation to civil society, which date back to the Ottoman period. These legacies in 
relation to civil society are still the constituent elements of the civil society in Turkey, 
and have implications on the EU influence. 
In empirical chapters I turn to implications of my pathway model on women, 
environmental and human rights civil society respectively. I examine how the EU 
used its accession context and conditions to exert influence on different sectors of 
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civil society. I focus on the in-depth analysis of the EU mechanisms, impacts of these 
mechanisms and provide an explanation of the EU impact by invoking a plausibility 
probe in each empirical chapter. 
The findings of the compulsory pathway and enabling pathway of the EU 
influence show similarities across different sectors of civil society. There are two 
main findings of the compulsory pathway: First, the EU has enforced a significant 
change in the legal framework. Yet, the post-2005 period surfaced implementation 
related problems. Second, EU funding has shaped the agendas and increased the 
capacity and visibility of civil society. 
Assessment of the enabling pathway of the EU influence indicates that civil 
society actors in all issue areas frequently use EU standards and norms as a reference 
point to legitimize their actions and to promote their agendas. This has led to 
empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state, but this effect has been vulnerable to 
fluctuations in EU-Turkey relations. 
In Chapter 5 I show that a stronger degree of Europeanization of women’s 
civil society is achieved when the EU meets with facilitating historical legacies. I find 
that traditionally, women’s civil society has been developed, has formed relations 
with the Turkish state and participated in decision-making processes and has 
collaborated with their counterparts and established transnational connections with 
external networks throughout different periods of history. In addition I show how the 
EU, through different pathways, has enabled women’s civil society to cooperate and 
collaborate with the state institutions, to take an active role in policy-processes, and to 
form and empower networks both with domestic civil society actors and their 
counterparts in other countries. I also demonstrate how legacies matter and provide an 
explanation of the EU impact. 
 In Chapter 6 I show that the EU impact has been ambivalent on environmental 
civil society. I illustrate that environmental activism has been moderate; it formed 
relations with the Turkish state to participate in policy processes but at the same time 
has been restricted by the state’s approach to civil society. Furthermore, 
environmental civil society has weak cooperation both with other domestic 
environmental actors and their European counterparts. Even though the EU has 
provided opportunities, the moderate status of the environmental movement and the 
weak cooperation among environmental actors have acted as constraining conditions 
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of the EU impact. I finally show how historical legacies matter for the 
Europeanization of environmental civil society in Turkey. 
In Chapter 7 I show that the Europeanization of civil society is limited when 
historical legacies function as a constraining condition for the EU impact. The 
controversial relationship between the state and human rights civil society, the 
restricted cooperation among human rights actors and the limited use of transnational 
connections has restrained the EU impact. In the cases of human rights, civil society 
legacies of the past have functioned as a constraining condition of the EU impact. 
Finally, Chapter 8 reviews the major findings of the analyses and highlights 
their implications for our understanding of the relationship between the EU and civil 
society. In this concluding chapter I also discuss the limitations of the present 
research and counterarguments, policy implications as well as new questions for 




ANALYZING THE EU IMPACT ON CIVIL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
 As I have shown in Chapter 1, civil society has been at the center of the EU 
enlargement process. This is in line with the argument of many studies in the 
Europeanization field that the EU has considerable impact on civil society 
development. One of the most important illustrations of that impact is the emergence 
of civil society as a central actor in Turkey’s pre-accession process for EU 
membership. Despite this growing interest, there is a lack of an in-depth assessment 
of mechanisms of the EU impact on different sectors of civil society and their 
interplay with domestic factors in Turkey. The study analyzes mechanisms of EU 
influence on different segments of civil society and provides an explanation of EU 
impact. To understand the impact of the EU, the present chapter develops a theoretical 
and methodological framework to study civil society. 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. It starts with a definition of civil 
society, and a review of the literature on academic debates on the EU and civil 
society. The first section presents key debates and findings and identifies the gap in 
the literature. Building on these studies, the second section develops a theoretical 
framework that proposes a pathway model of Europeanization and conditions of the 
EU impact. The third section explains the methodology in order to operationalize 
Europeanization analysis in the empirical chapters. 
 
2.1. Academic Debates on the EU and Civil Society 
 
 This section first starts with the definition of civil society, then reviews two 
main strands of academic literature that are important for this research. These strands 
are the rising importance of civil society in EU enlargement in CEE (the 
Europeanization of civil society in CEE) and the investigations into the impact of the 




2.1.1. Definitions: Civil Society and NGOs 
 
 As a starting point, it is important to precisely understand the kind of civil 
society that is under investigation and affected by the Europeanization processes. 
What is crucial in the current context is to clarify contested meanings of civil society 
and operationalize it for the purpose of this research. There are two key concepts that 
require further attention. These are civil society and NGOs. Civil society and NGOs 
are interrelated but different concepts. 
There are several ways of defining and studying civil society.
3
 This thesis 
follows an actor-oriented approach to civil society and concentrates on particular 
types of actors. This is not to deny the importance of various models of civil society 
ranging from institutionalized to less- institutionalized; instead this choice has been 
driven to operationalize the research question that is to trace the EU impact on civil 
society development in different sectors of civil society. In following an actor-
oriented approach to civil society, NGOs are used as a unit of analysis. 
The London School of Economics’ (LSE) Centre for Civil Society4 provides 
an analytically and empirically useful definition of civil society. 
 
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from the state, and 
market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, and market are 
often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity 
of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degrees of formality, 
autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as 
registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community 
groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, 





The thesis employs this working definition to civil society in the empirical 
chapters. In this definition, civil society refers both to various actors and spheres of 
                                                        
3
 There are two main approaches to study civil society. Actor-oriented approaches focus on different 
kinds of civil society actors and their characteristics while functional approaches concentrate on 
functions of civil society in various contexts. For more information see Spurk (2009). 
4
 The LSE Centre for Civil Society was established in 1995 to conduct research on theoretical and 
practical aspects of civil society and initiated the specialist MSc program in NGOs and management, 
and NGOs and development. The Center for Civil Society was closed in 2010. 
5
LSE Centre for Civil Society http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm 
[Accessed on: 23 December 2009]. 
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collection action, which reflect the interests, and values of a society. Therefore, it 
encompasses a range of actors, both formal and informal organizations and draws 
boundaries of civil society between state and market. 
Another concept that requires further clarification is a definition of NGOs. 
There are extensive studies on NGOs in civil society, development studies and 
international relations literature. Scholars have explored their contributions to good 
governance, and examine their strategies and tactics (Rucht 2001), their role in 
agenda setting (Joachim and Locker 2008), and the creation and enforcement of 
norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The term NGOs is defined as (i) self-governing; (ii) 
private and separate from both state and market; (iii) not-for–profit organizations that 
work for the public interest (Salamon and Anheier 1992; Vakil 1997; Lewis 2010; 
Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). NGOs are actors within civil society and operationalized 
as issue-based NGOs; e.g., women, environmental and human rights NGOs. 
 
2.1.2. The Europeanization of Civil Society in CEE 
 
In recent years, a growing number of studies have investigated the relationship 
between Europeanization and civil society. With the enlargement of CEECs, the 
Europeanization of candidate countries has become a separate research agenda 
(Grabbe 2001; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; 
Grabbe 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). The studies on the Europeanization of candidate 
countries are mainly conditionality driven and analyze the transformation of the 
policy, politics, and polity dynamics of the countries. EU conditionality as a “strategy 
of reinforcement by reward” provides an external incentive for a candidate country to 
comply with the EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In this regard, the 
Copenhagen Criteria has been a powerful condition and act as a catalyst for domestic 
transformations. 
The EU’s support for civil society development is analyzed in the context of 
enlargement policy. Mapping out different domains in the literature provides deeper 
understanding from variety of perspectives on the understanding, assessment, 
measurement, and outcomes of the Europeanization of civil society. Scholars of civil 
society have used two main theoretical approaches to analyze the relationship 
between the EU and civil society in CEE. 
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EU Assistance for Civil Society in CEE: An Agent of Democracy Promotion?  
 
The role of civil society in donor policies is inspired by the liberal democratic 
rationale that considers civil society as the cornerstone of democratic and economic 
development (Ketola 2013:16). Putnam’s work, following the Tocquevillean tradition, 
has been inspirational in understanding the relationship between the vibrant civil 
society and democracy. For Putnam (2000), strong civil society has been the 
foundation of democracy, economic development and political institutionalization; 
thus, associational life plays a key role in building trust, social capital and solidarity. 
In this understanding, civil society has normative connotations such as “a good 
force”, “participatory”, “democratic”, “transparent” and “accountable”. Drawing on 
the neo-Tocquevillean school, scholars have emphasized that vibrant civil society is a 
prerequisite for well-functioning democracy (Gellner 1994; Fukuyama 1995; 
Diamond 1999; Putnam 2000) and as Encarnación puts it, the concept of civil society 
has turned into “a magic cure for combatting virtually all of society’s ills” 
(Encarnación 2011: 470). 
In the 1990s, international donors began to support civil society as a key 
component of democracy promotion. In donor policy circles, it is suggested that 
democracy could be built and strentghened through financial and technical assistance 
to civil society (Ishkanian 2008: 60-61). For example, after the fall of Communism, 
democracy promotion through civil society assistance became a central goal of US 
foreign policy (Carothers 1999; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 2004). Like 
their American counterparts, the EU actively supports democracy promotion through 
civil society aid in its policies. This is important both in the EU and Turkish civil 
society context, because it is donor-NGOs relationship that characterises the 
Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. It is assumed that civil society activism 
will lead to more democratic, transparent and legitimate governance and more 
effective policymaking and implementation. Thereby, the existence of a vibrant civil 
society is not only considered as a necessary condition of democratization but also 
Europeanization.  As I will show in Chapter 3, this approach to democracy promotion 
lies at the heart of the EU’s policy towards civil society and is evident in its 
enlargement strategy. 
Scholars situate the EU’s strategy for supporting civil society within the 
broader literature critiquing external donor assistance for civil society development 
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(Sampson 1996; Quigley 2000; Wedel 2001; Mandel 2002; Mandelson and Gleen 
2002; Mercer 2002; Ishkanian 2008; Encarnación 2011). The external donors have 
chanelled their civil society development aid mostly through NGOs. This strand of 
literature problematizes NGOs as the only form of civil society. For donors, civil 
societies are equated with professional NGOs for competing for externally assisted 
projects in big cities, heavily dependent on external resources and have been criticized 
for failing to become involved with local constituencies and therefore not sustainable 
and accountable to their public. Carothers (1999:248) argues that “Democracy 
promoters pass through these countries on hurried civil society assessment missions 
and declare that very little civil society exists because they have found only a handful 
of Westernized NGOs devoted non-partisan public-interest advocacy work on the 
national side”. This led to “NGO”ization or “genetically-engineered civil societies” 
(Ishkanian 2008) and reduction of civil society particularly to NGOs, therefore, 
promotion of a particular model of civil society solely based on donor driven 
professionalized NGOs. 
Civil society promotion as a development strategy has also been debated on 
the grounds of the impact of external aid and consequences of such programs. The 
donors strategy of civil society promotion is based on the normative understanding 
that NGOs tend to hold state holders accountable, resist state power, deliver 
professional services and are neutrally supported by the broad constituencies. Critics 
have raised concerns about the consequences of civil society promotion programs and 
conclude that NGOs are donor driven and disconnected from their constituencies, 
therefore, far away from actors as agents of change and democratization (Howell and 
Pearce 2001; McMahon 2001; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Fagan 2005; Ishkanian 
2008; Encarnación 2011). In this regard, donors have not changed power relations, 
and not transformed civil society into a countervailing force for democratic deficit, 
and, in practice, such NGOs have functioned as apolitical technical agents. Crawford 
(2003a) argues that external democracy assistance seeks “a technical solution to a 
political problems” with very little participation from local actors, and a more 
participatory approach is needed to strengthen local action for genuine 
democratization. 
In following the traditional scholarship from democracy promotion studies, 
research has analyzed the relationship between the EU and civil society within CEE. 
Several country case and comparative study analyses of EU funding have given 
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various answers to the questions of how the EU assistance to civil society works and 
promotes activism, whether democracy could be strengthened via civil society 
funding, and why EU civil society development did not create the intended positive 
outcomes. 
In terms of the notion of civil society, traditonal democracy promotion 
literature has adopted a broad understanding of civil society. Civil society is 
understood typically involving all types of voluntary non-profit organizations. It is 
attributed democratic functions and is based on the principle of participatory 
democracy, therefore, affilated with direct democracy, political legitimacy, citizens’ 
participation and representation (Zimmer and Freise 2008). Civil society 
organizations are understood as intermediaries between the citizens and the EU. In 
this context, civil society has been attributed a positive role. The approach to civil 
society is important, because it has significant implications for the judgement of the 
EU impact. In judging the EU impact, democracy promotion scholars have analyzed 
the extent to which the EU promotes participatory democracy and fosters plurality 
and democratic credentials of  society. 
In assessing the EU influence on civil society, studies have shown that  EU 
funding has created a particular form of civil society as “grant-seeking professional 
organizations” (McMahon 2001; Mandelson and Glenn 2002; Fagan 2004; 2005). 
Scholars have examined the consequences of the EU’s intervention solely through 
financial instruments. In an analysis of the Czech environmental movement, Fagan 
(2005) demonstrates that chanelling aid mostly through NGOs has resulted in the 
professionalization of NGOs which has created influential organizations at the elite 
level, yet, highly disconnected from their broader communities. These organizations 
are dependent on donor funding and reflect donors’ interests and do not fulfill the 
democratic functions of civil society such as civic engagement and participation and 
can only be successful if they align themselves with community-based activism 
(Fagan 2005). 
The expansion of professionalized advocacy has shifted researchers to 
investigate a particular form of activism that formed as a consequence of the EU’s 
external funding. One of the influential contributions that illustrates the debates on the 
new form of activism is the study by Petrova and Tarrow. They argue that the EU 
influence led to different type of activism labelled as “transactional activism” 
(Petrova and Tarrow 2007). Transactional activism refers to “the ties-enduring and 
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temporary-among organized nonstate actors and between them and political parties, 
power holders, and other institutions” that are on transactions (Petrova and Tarrow 
2007: 79). Drawing on Petrova and Tarrow’s concept of “transactional activism”, 
Císař (2010) examines the impact of international civil society building programs on 
Czech environmental movement organizations and demonstrates how the EU triggers 
a particular type of environmental political activism that is based on advocacy 
organizations and promotes transactional activism. Since then, several studies argue 
that donors have facilitated a new type of politically-oriented activism known as 
“transactional activism” which is based on transactions (Císař 2010; Fagan 2011; 
Císař 2013). These studies draw a more positive picture of EU aid and impact and 
strives to revise a skeptical understanding of civil society by shifting debates to  new 
forms of political activism. We now know how EU funding created conditions 
conducive to the emergence and development of a new type of activism that differs 
from mobilization (Císař 2013). These assessments are essential in understanding the 
new type of activism that stimulates interactions among various actors and different 
processes. Although this thesis does not employ the concept of transactional activism 
per se, a similar premise also found within this thesis: that studying interactions 
between different actors is fundemental to understand the Europeanization of civil 
society. 
Turning on the understanding of Europeanization of civil society from the 
perspective of traditional scholarship, this body of research understands 
Europeanization as a top-down and reactive process where pressures from above 
increased dependency on the EU and disconnected civil society organizations from 
grassroots organizations and weakened its democratic credentials. This led to a 
participatory deficit such as low political participation and activism. However, at the 
same time, as a consequence of Europeanization processes, civil society has become 
professionalized, developed its capacities and formed a new type of politically-
oriented activism that is based on interactions (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Císař 2010; 
Fagan 2011; Císař 2013). Accordingly, the analyses on the Europeanization of civil 
society in CEE presents diverse findings of the EU impact. 
This strand of literature has developed our understanding of the 
operationalization of civil society in the EU programs, the consequences of the EU’s 
civil society-focused democracy promotion strategy, the participatory deficit of civil 
society as a result of the EU funding by drawing on top-down approach of civil 
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society development. However, the relationship between the EU and civil society is 
more complex and intertwined with other factors; therefore, there is a need to analyze 
this relationship more comprehensively in order to understand how it influences civil 
society. These debates have failed to answer the question of how the EU impacts civil 
society, and presents two problems. 
On the one hand, traditional democracy promotion research has mainly been 
concerned with participatory deficit, the lack of engagement with broader 
constituencies, low-level of individual participation and the inadequate representation 
of interests in judging the impact of EU. The grassroots organizations play key roles 
for mobilization and representation of community interests. However, as Fagan 
(2011) argues, excessive emphasis on the democratic deficit underestimates the role 
of advocacy NGOs both as agents of change and policy partners. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society development 
and the EU’s intervention in civil society was not only advanced on the basis of 
democracy promotion, but also as partners in European governance and its role in the 
transformation of relationships. Therefore, we need to move beyond  discussions of a 
participatory deficit and evaluate the EU impact both on the operation of civil society 
and policies. This takes us to the heart of the following problem. 
On the other hand, traditional democracy promotion studies have focused 
solely on civil society funding as the main instrument of the EU’s influence and its 
outcomes. In this tradition, Europeanization is mainly perceived as a top-down 
process. However, I argue that the EU has impacted civil society through 
simultaneous and various processes. The examination of processes and interactions 
between EU driven and domestic level factors have been absent in this research. 
Furthermore, there is no assessment of the EU influence in different issue-areas. The 
new empirical findings in my research suggest that studying various issue-areas and 
understanding the interactions among various actors is much needed to explain the 
EU influence. The EU civil society programs and accession context facilitate 
interactions between non-state actors, state-civil society, and their counterparts in EU 
countries. Looking at the relationships and analysis of different mechanisms provide 





EU Assistance for Civil Society in CEE: Policy Partners in European Governance? 
 
Civil society has also inspired research on governance studies. In governance 
studies, the notion and understanding of civil society derived from the “governance 
turn” in EU studies, and is based on cooperative forms of policymaking (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger 2006). The basic premise of new modes of governance is the inclusion 
of all relevant actors (state and non-state) into decision- making to promote non-
hierarchical forms of policymaking. Civil society in this context is an instrument of 
“participatory governance”, participant “stakeholder” in the arrangement of “public 
private partnerships” (Kohler-Koch 2009: 51). Therefore, it is based on participation 
in decision-making, and the assumption that civil society has specific resources and is 
expected to provide services and contribute to effective problem solving at the EU 
level. The approach to civil society has important implications for the judgment of the 
EU impact. In this tradition, scholars have judged the EU impact on its ability to 
empower civil society in public policies. 
Recently, scholars from governance schools have examined the 
Europeanization of civil society within the context of CEE  (Börzel 2009; Börzel and 
Buzogány 2010a; Gasior-Niemic 2010). Studies are motivated by the question of the 
extent to which EU empowered civil society is in different areas of public policy. In 
general terms, the literature on governance has concentrated on the specific mode of 
governance based on nonhierarchical coordination and interaction and the 
involvement of non-state actors in public policies (Börzel 2009: 1). It is based on the 
assumption that participation of non-state actors into public polices would increase 
the effectiveness, and legitimacy of these processes. Through an examination of 
environmental policy, Börzel (2009) shows that the EU’s civil society support in 
candidate countries is predominantly facilitated through conditionality and is intended 
to engage state and non-state actors in policy processes and the development of new 
modes of governance. However, comparative and case study analyses of civil society 
demonstrate that EU intervention has failed to stimulate intended expectations on the 
practices of new modes of governance, because the countries of the Southern and 
Eastern enlargement have lacked necessary capacities for the effectiveness of new 
modes of governance (Börzel 2009). 
Studies have also analyzed whether the EU, through its accession process, 
empowered the civil society in different policy areas. Researchers argue that the EU’s 
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pre-accession instruments, policy rights and civil society funding provided additional 
resources for non-state actors (Börzel 2009; Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 
a,b; Grosse 2010). However, the extent to use resources is constrained by the 
capacities of non-state actors. In general, harmonization with acquis communautaire, 
conditionality, and the Copenhagen criteria created a more operative environment for 
the functioning of the civil society, promoted public inclusion and transparency. 
Furthermore, EU policies such as environmental (Börzel and Buzogány 
2010a,b) and regional (Gasior- Niemiec 2010) also provided policy rights and 
mechanisms of participation for civil society. Gasior-Niemeiec (2010) shows the role 
of social partners in the regional policies in Poland and concludes that civil society 
organizations could not use opportunities to participate in the committees due to weak 
capacities and legitimacy of such organizations. Similarly, in a comparative study in 
Hungary, Poland and Romania, Börzel and Buzogány find that the EU’s 
environmental policy provided the civil society opportunities to participate in policy 
making and develop cooperation with the state; yet, as the authors put it “double 
weakness of transition countries and a political culture hostile to public involvement 
seriously constrained the empowering of non-state actors by ‘Europeanization through 
accession’ ”(Börzel and Buzogány 2010b: 176). 
The EU’s pre-accession instruments- political, technical, and financial-, and 
Community programs supported civil society for building and developing their 
capacities. Capacity building and development via funding is one of the most 
important consequences of the EU’s intervention in the civil society (Hicks 2004; 
Carmin and Vandeveer 2004). For example, Carmin (2010) examines the relationship 
between capacity building and engagement in governance and finds that there are two 
clusters of organizations as a consequence of capacity building activities: 
professionalized advocacy NGOs engage in policymaking and grassroots 
organizations function at the local level. Therefore, funding has empowered the more 
developed NGOs and their participation in governance. 
The literature on CEE also shows that the EU has promoted participation in 
transnational networks and European umbrella organizations to develop capacities 
and trigger learning both at the domestic and EU levels. Forest (2006) and Parau 
(2009) argue that civil societies were empowered through transnational networks in 
the accession process. Kutter and Trappmann (2010) also show that civil society 
organizations use transnational networks to promote their “national profile”. 
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Overall, this strand of the literature finds that the Europeanization of civil 
society has been ambivalent. The EU has provided diverse opportunities to civil 
society organizations for empowerment; yet, Europeanization has mainly empowered 
actors with sufficient capacities. Scholars have also showed that weak governance 
capacities–both state and non-state actors–have limited the Europeanization 
outcomes. Therefore, studies demonstrate a lack of necessary preconditions for the 
effectiveness of new modes of governance. They point out the importance of domestic 
factors such as capacities and political culture. However, research on multilevel 
governance and various policy areas presents three main problems 
First, studies on new modes of governance mainly utilized a policy-oriented 
angle to understand how different European policy influences domestic NGOs in 
certain policy fields. In other words, the primary focus has been on the policies, and 
civil society is analyzed within these policy areas. The relation between policies and 
civil society is useful to understand how policy areas create opportunities for civil 
society organizations and shape their agendas. Nevertheless, the Europeanization of 
civil society is a much broader context, and assessment of civil society as a unit of 
analysis draws attention from policies to actors and the ways in which they are shaped 
by the diverse processes of Europeanization. Understanding the impact from multiple 
aspects is significant to extend the research agenda in Europeanization studies. The 
EU accession process and assistance to the civil society has provided an opportunity 
to investigate the interactions between state and non-state actors. Focusing on how the 
EU impacts those interactions at multiple levels has important implications for 
Europeanization studies. In this regard, extensive analysis of the EU influence across 
different segments of civil society has not been adequately examined in the literature. 
Second, most of the studies have overemphasized the role of capacities as 
explanatory factors in understanding the outcomes of Europeanization studies. It is 
important to ask what other domestic factors are significant for the analysis of 
Europeanization of civil society? As I will show, an investigation of the society’s 
historical legacies holds significant potential for understanding civil society 
development. Domestic factors that they highlight such as capacities and political 
culture can all be linked to historical legacies. Studies have not explicitly pointed out 
how historical legacies shaped current conditions of civil society and influence 
Europeanization outcomes in these countries. 
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Third, most of the analysis of Europeanization of civil society in CEE has 
focused on the role of civil society organizations within the specific policy area as 
well as comparative country studies in one-policy fields. However, as shown in this 
thesis, in-depth assessment of the EU impact through an embedded case study design 
and explanation of the impact of the EU has been absent in the literature. 
 
2.1.3. The Europeanization of Civil Society in Turkey 
 
 Another important area of research which provides information about the 
relationship between the EU and civil society are the contributions concerned with the 
EU influence on civil society development in the context of enlargement. These 
studies explore the relationship between the development and transformation of civil 
society in Turkey in relation to the European integration. 
 The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has expanded 
in recent years (Diez et al. 2005; İçduygu 2007; Grigoriadis 2009; Ergun 2010; 
Kaliber 2010; İçduygu 2011; Öner 2012; Ketola 2013; Zihnioğlu 2013; Rumelili and 
Boşnak 2015). Studies have focused on the analysis of different civil society actors 
(Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; İçduygu 2011; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), 
the impact of the EU on the development of civil society (Diez et al. 2005), the role of 
Turkish civil society and public opinion in the pre-accession process (Kubicek 2005; 
İçduygu 2011), the philosophical underpinning and rationale of the EU’s civil society 
policy (Ketola 2011; Zihnioğlu 2013), processes (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015) and 
conditions of the EU influence (İçduygu 2011). 
Since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, there has been a positive environment 
regarding the role of the EU on civil society in Turkish academia. Initially, scholars 
examined the development of civil society as an instrument of EU democratization 
(Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Kubicek 2005). For example, Keyman and İçduygu 
(2003:224) argue that the formal candidacy status of Turkey in 1999 has started to 
influence the civic sphere where “ …the process of European integration means the 
emergence of the democratic mode of regulation of the state-society relations in 
Turkey” and adoption of the EU acquis communitaire led to the transformation of 
current domestic politics. Accordingly in 2001, the Turkish government announced 
the National Program and followed a series of reforms to comply with EU legislation. 
In a similar vein, studies have underlined the importance of a legal framework to 
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create a conductive framework for the operation of a civil society (Özbudun and 
Yazıcı 2004; Bikmen 2005). These reforms- freedoms of association and peaceful 
assembly- created an enabling environment and induced changes in the operation of a 
civil society. Therefore, the influence of the EU on civil society has been examined 
relatively briefly as a part of the broader democratization process in Turkey 
Whilst Turkey represents distinct challenge for the EU, it is no longer 
challenged that the EU has exercised considerable influence over the development of 
Turkey’s civil society. Our understanding of how the EU’s financial assistance works, 
under what conditions it is more or less successful in stimulating change, the logic of 
EU’s civil society policy, and the role of civil society in integration process is now 
quite developed. The EU influence has been studied both through the normative 
context of EU enlargement (Kaliber 2012) and the impact of the financial assistance 
on civil society. 
 The studies on the Europeanization of civil society have defined civil society 
in three main ways. Some scholars have included a variety of organizations in their 
definitions. For example, İçduygu (2011) has defined civil society on the basis of 
legal status and focused on associations, foundations, public professional 
organizations and cooperatives in Turkey. Similarly, Zihnioğlu (2013) has identified 
diverse civil society organizations on the basis of their capacity, working area and 
ideological lines. Others have defined civil society as particular types of actors such 
as NGOs (Ketola 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), and issue areas (Rumelili 2005).  
Another group has based their analyses on interviews conducted with an unspecified 
set of organizations (Ergun 2010; Kuzmanovic 2010). Therefore, there are different 
understandings of civil society. 
 There are three main perspectives of Europeanization that prevail in the 
literature. First, Europeanization is defined as EU-driven processes (Göksel and 
Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; Öner 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). For example, 
Rumelili and Boşnak (2015:131) define Europeanization of civil society in Turkey as 
“processes that enhance the autonomy and independence of NGOs from the state and 
develop the NGOs’ institutional capacities and networks in a way that enables their 
effective contribution to policymaking in Turkey and in Europe”. This definition of 
Europeanization emphasizes the different processes. Second, Europeanization is 
perceived as a bottom-up process where civil society contributes to the 
Europeanization process. For instance, Kubicek (2005) shows how civil society has 
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played an instrumental role in advancing the political reform process in Turkey. 
Third, Europeanization is understood as a more interactive process where cooperation 
between domestic civil society, international partners, and the state are key 
constitutive elements that characterize the Europeanization of civil society (Ergun 
2010: 511). The first perspective of Europeanization that focuses on multiple 
processes and the third perspective that tries to understand the interactions that are 
taking place between the EU and civil society resonate most closely with the approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
 In analyzing the EU influence on civil society, scholars have shown that the 
EU has exercised considerable power over the civil society development in Turkey 
but they differ in outcomes of the EU impact. There is broad consensus that, through 
conditionality, the EU has imposed a change in the domestic legal framework 
governing the operation of civil society in Turkey (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 
2005; Ergun 2010; Öner 2010; İçduygu 2011; Ketola 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 
2015). The new law on Associations and Foundations has created a more conductive 
environment in Turkey. Studies have discussed EU financial assistance and 
consequences of assistance to civil society (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; 
Ergun 2010; Öner 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). In this context, the EU has 
shaped their agendas according to EU priorities, and diffused a “project culture”, 
professionalism and standardization in their activities. The EU has also legitimized 
the activities of civil society in Turkey (Diez, et al. 2005; Rumelili 2005; Kaliber 
2010; 2013). For example, Rumelili (2005) argues that civil society in Turkey 
contributed to the deepening of Greek-Turkish cooperation by using the EU as a 
symbol of legitimization. The EU has fostered networks both between Turkish NGOs 
and their counterparts in other European countries and between civil society 
organizations and policymakers in Turkey (Ergun 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). 
The networks formed between Turkish and European organizations have provided an 
opportunity to exchange experiences and knowledge (Ergun 2010) and project issues 
into the European agenda. The networks formed between NGOs and policymakers in 
Turkey, on the other hand, have strengthened the role of the former in policymaking 
and fostered cooperation and partnership between civil society and the state (Rumelili 
and Boşnak 2015). 
Thus, the existing debates on the EU impact on civil society development 
shows that civil society has been transformed in a variety of ways in Turkey. 
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Moreover, the literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey provides a 
comprehensive account of the main transformations of civil society that occur as a 
result of the EU pre-accession process. The major shortcoming of the current studies 
is that they tend to end up providing a general and one-sided account of the 
relationship between civil society and EU pre-accession process and neglects the role 
of domestic factors. This prevents us to fully capture a comprehensive account of the 
current developments and instead present a distorted understanding of the 
relationship. 
Furthermore, an in-depth examination of the EU impact through an analysis of 
different issue-areas and an explanation of the impact has also been absent in the 
literature. This thesis provides a much more comprehensive understanding of the EU 
impact on civil society development in Turkey through highlighting the simultaneous 
relationships and linkages between the domestic historical context and the process of 
integration. It also presents a substantial historical analysis of prominent civil society 
organizations- women, environmental and human rights-in Turkey. 
To conclude this section, the existing literature on the Europeanization of civil 
society both in the context of CEE and Turkey reveal that the EU’s impact is 
“transforming”, “strengthening” or “weakening” civil society. As discussed 
elsewhere, the literature has been characterized by multiple and sometimes an 
incompatible understanding of civil society, Europeanization processes, and its 
outcomes (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The comprehensive review of the literature 
demonstrates that although studies have adopted various perspectives and reached 
diverse conclusions, the impact of the EU has mainly been studied through top-down 
and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approaches to civil society have analyzed 
the ways in which EU pressure, mainly through civil society funding, changes the 
structure of civil society in line with European practices. It therefore concentrates on 
“uni-directional” changes and investigates the implementation of European civil 
society policy at the domestic level. The bottom-up approaches to civil society have 
examined how domestic civil society actors influence the EU. However, both 
approaches have failed to explain the role of domestic factors in understanding the 
relationship between the EU and civil society. The exclusive emphasis on top-down 
and bottom-up approaches undermines the explanatory power of domestic factors. 
More recently, a new and expanding body of research has moved beyond the 
top-down and bottom-up controversy and explains how domestic factors mattered for 
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Europeanization studies (Alpan and Diez 2014 and Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). 
This thesis has not focused on the EU impact as a one-way process. The 
Europeanization of civil society has been defined as an interactive process, where 
domestic civil society actors together with EU interactively mold Europeanization 
outcomes. In this context, it supports the contention that domestic factors play an 
important role in Europeanization processes. Yet, my findings emphasize that 
domestic factors are embedded in an historical context and should not be seen as 
separate from each other. Therefore, the following sections will highlight the 
importance of a legacy-based approach to Europeanization that is responsive to the 
historical context. By focusing on domestic factors and integrating the historical 
legacies into the analysis to explain the Europeanization of civil society, this thesis 
explores how legacies have shaped the outcomes of the EU impact. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Recently, the Europeanization of candidate countries has become a separate 
research agenda in the literature (Sedelmeier 2011: 5). Within this perspective, 
conditionality has been the principal focus and examined mainly in the context of 
Eastern enlargement. Extensive research, mostly deriving from second-generation 
Europeanization has demonstrated that the EU has considerable impact on the polity, 
politics, and policy dimensions of the candidate countries by focusing on the 
mechanisms and procedures of Europeanization (Grabbe 2001; Grabbe 2006; Kelley 
2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005). 
For the purpose of this study, I will examine the EU impact in the context of 
the theoretical perspectives that have been used to analyze the Europeanization of the 
candidate studies. This is significant in two ways. First, literature on candidate 
Europeanization predominantly developed in the context of Eastern enlargement and 
the CEECs. At the theoretical level, the conceptual framework will be used to analyze 
enlargement cases beyond the case of the CEECs. Since the impact of the EU varies 
in different contexts, focusing on the Turkish case could broaden our understanding in 
this research area. More importantly, conceptualization and operationalization of the 
domestic factors will broaden our understanding on why and how domestic factors 
matter for the EU impact. Second, Europeanization of Turkey is a new and emerging 
sub-field (Diez et al. 2005; Engert 2010; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Kubicek 2005; Öniş 
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2007; Tocci 2005). We know from the empirical literature on Europeanization in the 
member states that the impact of the EU is differential across countries and issue 
areas (Sedelmeier 2011: 6). Studies of domestic civil society in Turkey will shift our 
understanding from general Europeanization to more issue specific cases. 
Europeanization scholars have developed theoretical approaches within the 
context of the “new institutionalism”. The notion that “institutions matter” has 
characterized different variants of institutionalism (Bulmer 2008; Hall and Taylor 
1996). Theoretical approaches of the Europeanization of candidate countries are 
mainly deducted from two main variants- rationalist institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. These approaches provide important tools for highlighting different 
mediating factors for the EU’s domestic impact. In particular, conditionality (a 
strategy emphasized by rationalist institutionalist approaches) and socialization (a 
strategy highlighted by sociological institutionalist approaches) are the two key 
mechanisms of EU impact that are contrasted in the Europeanization literature (Börzel 
and Risse 2003; Cowles et al. 2001; Jacoby 2004; Keeley 2004; Kubicek 2003; 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Although these approaches are analytically 
different, most of the studies highlight that they are complementary and not mutually 
exclusive. 
The main objective of this thesis is not only to demonstrate whether the EU 
has an influence on civil society development but also how and under what conditions 
the EU performs such impact. The role of domestic factors and processes are 
significant in understanding the EU impact. In the following section, I will show how 
rationalist and constructivist institutionalist approaches provide different conditions 
and factors that determine the effectiveness of the EU impact. 
 




In general, this body of literature focuses on the use of conditionality to 
influence candidate countries. Conditionality is based on the rationalist bargaining 
model. It follows the “logic of consequentialism” in which actors engage in rational 
strategic action based on the costs and benefits analysis calculations. They choose the 
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action that maximizes their utility and minimizes their costs, thus, calculating the 
consequences of their actions. Here, a pattern of action is explained by reference to 
goal-seeking behavior. In this case, the EU sets the rules as conditions that candidate 
countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the EU. 
In the Europeanization of candidate countries literature, this is known as the 
external incentive model (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Conditionality is 
the principle mechanism in which the EU exerts influence on candidate countries and 
other countries on the basis of meeting specific criteria to gain access to the EU.  The 
literature shows that the effectiveness of conditionality depends on both international 
facilitating and domestic facilitating factors. At the international level, rationalist 
institutionalism focuses on the clarity of EU demands, the credibility of 
conditionality, the size of rewards and power asymmetry, the temporal proximity of 
rewards, linkages to Western Europe, and monitoring capacity (Börzel and Risse 
2000; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2011: 12-14). Rationalist 
institutionalism also highlights domestic facilitating factors at the domestic level that 
mediate the EU’s impact. Domestic facilitating factors include adoption costs, 
administrative capacities, societal mobilization and formal institutions (Börzel and 




Sociological institutionalism analyzes the processes of socialization and 
persuasion as a mechanism of the EU’s impact. As a point of departure, 
constructivists criticize the concept of homo-economicus and conceptualized humans 
as homo sociologicus, whose behavior follows logic of appropriateness. In this 
context, actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons. Actors do what is appropriate in a 
given situation based on a given social role. Appropriate behavior is driven by 
cognitive and normative modes of action that empower complex learning and 
socialization. 
March and Olsen (2006: 689) define the “logic of appropriateness” as follows: 
 
The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules 
of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed 
because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to 
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fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political 
community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. 
Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves 
in a specific type of situation. 
In the Europeanization of candidate countries literature, this perspective is 
known as the social learning model (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005).  Similar 
to rationalist institutionalism, this body of literature also specifies conditions for 
effective EU influence. At the international level, this strand of the literature focuses 
on the legitimacy of EU demands and the legitimacy of the process (Schimmelfenning 
and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-19; Sedelmeier 2011: 15-16). In Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier (2005) the social learning model legitimacy hypothesis suggests that the 
likelihood of rule adoption increases as the legitimacy of rules increases. Similarly, 
there are domestic facilitating factors that mediate the EU impact. In the literature, 
identification with the EU, positive normative resonance with domestic rules, and 
transnational (epistemic) networks are identified as the domestic facilitating factors 
(Epstein 2008; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 
2011: 12-14). 
The Europeanization of candidate countries literature is important for the 
current study. This literature not only emphasizes the importance of a domestic 
context but also shows how such context matters in relation to the candidate countries 
by revealing the domestic facilitating factors of Europeanization. Therefore, different 
theoretical approaches- whether they are rationalist institutionalism or sociological 
institutionalism- clearly indicate the importance of domestic factors and identify 
domestic facilitating factors that mediate the effectiveness of the EU’s impact. Most 
of the literature also highlights the significance of the interplay between international 
and domestic factors. My work is also situated in this broader literature and precisely 
emphasizes the importance of a domestic context. 
However, literature on the Europeanization of candidate countries has two 
shortcomings for the current study. First, studies do not adequately problematize 
domestic factors. Second, research on the Europeanization of candidate countries 
dominated by rationalist and sociological institutionalism and in most of the 
explanations, historical factors do not play an important role. The following analysis 
will position this literature to specify mechanisms of the EU impact. The pathways of 
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the EU impact derived from theories of rationalist and sociological institutionalism 
will provide a framework for the subsequent analysis in the empirical chapters. 
 
2.2.2. Pathways of the EU Influence 
 
 My purpose in this part is to explain how and under what conditions the EU 
exercises influence, and show variations in the EU influence. This purpose is pursued 
by two analytical steps. First, it is crucial to demonstrate how the EU influence 
occurs. To understand the EU influence, I construct a framework and analyze 
different types of impacts on civil society development and show the interplay 
between the EU and domestic-level factors. Secondly, I will show that there is 
variation in the EU impact by using this analytical classification. This classification is 
at the center of the puzzle and requires thinking about differentiation and why such 
differentiation occurs. 
 Europeanization literature establishes several mechanisms of EU influence 
that reflect two logics of domestic change. In most of the studies, conditionality and 
socialization are the two key mechanisms of EU influence (Kubicek 2003; Kelley 
2004; Schimelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). As Schimelfenning (2012: 9) puts it “all 
other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental 
logics- varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality 
and socialization”. Since these approaches identify different casual factors for 
institutional change, they are regarded as alternative but not necessarily exclusive 
models of EU influence. 
To explain the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I used a pathway model 
that has been employed to examine the EU impact on border conflicts (Diez et al. 
2006; 2008). In this study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Diez et al. 
conceptualize four pathways of EU impact by using the work of Barnett and Duvall 
(2005) on different categories of power in international politics. They differentiate 
pathways along two dimensions and construct a two-by-two table. On the one hand, 
they distinguish pathways according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete 
EU measures or an effect on integration process that are not directly influenced by EU 
actors” (Diez et al. 2006: 571). On the other hand, the EU impact can be on policies 
or social dimensions. The first pathway is a “compulsory impact”- direct impact, 
based on carrots and sticks policies. The second pathway is an “enabling impact” a 
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form of indirect impact when actors in conflict empower their positions by linking 
their agendas and positions to the EU. The third pathway, connective impact, is 
another form of direct impact and established through mainly financial and concrete 
measures establishing and supporting contact among conflict parties. The final 
pathway is the “constructive impact” that results in reconstruction of identities (Diez 
et al. 2006: 572-574). 
The model through the categories of pathways distinctly shows multiple but 
interconnected types of EU influence and allows me to capture the interplay between 
direct and indirect forms of EU involvement. I applied this model to civil society and 
used analytical categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways to 
explore the EU impact on civil society. However, I will not use the category of the 
constructive pathway for the analysis of the EU impact on civil society development. 
When applied to civil society, the constructive impact is the most powerful, but also a 
long-term transformation of civil society, which depends on a deep change in identity 
constructions, and (re-) construction of identities (Diez et al. 2006). Transformation 
of civil society in terms of constructions of identities is a long-term process and 
indicators of change take considerable time to become visible, thus problematic to 
trace. Nevertheless, it is an incremental structural change that occurs in civil society, 
but difficult to observe during the course of my research. I have also borrowed labels 
for different forms of impact from Diez et al. (2006; 2008) since it provides a good fit 
with the main research question that I am examining. The added value of the proposed 
model is twofold. First, interaction between different mechanisms of EU impact on 
civil society development is rarely explored in the literature. In the Europeanization of 
civil society literature, most of the analyses of the EU impact have focused on 
compulsory and enabling pathways. Nevertheless, it has become clear during my 
research that the connective pathway has a particular importance although  it has been 
overlooked by most of the literature. In addition to other pathways, the connective 
pathway of EU influence is innovative both in terms of understanding the interactions 
between actors and the differential impact of the EU across sectors of civil society. 
Second, the model shares considerable overlap in the conceptualization of EU impact 
with most of the literature in the Europeanization field that contrasts logic of actions- 
logic of consequentialism and logic of appropriateness. 
The compulsory pathway is based on a rationalist bargaining model. As 
emphasized by rationalist institutionalism, it follows a “logic of consequentialism” in 
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which actors engage in rational strategic action based on the costs and benefits 
analysis calculations and choose the action that maximizes their utility and minimizes 
their costs, thus, calculating the consequences of their actions. Here, a pattern of 
action is explained by reference to goal-seeking behavior. In this case, the EU sets the 
rules as conditions that civil society actors have to fulfill in order to receive rewards 
from the EU.
6
 In this context, Europeanization is perceived as an “emerging political 
opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, 
while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals” (Börzel and 
Risse 2003: 63). Accession conditionality is the principle mechanism in which the EU 
exerts influence on applicant countries on the basis of the implementation of the 
acquis in order to gain access to the EU’s opportunities (Schimmelfening and 
Sedelmeier 2005). From this perspective, the EU has provided a political opportunity 
structure to civil society actors through accession conditionality and changed legal 
environment and financial resources (Börzel and Buzogány 2010b: 161). On the one 
hand, in the enlargement process, accession conditionality and implementation of EU 
policies offered opportunities to civil society to strengthen their positions and 
participate in policy making. On the other hand, financial assistance programs 
provided access to additional resources for civil society actors. 
The enabling pathway emanates when specific civil society actors link their 
political agendas to the EU and justify and legitimize their actions and decisions with 
reference to the EU. The EU has functioned as a “legitimization device”, 
“legitimizing usage” (Jacquot and Woll 2003) and becomes a reference point in 
domestic political debates to justify policies, decisions and actions. For instance, 
Risse et al. (1999) have shown that human rights groups are often marginalized and 
treated as traitors. In such cases, civil society actors can use a normative EU 
framework to substantiate their positions and arguments. As Jacquot and Woll 
explain, in this way legitimization is used “to increase and renew the public 
acceptance of a policy decision at the national level” (2003: 7). In this framework, 
civil society actors justify their decisions through European symbolism and with 
reference to EU norms. For instance, Ian Manners (2002:242) argues that there are 
five main norms of the EU: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. 
Civil society actors can refer to these norms and promote them as legitimate behaviors 
                                                        
6
 The external incentive model is mainly promoted by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir (2005) and 
shows that the EU has the potential to empower non-state actors during the enlargement process. 
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at the domestic level, which in turn enable civil society actors to advance and 
legitimize their political agendas. Therefore, identification with Europe generates 
support and legitimization. However, the enabling pathway of the EU impact depends 
on the political commitment of the government to fulfill EU conditionality and the 
prominence of issues on the EU-Turkey agenda (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015: 139). 
The connective pathway promotes contact between civil society actors chiefly 
through common activities. It is expected that support and contact through the context 
of common projects may lead to “broader societal effect in the form of social 
networks” (Diez et al. 2008:28) across civil society actors in the long term. In the case 
of civil society, it is possible to observe connective impact at three levels both through 
the accession process and civil society programs. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, 
the EU’s civil society policy promotes interaction between actors through the 
partnership principle. First, the EU pre-accession process facilitates interaction 
between the state and civil society. In line its understanding, civil society is seen as 
partners rather than rivals in decision-making processes. The cooperation between the 
state and society is also pre-requisites in EU-funded projects. Second, both the EU 
process and EU programs support interaction between civil society actors. Strong 
civil society is seen as an essential component of the enlargement process. Third, the 
EU encourages transnational relations with the European counterparts to trigger 
learning in civil society. Participation in Euro-umbrella networks and partnership are 
two key instruments of the connective impact. 
Although these categories of the EU pathways have been adapted to civil 
society and provide a good fit, at the same time adaptation involves some problems. 
At the theoretical level, there are different analytical categories of the EU impact. Yet, 
at the empirical level, pathways and outcomes of the EU impact could lead to 
ambiguous outcomes. 
In the original framework, Barnett and Duvall have described compulsory 
power as “the direct control of one actor of the conditions and actions of another” 
(2005: 51). Therefore, compulsion exists through direct control, domination and 
force. In the case of civil society, there is no such force. The EU cannot directly force 
and control conditions and actions of civil society. For that reason, compulsory 
impact is never complete because civil society can reject EU conditions and actions. 
So, how does compulsion work in civil society? The compulsory impact has occurred 
through the acquis communautaire and the financial incentives. The compulsion takes 
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place in the accession process by pressuring the state to comply with EU legislation. 
The EU, in this way, has pointed out constitutional, legal reforms to comply with the 
Copenhagen criteria. Of course, this does not have a direct impact on civil society but 
by pressuring the Turkish state, the EU has indirectly shaped the functioning of civil 
society in Turkey. This has created an opportunity for these organizations, and 
enables them to follow and prioritize their agendas. Therefore, civil society actors 
were not forced directly by the EU, but the EU empowers and enables these actors by 
forcing the Turkish government. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will show how this is the case in 
different issue areas by focusing on concrete examples from the different fields. 
Another way that the EU performs compulsory impact is through funding. At 
the empirical level, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU impact 
is extremely complicated, and compulsory impact could lead to interrelated but 
different outcomes. In a way, funding itself is compulsory where it is established 
through concrete conditions. Nevertheless, the outcome of funding could belong to 
other categories of the EU impact- compulsory, enabling and connective. For 
example, one illustration of the compulsory impact is the calls for proposals in the EU 
projects. In these projects, the EU explicitly spells out conditions for funding for civil 
society actors. The EU prioritizes certain issue areas according to its policy fields. 
However, the provision of funding is only compulsory when the EU forces civil 
society actors to undertake projects according to its priority area rather than their 
original expertise. This is compulsion because civil society actors are forced to adapt 
their issue areas according to EU priorities, and there is a strategic move as a logic of 
behavior to get funding. In other cases, some civil society actors use the “window of 
opportunity” that the EU provides. In this case, their expertise or agenda fits perfectly 
with the EU priorities, and they just use this opportunity to promote their agendas and 
policies, demonstrating the enabling impact. Finally, the EU also provides civil 
society actors incentives to follow EU rules. For instance, in the EU projects the 
provision of funding involves a transnational incentive. Thus, the outcome of the 
funding is connective. 
Although rationalist and sociological institutionalism is central to comprehend 
the pathways of the EU impact and how the EU influences civil society, both 
approaches neglect the importance of history in understanding Europeanization 
outcomes. Disregarding history in the analysis presents problems. The rational choice 
orientation stresses the significance of political opportunities provided by the EU. EU 
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channels funds to civil society to build and develop the capacities of these 
organizations. As discussed in section 2.1.2. in detail, several studies show that 
despite the opportunities provided by the EU, civil society in CEE has lacked 
capacities; Europeanization has chiefly empowered organizations with sufficient 
capacities, including the governance capacities. Yet, if the EU does not take into 
account historical factors and traditions in a country, EU funds by itself do not 
necessarily empower civil society organizations. For example, transferring funds to 
Turkish civil society is an important resource for Turkish civil society, but has not 
created the intended objectives. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, traditionally 
receiving funding from international institutions and foreign countries has been seen 
as “interference into internal affairs” and “betrayal to one’s country”. For instance, 
Chapter 7 further shows that, for a long time, EU demands on human rights have not 
been seen from the human rights perspective and human rights organizations have 
been regarded as “traitors”. Therefore, the EU influence does not occur independent 
from the historical context. 
Sociological institutionalists emphasize the construction and diffusion of ideas 
and socialization brought by the EU processes. Learning is a key instrument of 
sociological institutionalism. Several EU programs have made cooperation between 
civil society actors a condition for civil society funding. Moreover, the EU has 
introduced various mechanisms in these programs to trigger learning between actors. 
One example is the cooperation between domestic civil societies and activities that 
support cooperation. However, if there is no tradition of cooperation between civil 
society actors, learning and socialization is limited. Civil society actors learn in light 
of their former experiences. In Chapter 4, I show that an inherited characteristic of 
Turkish civil society is lack of cooperation and division between civil society actors.  
Empirical Chapters-Chapters 5, 6, and 7- show that cooperation between civil society 
actors varies depending on the issue area. Civil society actors, which have a stronger 
tradition of cooperation, are more likely to cooperate. The following section will 
situate the historical dimension into the broader literature. 
 
2.2.3. Historical Legacies as Deep Conditions of the EU Impact 
 
One of the main analytical questions that inform the thesis is how to explain 
variation in the impact across different issue areas in the context of civil society. In 
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this context, explanations for variation in the EU’s impact offer insights into the 
conditions under which the EU can influence civil society development. The previous 
sections have shown that domestic conditions have not been adequately studied and 
operationalized in the studies of the Europeanization of civil society. This section 
introduces the concept of historical legacies as an important domestic factor of the 
EU’s influence. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show how historical legacies matter for 
understanding the EU impact. This will inform the empirical chapters of the research. 
In this section, I discuss how I perceive historical legacy, and the ways in 
which research can incorporate historical legacy in the Europeanization of civil 
society in Turkey. This is important in two ways. First the literature on 
Europeanization offers different explanations, but historical legacies have largely 
been neglected as explanatory factors in these studies. Explaining variations in civil 
society will turn my attention to historical legacies and their differential impact on 
civil society. Second, in the case of civil society, current domestic factors such as 
state capacities, capacities of social actors, institutional capacities, levels of societal 
mobilization and political tradition can all be linked to historical legacies. Therefore, 
historical legacy is an important domestic factor, which matters for civil society. In 
this context, I argue that Europeanization outcomes shaped by complex interaction 
between EU driven and domestic legacy factors. 
The literature provides two main ways to conceptualize historical legacy. The 
first camp conceptualizes historical legacies as path-dependent processes, while the 
second camp follows more an agency-oriented approach in the conceptualization of 
historical legacies. In the second understanding, selected aspects of the past are 
reconstructed to adapt to new circumstances (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 
430). In analyzing the EU’s impact on civil society in Turkey, I conceptualize 
historical legacies as path-dependent processes. In this particular context, legacies are 
path-dependent processes, therefore, “once set in motion by contingent choices or 
critical junctures particular patterns of institutional or cultural development will 
logically reproduce themselves beyond the control or intervention of individual 
actors” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010:430). Therefore, in this study, historical 
legacies are conceptualized as continuities of institutions and practices over time. 
Whether they are conceptualized as path-dependent or agency-oriented 
approaches, in broad terms, legacies can be defined as “the inherited aspects of the 
past relevant to the present” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 426). Evaluation 
 38 
of the continuity or change between the past and the present is the key characteristic 
of legacy-based explanations. The term historical legacy is defined in a variety of 
ways in different fields and regions
7
 and can act both as a facilitating and a 
constraining factor (Ekiert and Hanson 2003: 92). Historical endowments do not only 
constrain but also enable the current outcomes. For example, as I show in Chapter 5, 
while legacies have functioned as facilitating domestic factors in women’s civil 
society, Chapter 7 illustrates that historical legacies have played a constraining role in 
human rights civil society. 
As Wittenberg (2013:6) argues “there is no consensus on what counts as a 
legacy, what kinds of legacies there are, or how to study them”. How can one identify 
historical legacies in Turkish civil society? Wittenberg (2013) has laid out three 
conditions for a phenomenon to be considered as a legacy: (i) existence of a 
phenomenon minimum two time periods, divided by conventionally-defined 
demarcations; (ii) occurrence of the same phenomenon between the past and the 
present time; and (iii) transmission of the phenomenon from the past rather than 
solely replicated in the latter period. Even though Wittenberg centers a discussion on 
pre-communist, communist and post-communist legacies, his criteria on what counts 
as legacies is useful for identifying legacies in other contexts. 
By using these three criteria, Chapter 4 identifies “which past matters most” in 
the case of civil society in Turkey. I pointed out six key legacies that matter for the 
analysis of EU impact: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has 
been chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive environment 
characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of 
rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state 
tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, 
and the presence of diverse connections with external networks. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
extensively evaluate historical legacies in different sectors of civil society and their 
roles in the Europeanization of civil society. I argue that these legacies of the past still 
                                                        
7
 Historical legacies have been studied in various regions and fields. There has been expansive 
literature on communist legacies in the field of Comparative Politics. Some important pioneering works 
on legacies: Crawford and Lijphart (1997); Ekiert and Hanson (2003); Elster et al. (1998); Jowitt 
(1992); Kopstein (2003); Pop-Eleches (2007); Wittenberg (2006). Authoritarian legacies have also 
been examined in Western Europe, see Pinto (2010) and Latin America, see Hite and Cesarini (2004). 
Historical legacies have also been explored in international relations literature. A recent study has 
examined the legacies of empire, Halperin and Palan (2015). This is by no means an exhaustive list but 
gives an indication of the many studies taking place on historical legacies. 
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shape civil society, its relations with different actors and the influence of the EU. In 
other words, this is critical because historical legacies influence the Europeanization 
of civil society. 
Then, the key question is how are legacies used analytically in the studies of 
Europeanization? Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010) propose a framework of 
analysis to examine the role of legacies in Europeanization. This study is a turning 
point in historical legacies literature because it proposes three different ways in which 
legacies could be incorporated into the Europeanization processes as explanatory 
factors. The theoretical framework of Europeanization is mainly dominated by 
rationalist and sociological institutionalism. The analytical framework does not argue 
that these approaches should be completely abandoned by legacy-based explanatory 
models. Rather, legacy-based explanatory models are considered to complement and 
interact with these explanations. 
Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010) have offered three different ways to 
incorporate legacy-based explanations in Europeanization studies: (i) legacies as deep 
conditions; (ii) legacies as enduring conditions; and (iii) legacies as encompassing 
conditions. In the first model, legacies complement explanations of Europeanization 
and give them more historical emphasis as explanatory factors. Domestic conditions 
attain intermediate steps in the causal path from legacies to contemporary outcomes 
(Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 431). Historical legacy is not the main cause 
of the Europeanization outcomes; rather, historical endowments is a deep condition 
which shapes various contemporary factors. For instance, as I show in Chapter 7, 
cooperation between human rights organizations and the state largely depends on the 
state’s approach to civil society, and these approaches are to a great extent shaped by  
historical experiences. Civil society actors in general, and human rights NGOs in 
particular are perceived as a threat to the survival of the state and hence any activities 
that are seen in conflict with the state’s interests are not tolerated. From the late 1990s 
onwards, the EU has intended to develop cooperation between the state and society 
through its pre-accession context and financial assistance by providing opportunities. 
Yet, the EU influence on the relationship between the state and human rights 
organizations is limited, because state and society actors lack the tradition of 
cooperation and the state has treated these organizations as rivals rather than as 
partners. This example shows how the domestic conditions in the particular country 
are shaped by the past. Following Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010:432), in this 
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case “legacies may offer a historically deep explanation of the extent to which 
external incentive structures are effective in shaping domestic outcomes”. 
In the second model, legacies act as enduring conditions. This means that the 
importance and the effect of legacies change over time. This model highlights the 
importance of temporal dimension. Legacies may be important at some time in history 
but not that important at other times. Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010:434) give 
the following example to show how historical legacies matter as enduring conditions.  
Accession conditionality has been a very powerful short-term factor across CEECs. 
Before the candidacy period, countries adopted EU rules in different formats. In this 
period, legacies had a “discernible” influence whether the CEECs embraced or 
resisted external institutions and rules. Nevertheless, during the pre-accession period, 
EU conditionality was powerful and all countries accepted EU rules. After EU 
membership, the power of the EU conditionality has weakened and diverse effects of 
the EU membership have surfaced across the CEECs. As Cirtautas and 
Schimmelfenning (2010:434) argue “…we can assume that legacies will regain causal 
relevance after accession determining, for example, when and where backsliding, 
non-compliance or even over-compliance will occur”. 
 In the third model, legacies act as encompassing conditions. Here, both 
enlargement and its effects were shaped by deeper historical legacies (Cirtautas and 
Schimmelfenning 2010: 435). To give an example, the historical-psychological 
legacies transmitted from the World War II period molded both the EU’s engagement 
in CEECs and the conviction that their destiny lies in the EU (Cirtautas and 
Schimmelfenning 2010: 436). Therefore, in this case, both the EU’s commitment and 
the influence of the enlargement in CEE were shaped by the legacies of the past. 
I will take historical legacies as deep conditions and analyze civil society 
development in this way because conditions of civil society development in Turkey 
are shaped by the past and are rooted in national political trajectories. In turn, the 
degree of Europeanization depends on past political traditions in Turkey. As I 
emphasized above, historical legacies offer “a historically deep explanation”. This is 
not a claim that historical legacies are the main cause of the current development but 
give them a more historical focus. In my account of the analysis of civil society 
development, I include historical legacies in this way and argue that the EU impact on 
civil society development is shaped by legacies. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the 
legacy based explanatory model. 
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Figure 2.1: Legacies as deep conditions  
Legacy contemporary conditions Europeanization outcome 
(Cirtautas and Schmmelfenning 2010: 432) 
 
For the purposes of my analysis I have outlined these legacies as deep 
conditions where domestic conditions attain intermediate steps in the causal path from 
legacies to contemporary outcomes (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 431). 
Following this understanding, I identify mechanisms that link historical legacies and 
Europeanization outcomes. To put it more simply, I demonstrate “how exactly 
legacies might interact with EU enlargement” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 
2010:437). This requires first identifying relevant legacies and then, specifying the 
mechanisms of the EU impact that link them with outcomes. The process raises 
several challenges both at the theoretical and methodological levels. Incorporating 
legacies in Europeanization studies requires specifying causal mechanisms. Recently, 
in this field, studies have shown that historical legacies act mainly as deep conditions 
and complements explanations of Europeanization in various issue areas such as state 
promotion of foreign direct investment (Bandelji 2010), post-accession compliance in 
Bulgaria and Romania (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010) and political party discourse in 
Poland (Vermeersch 2010). 
We now know that there are different legacies that coexist with each other. 
Also, studies substantiate the expectation that there might be different historical 
legacies and these legacies may exert differentiated impacts. One thing should be 
strongly emphasized: although some studies prioritize particular types of legacies 
over others and debate the kinds of legacies that matter most (communist, pre-
communist or post-communist legacies), I will show that in case of civil society, 
findings are more issue-dependent and changes both according to the issue area and 
the mechanism. Therefore, there is no predominant legacy; rather, there is interaction 
with the EU and a mix of legacies in Turkey. Moreover, these legacies do not have a 
uniform effect on the mechanisms. In other words, historical legacies exert different 
effects on the mechanisms. I expect to see greater variations in specific mechanisms.  
In addition, historical legacies act both as facilitating and constraining factors for the 
effectiveness of the EU impact. Although legacies have negative connotations and 
most studies argue that they act as constraining factors, in some issue areas they also 
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function as facilitating factors. In her research, Bandlej (2010) analyzes how EU 
integration and legacies interact in foreign direct investment into CEE. She reveals 
that both “EU integration and legacies of the past shape both the structural and the 
ideational context of domestic decision-making elites in CEE, and may act not only as 
constraints but also as enabling conditions facilitating the global economic integration 
of the region” (Bandelj 2010: 481). In a similar vein, Ekiert (2003) examines patterns 
of political and economic transitions in post communist Eastern Europe, and finds that 
facilitating legacies such as the history of political conflicts and reforms, economic 
liberalization under the old regime, pragmatization of communist elites, stronger 
political/cultural opposition and strong ties to the West account for successful 
transformation. These studies show that in particular contexts historical legacies can 
also function as facilitating factors for transformation. 
The current context calls for an analysis of the interaction of mechanisms and 
historical legacies. Two key questions are addressed in the frame of civil society: 
How do historical legacies as deep conditions affect the different analytical categories 
of the EU impact in Turkey and how do these legacies function? Do they act as 
facilitating or/and constraining factors for Europeanization of civil society? The thesis 
contends that the interplay of mechanisms and historical legacies exhibit different 
patterns. Different types of legacies are evident in the different mechanisms of EU 
impact. In the case of compulsory and enabling impact, historical legacies seem to 
have less impact, and have uniform effect. The connective impact has different kinds 
of legacies for issue areas. These mixed legacies act as facilitating as well as 
constraining factors for the Europeanization of civil society. In the case of connective 
impact, historical legacies seem to have a stronger effect in accounting for 
differentiation in the sectors of civil society. 
 
2.3 Methodology of the research  
 
 In order to provide a comprehensive account of how EU influence has led to 
differential impact on civil society development, I will first demonstrate the 
mechanisms of the EU influence and differential impact of the EU on civil society 
development. Then, I will provide an explanation for the differential impact of the EU 
influence. My methodology will address the following issues: what are the main types 
of actors under investigation, why did I choose these actors, how did I choose these 
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actors, which data will form the empirical material for the research, how did I collect 
them, and how will I analyze them? 
 
2.3.1 Selection of NGOs- Why these NGOs?  
 
I have decided to undertake an “embedded case study”, involving several 
subunits rather than focusing on a “holistic case study” as a single unit of analysis to 
operationalize my framework at the empirical level (Yin 2003: 42-46). As subunits, I 
focus on three issue areas namely, women, environmental and human rights NGOs. 
There are two main reasons for the selection of these issue areas. On the one hand, in 
the Turkish context, women, environmental and human rights NGOs have been key 
actors in the space of civil society. They are significant both in terms of activities and 
their contributions to policymaking processes. In Turkey, women, environmental and 
human rights issues have expanded with a diverse array of activities and 
organizations. These actors increase public awareness in a variety of issues, provide 
services, and watch the state’s activities. At the same time, they become political 
entrepreneurs in policy fields. On the other hand, in the European context, civil 
society has been vital actors in three different policy fields. Gender mainstreaming, 
environmental governance and human rights draw particular attention role of civil 
society actors in the formulation and implementation of EU policies. Gender equality 
is an important aspect of the European Social Model in which the EU has adopted a 
positive approach to gender equality in all policies such as education, health, social 
services and employment (Spidla 2004: 18). More importantly, gender 
mainstreaming- integration of a gender perspective into all other policies- has been 
significant in the enlargement context as well. The EU has also promoted gender 
equality in the enlargement context through the prioritization of women’s issues in 
annual Progress Reports and the provision of financial assistance to support the 
empowerment of women. In environmental policy, both member and candidate 
countries are expected to put environmental acquis into practice and comply with and 
implement the EU legislation on environment. Both at the EU level and domestic 
level environmental organizations have been integral components of environmental 
governance. Finally, the promotion of human rights is an important foreign policy 
instrument of the EU and human rights conditionality is the most crucial aspect of the 
Copenhagen Criteria (Smith 2003: 97-120). The EU uses different mechanisms to 
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promote and protect human rights. In this respect, the relationship between the EU 
and human rights NGOs is worth analyzing to understand its implications. 
NGOs come in all shapes and forms within Turkey. I have established four 
main criteria to select NGOs for interviews. The NGOs in the three issue areas have 
been selected according to the following criteria:  
First, for the purpose of my research, I concentrate on NGOs that have had 
experience working with the EU. The relationship with the EU is defined in different 
ways. The most common way is to get funding from the EU. All of the organizations 
have conducted different EU projects. Another way of interaction is through exchange 
of information for EU Progress Reports. EU officials have visited civil society 
organizations to get information on specific issues. Lastly, civil society organizations 
may not be the main beneficiaries in the EU projects but they can participate in 
projects as partners. 
Second, I identified three cities that have most benefited from the EU funding: 
İstanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır. In addition to EU funding, these cities are 
significant in many ways. Most of the women’s and environmental organizations 
headquarters are located in İstanbul. Ankara as the capital city is home mainly for 
human rights organizations. Human rights organizations watch state policy in Ankara 
and work to influence decision makers. Diyarbakır is a Kurdish populated and the 
most important city in Southern Turkey. 
Third, NGOs are selected on the basis of their size and capacity. They are 
established advocacy NGOs that operate in center cities and have local and 
international levels of correspondence. It is important to stress that there are several 
challenges to empirically study civil society and NGOs as key actors within civil 
society in Turkey. There are multiple players in civil society ranging from 
movements, grassroots organizations, bar associations, business associations and 
informal networks. They are diverse in types and sizes, professional and less 
professional, large and small, and can wield various functions and influence. The civil 
society space is characterized by continuities as well as changes. 
 To understand these dynamics and transformations, most studies have focused 
on institutionalized civil society. This study also concentrates on national NGOs, 
because my objective is to trace their development and analyze the EU impact. 
However, focusing on institutionalized civil society does not capture all actors in civil 
society. In order to minimize this problem, I have selected NGOs that also conduct 
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other activities and have strong links with all types of civil society actors. All NGOs 
that I interviewed have been part of various social movements, platforms and have 
strong connections with local civil society. For example, most of the NGOs have local 
branches around Turkey. I particularly eliminated local NGOs for practical 
considerations- difficulty accessing these organizations, time and financial 
constraints. Furthermore, most of them do not have websites and published materials. 
Therefore, there is also a major problem in accessing data to conduct research. My 
empirical chapters start with a detailed review of major developments of civil society 
in issue areas, present inherited characteristics and identify sector specific legacies in 
civil society. These involve different types of actors in civil society. Yet, my analysis 
of the EU impact centers on NGOs. 
Fourth, NGOs are selected according to their areas of impact and visibility of 
these organizations in public debates. These organizations are influential actors in the 
domestic framework and issue areas. In all three categories, NGOs are diverse entities 
and the most important civil society actors in terms of size, area of impact, national 
coverage, funding, and access to internal and external networks. 
The distribution of NGOs according to issue areas is uneven (see Appendix 
A.2). This is because of my selection criteria. While there are more organizations 
according to my selection criteria in women’s civil society and human rights civil 
society, there are fewer environmental NGOs. This is also reflected in the empirical 
chapters. For instance, in the Chapter 5 both primary and secondary data are more 
extensive compared to the Chapter 6. 
 
2.3.2 Data Collection 
 
 My analysis started with an extensive literature review, which included books 
and articles on Turkish political history, political culture and Turkish civil society as 
well as Europeanization studies. The former aimed to provide an understanding of the 
main characteristics of Turkish civil society and identify core events in Turkish 
political history whereas the latter has allowed perceiving the rationale of EU’s civil 
society policy and constructing the mechanisms of the EU impact to pursue my 
fieldwork in Turkey. The objective of my fieldwork was to understand the functioning 
of civil society, interactions among actors, policy domains and structures, the 
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relationship with the EU and the reactions of NGOs to these processes, which are 
historically established at the national level. 
 To understand the structure and functioning of civil society under 
investigation, I read NGOs documents
8
 in each of these issue areas and explored their 
history, mission, organizational structure, supporters, partnerships, international 
relations/memberships, projects and other activities. This allowed me to understand 
NGOs organizational structures comprehensively and prepare for the interviews. 
Afterwards, I also used these documents for the triangulation of my interviews. 
I conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with NGOs representatives, 
EU and Turkish officials. Semi-structured interviewing has the utility to examine in-
depth experiences of the respondents, and understand certain contexts (Rathbun 2008: 
686). I conducted interviews because they provide comprehensive information about 
how individuals experience, perceive and explain the EU processes. I prepared a topic 
guide
9
 for interviews with NGOs. I structured the topic guide around four themes and 
questions followed accordingly: organizational structure, and my analytical categories 
of EU impact- compulsory, enabling, and connective impact. Connective impact is 
divided into three sub-categories: relations with the state, relations with other civil 
society organizations, and external relations. The topic guide started with more 
general questions on organizational structure and moved to particular questions. 
Interviews with NGOs were important to understand their opinions, 
institutional experiences and positions towards the EU processes. Interviews with EU 
officials from the Delegation of the EU to Turkey were critical for perceiving the 
EU’s approach to civil society, underlining logic and their experiences with Turkish 
civil society. Interviews with Turkish policymakers in relevant ministries were 
significant to understand official positions on the EU accession process and their 
attitudes towards NGOs during these processes. 
I conducted 53 in depth semi-structured qualitative interviews and used 
methods of purposive sampling and snowballing to select the interviewees (Rathbun 
2008: 696). Purposive sampling allowed me choose respondents according to their 
profiles. Snowballing refers to a method where interviewees recommend others for 
further interviews for establishing contacts. Intermediary organizations such as the 
                                                        
8
 NGOs documents were collected through websites and during the visits to their headquarters. These 
documents include reports, books, project documents, press releases and pamphlets. 
9
 Topic guide structuring around main themes of this research is included in the appendix A.1. 
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Civil Society Development Centre (STGM- Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi) in 
Ankara and Diyarbakır also helped me in contacting key respondents. 
Most of the interviews were recorded and complemented by extensive notes 
that were taken during the interviews. I extended my notes after each interview and 
transcript some parts to use for direct quotations. For confidentiality I made 
quotations by referring to the names of organizations but did not directly identify 
names of interviewees. Direct quotations were supplemented by other sources of data 
for triangulation. In other cases, conclusions drawn from more than one respondent 
aim to show that the issue was not specific to that organization. Mainly in Diyarbakır, 
I preferred not to use a voice recorder. During the time of my visit most organizations 
were under intense scrutiny and most representatives were arrested due to 
investigations into the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Topluluklar 
Birliği-KCK),10  the alleged urban wing of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya 
Karkaren Kurdistan), known by its Kurdish acronym as the PKK. In these cases I 
took extensive notes to allow respondents to explain as much as possible. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in Turkish. Where this is not possible, for example in the 
Delegation of the EU to Turkey, I conducted interviews in English. 
The EU documents such as Progress Reports, project fiches and policy 
documents retrieved from the EU’s official website provided extensive information 
on the understanding of the EU’s civil society policy, its instruments, and main actors 
(see Chapter 3). This is significant to show that the EU is shaped by a certain 
understanding of civil society. The EU documents on civil society policy are selected 
by a sample of the most important documents that identified from the secondary 
literature. Moreover, EU documents-Progress Reports and project fiches- are other 
data that helped me to triangulate interview data by providing multiple sources for the 
same data. For selection, I first used NGOs documents and interviews to identify the 




                                                        
10
 Anti-KCK operations refer to massive police operations against Kurdish opposition members that 
were initiated in 2009. The Turkish government justifies anti-KCK operations on the basis that the 
KCK is an umbrella organization that involves PKK and serves as its political wing. However, a study 
on the profiles of the defendants shows that the targets of the KCK operations are politicians and 
activists of Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP) affiliated supporters (İlkiz 
2012:45).   
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2.3.3 Data Analysis 
 
My empirical analysis starts with an examination of patterns of continuity and 
change in Turkish civil society and then evaluates how civil society has been 
influenced by processes of Europeanization. I used multiple methods such as 
periodization, long-term analysis, process-tracing and plausibility probe to 
operationalize the Europeanization analysis. 
 Given that my study focuses on the domestic level, I identified the key turning 
points in Turkish political history to assess the patterns of continuity and change in 
Turkish civil society. Periodization mainly used by historical institutionalist scholars 
has a major benefit for understanding how civil society evolves throughout the 
different periods of history. Although empirical chapters are divided into two main 
sections, starting from Tanzimat in the Ottoman period I have pointed out five critical 
periods in Turkish political history: (i) Ottoman Period (1839-1923), (ii) early 
Republican and multi-party period (1923-1980), (iii) Post-Republican period (1980-
1999), (iv) EU period (1999- 2005), and (v) Post-2005 EU period (2005-onwards). 
The first period in the study, between 1839-1923, starts with the Tanzimat 
period and analyzes civil society activity until the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic. Civil society is characterized as associational life. The second period in the 
study shows civil society activity from the foundation of the Republic to the multi-
party period and to the years of turbulence during the successive military coups. The 
third period demonstrates the influence of the military coups, and the revival of civil 
society coupled with external processes such as globalization and the EU processes. 
The fourth period is characterized as a EU candidacy period where a dynamic reform 
agenda is pursued and the EU becomes an important actor in civil society. The last 
period from 2005 onwards is a period of weakened EU impact. Identification of 
turning points in the history of civil society also allowed me to provide a road map for 
long-term analysis. Chapter 4 analyzes the historical context of civil society until the 
end of the Post-Republican period in order to show characteristics of the civil society 
before the EU interaction. Empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) individually 
analyze sector specific developments in civil society both before and after the EU 
interaction. 
Long-term analysis provided an understanding of the backgrounds of Turkish 
civil society as well as different issue areas during the course of history (Saurugger 
 49 
2005). Following on periodization, I used secondary literature to identify main 
characteristics of civil society and patterns of continuity and change. In section 2.2.3. 
on historical legacies, following Wittenberg (2013), I use three criteria to explore a 
phenomenon as a legacy: the existence of a phenomenon over at least two time 
periods, the occurrence of the same phenomenon between the past and the present 
time, and the transmission of the phenomenon from the past to the present. By 
following these criteria and examining civil society activity, I pinpoint and 
operationalize six key legacies that matter for the analysis of the EU impact: the lack 
of resources and dependency where civil society has been chronically underfunded in 
terms of resources, a restrictive environment characterized by the absence of 
autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an important 
symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an ideologically divided 
civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the presence of diverse 
connections with external networks. All of these legacies in civil society satisfied the 
previously described three criteria. For each empirical chapter 5, 6 and 7 I repeat a 
long-term analysis. 
One of the most challenging issues in Europeanization research is to 
demonstrate whether domestic developments would have occurred in the absence of 
the EU. Differentiating between independent and dependent variables becomes 
difficult when assessing the impact of EU processes on civil society actors. Multiple 
actors participate in and are influenced by the Europeanization processes. At the end, 
it becomes problematic to relate causes and outcomes. Cowles et al. (2001) highlight 
that process tracing and concentration on time sequences between EU policies and 
domestic changes allow researchers to distinguish between the impact of 
Europeanization and domestic politics. 
In order to study Europeanization of civil society, I use process tracing to 
understand the development of civil society before EU involvement and to observe 
domestic and European level developments. Therefore, with regard to the 
Europeanization of civil society actors, I start with an analysis of the relationships 
between civil society groups and other actors at the domestic level before the 1999 
period when Turkey was granted candidacy status for EU. This method allows me to 
gain considerable insights into the different sectors of civil society at the domestic 
level. During the course of this research, I repeated this approach for each sector of 
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civil society in my empirical chapters. Process tracing allowed me to observe changes 
at the national level and to distinguish between European and domestic variables. 
As the theoretical framework indicates, with regard to the Europeanization of 
civil society, there are different pathways of EU influence- compulsory, enabling and 
connective. Through careful process tracing, I observed the relationship between 
pathways and changes and I showed how a particular pathway was leading into 
particular outcomes and empirically examine the relationship by focusing on different 
subunits. 
I also developed a list of questions, which helped me for the operationalization 
of concrete EU pathways. I analyzed all interview materials and documents by using 
the following questions and categorize the EU influence accordingly: 
 Compulsory impact: what is the EU’s strategy in the issue areas in the 
enlargement policy? Which civil society actors does the EU promote in the 
enlargement policy? Does the EU create a political opportunity structure for 
civil society? What kinds of “incentives” does the EU employ in order to 
influence civil society? What kinds of “threats” does the EU employ in order 
to influence civil society? Are there differences between the EU model of civil 
society and Turkish civil society? How has the relationship between EU and 
Turkish civil society evolved over time? Is there any change in the structure of 
Turkish civil society after EU interaction? Are there any legal provisions that 
oblige candidate states to comply (civil society and acquis communautaire)? 
Have these legal commitments been mobilized in Turkish civil society? Is 
there observable evidence of EU pressure inflicted on Turkey to modify its 
civil society structure? How has Turkish civil society responded to these 
pressures? Have civil society organizations changed their structures and 
characteristics to take into account EU requirements? Is there any difference 
across issue areas? 
 Enabling Impact: to what extent and how are EU policies (the acquis 
communautaire or agreements between the EU and the civil society) used as a 
point of reference within the civil society realm in Turkey? Has the EU 
become a reference point in the domestic political debates? Are there 
discussions/events in which the EU is presented as an example to emulate? To 
what extent are EU norms of appropriate civil society invoked according to 
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legitimize/delegitimize specific civil society actions/ decisions? Has the use of 
the norms directed civil society towards a particular form of action? Are these 
norms cited by a wide variety of civil society actors or is their use restricted to 
specific types of actors? Is the impact of the EU similar or different across 
civil society sectors? 
 Connective Impact: How does the EU promote cooperation between actors? 
Why does the EU encourage cooperation between actors? Does the 
relationship between the state and civil society change after EU interaction? 
Does the relationship between civil society actors change after EU 
intervention? Does the connection between civil society actors and external 
networks change after EU intervention? Does the EU provide mechanisms to 
build a constructive relationship between actors? How do civil society actors 
react to these processes? Does the EU provide opportunities and networking 
across civil society actors? Have these actors been benefited or disadvantaged 
by these processes?  Learning? Is there any difference across issue areas? 
 
After the analytical categorization of material, I developed a set of indicators for 
assessment of the EU impact. Table 2.1 shows the indicator for each pathway. Each 
category of the EU pathway has a set of indicators. These indicators are in line with 
the analytical framework and associated questions and operationalized for the purpose 
of this research. 
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Table 2.1: Indicators of the EU impact on Civil Society 
 Compulsory Enabling  Connective 
Indicator Progress with the adoption and 
implementation of legal 
framework 
 Change in laws- civil 
society related 
 Change in specific 
policy areas 
 
EU incentives for the 
development of civil society 
 Number of incentives 
 Types of incentives: 
financial or/and other 
forms of incentives 
Linkages to the EU 
Positive references to EU 
policies  
 Enlargement 
 Social Policy 
 Environment  
 Human Rights 
 
Positive references to EU rules 
 
 acquis communautaire 
 
Positive references to EU norms 
 Peace  
 Liberty  
 Democracy 
 Rule of law 





 Mechanisms -Public 
institutions 
 Frequency of meetings 
 Access to information 
 Selection and diversity of 
civil society  
 Feedback from civil 
society  
 Degree to which 
feedback is considered 
(are there any initiatives 
about the issue?) 
 Input from civil society 
 Only participation into 
the meetings 
 No cooperation 
Cooperation among Civil 
Society 
 Establishment of 
platforms  
 Joint activities and 
projects  
 Membership in umbrella 
organizations  
 53 
 Only in contact 
 No cooperation  
External network 
 Partnership in projects 
 Membership in networks 
 Participation in networks  
 Transfer of experiences 
into domestic context 
(top-down) 
 Raising issues (bottom-
up) 
 Sustainability 
 No cooperation 
 
Europeanization Outcome Change in legislation 
Policy related capacity building 
Different types of 
Europeanization outcomes (see 
section 2.2.2. in pathways of the 
EU influence – overlap with 




Inclusion in decision-making 
Influence on policymaking 
Participation in external/internal 
networks 
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Finally, I invoke a plausibility probe to show whether legacies matter for both 
the development of civil society and in the explanation of the Europeanization 
outcomes. Plausibility probes are considered to be an intermediate step between 
hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing (Levy 2008). Illustrative case studies fall 
under this category, and rather than testing a theoretical proposition, the goal is to 
show the plausibility of the proposition by briefly exploring one relevant case 
(Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008). 
For this purpose, I identify a case for each empirical chapter to illustrate the 
relevance of the legacy argument. I probe my argument by selecting a different 
empirical case for each chapter (see Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The key reason for the 
selection was that Cyprus, Hungary and Czech Republic all represent cases that are 
different from Turkey, and critical to illustrate the legacy argument. If the theory does 
not fit closely in these cases, my argument could hardly be expected to be valid. 
My analytical framework suggests that the EU has a strong influence on civil 
society if there is strong cooperation and mobilization between civil society actors, 
collaboration with the state and effective use of the external networks. I present an in-
depth analysis of the importance of these factors for the differential impact of the EU 
on different segments of Turkish civil society. In addition, brief analyses of the 
experiences of civil society development in Cyprus, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
illustrate that my legacy argument extends beyond the Turkish case. This means that 
the impact of the EU on civil society in these countries was also mediated by the 
factors highlighted in my theoretical framework. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I developed an analytical framework to assess the impact of the 
EU on civil society. I started with a review of the academic debates on the EU and 
civil society both in the context of CEECs and Turkey. There are two major 
shortcomings of the studies on civil society. Firstly, comprehensive analysis of the 
EU influence across different segments of civil society and explanation of the 
differential impact of the EU has not been studied. Secondly, in the case of civil 
society, theories of Europeanization are dominated by top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. These approaches have not sufficiently paid attention to domestic factors, 
and particularly historical legacies as a domestic factor are absent in the explanations 
of the Europeanization of civil society. To understand the EU impact, I applied a 
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pathway model to civil society and used analytical categories of compulsory, enabling 
and connective pathways. Finally, I incorporate the concept of historical legacies into 
the explanation of the Europeanization of civil society. 
 The methodological section addressed these key questions with multiple 
methods. I study EU impact in three sectors of civil society (women, environment and 
human rights). In order to uncover the relationship between the civil society and the 
EU, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU and Turkish 
policymakers and civil society representatives. Along with the interviews, I 
operationalized Europeanization analysis by using periodization, long-term analysis, 
process tracing and a plausibility probe. The following chapter will perform these 





EU CIVIL SOCIETY POLICY 
 
 As we have seen in section 2.1.2. , the relationship between the EU and civil 
society has received considerable attention in the academic literature- the conception 
of civil society, its assessment, measurement and outcomes of the Europeanization of 
civil society. The focal point of the development of civil society is the promotion of 
democracy and partnership as a vehicle of Europeanization. As such, in this policy 
area, several processes took place at the same time that put civil society under 
Europeanizing pressures. Studies have hinted at two main approaches to civil society 
that lay at the center of the EU civil society policy. This chapter argues that the EU 
pursues a twin-track approach to civil society. First, the EU facilitates civil society as 
an agent of democracy promotion. Second, civil society has been regarded as a 
partner in European governance that is based on the partnership interpretation of civil 
society. To substantiate these claims, I scrutinize the broader framework of the EU 
policy towards civil society. 
In order to do this, the chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part of 
this chapter provides background of the development of EU’s civil society policy. The 
second part looks at the features of EU’s civil society policy in CEECs, and explains 
how EU exports its civil society model to these countries. The third part investigates 
EU policy in Turkey and examines motivations behind this policy. Overall, the 
chapter shows that the EU’s policy towards civil society reflects a specific kind of 
Europeanized civil society based on two approaches that are considered 
complementary to each other and EU conveys this model to other contexts. 
  
3.1. An Outline of the Development of EU Civil Society Policy 
 
 The following section chronologically outlines the milestones in the 
development of civil society policy and demonstrates how the discourse and the 
rationale behind the EU policy towards civil society have developed at the EU level. 
The analysis of policy documents shows how civil society has become a tool for 
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democracy and a partner in European governance. Although the analyses are based on 
the original policy documents, the range of the policy documents is selected from 
secondary literature and shows the nature of the EU approach in the realm of civil 
society (Ketola 2013: 38-43). The documents show the evolution of civil society 
policy at the European level. They mainly reflect the developments in the 1990s that 
start with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the debate on the democratic 
deficit. The policy documents illustrate that although there are diverse models of civil 
society within the EU, the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society 
development. 
 
3.1.1. Major Turning Points in the Development of Civil Society Policy at the EU 
Level  
 
 Although the early 1990s mark the main turning point for EU policy on civil 
society, the presence of interest groups at the EU level dates back to the foundation of 
the European Economic Community in 1957. The Treaty of Rome was established the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to represent national socio-
economic interest groups and involve them in building the European market. Initially, 
it was designed as a body with advisory powers, and its position “as an institutional 
expression of the organizations making up civil society” (Smismans 2003: 481) is a 
later identification of EESC at the European level. 
 The democratic transitions or “third wave of democratization” and eventual 
accession of Southern European countries and the independence of CEECs in the 
1980s underscored the importance of “stable democracies” (Zihnioğlu 2013: 30). 
Equally important was the establishment of the European Social Dialogue in 1985 at 
the initiative of Commission President Jacques Delors aimed to involve the social 
partners in the internal market process. These developments have paved the way to 
understanding how the civil society has become prevalent within the EU social policy 
field. 
 However, the recognition of civil society as a key actor in EU affairs, the 
increasing emphasis on civil society by the European institutions and the involvement 
of civil society organizations in policymaking have become notable in the 1990s 
(Armstrong 2002; Smismans 2003; Saurugger 2008; Smismans 2006). The Maastricht 
Treaty’s ratification process in 1992 led discussions on the democratic deficit within 
the EU and the role of civil society actors in EU integration. The Danish ‘No’ vote 
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and the limited support of the French on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
contributed to the awareness of integrating civil society in the European project 
(Zihnioğlu 2013: 29). Equally important, in 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were 
established during the Danish presidency and political, economic and human rights 
conditionality were introduced as a major aspect of European politics. Therefore, in 
the early 1990s, civil society was developed as a strategy to tackle the democratic 
deficit by the EU institutions. Starting from the early 1990s, the policy documents 
underlined the EU’s motivations behind the EU’s civil society policy. 
In An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special 
Interest Groups (1992), the Commission stressed the importance of developing 
relations and promoting dialogue with interest groups. The aim of the 1992 
communication from the Commission was to promote a dialogue, formalize relations, 
and initiate a debate about the role of interest groups in the development of the EU’s 
policies (Commission of the European Communities 1992: 1). Therefore, this report 
highlights the role of interest groups as actors in EU policymaking to enhance 
transparency and provide a more informed public debate in the Union’s activities. In 
this respect, the Commission differentiated between non-profit making organizations 
and profit making organizations and interest groups expected to provide services with 
technical information in EU policymaking (Commission of the European 
Communities 1992: 1). 
This early document on the role of interest groups makes two significant 
observations about the EU’s policy towards civil society. First, civil society is 
understood as a means of improving democratic deficit at the EU level. By pointing 
out the Maastricht Treaty that had been ratified at that time, the document stresses 
“transparency of the decision making process strengthens the democratic nature of the 
institutions and the public’s confidence in the administration” (Commission of the 
European Communities 1992: 8). Hence, civil society participation is justified on the 
basis of its contribution to democratization. Second, civil society is perceived as a 
partner at the EU level where the Commission emphasized the importance of interest 
groups as policy actors for effective policy outcomes. 
 Following this document, in 1997, the Communication from the Commission 
on Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in Europe built 
on the idea of democratic and transparent decision making and promote civil dialogue 
to foster solidarity and citizenship via voluntary organisations and foundations 
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(Commission of the European Communities 1997; Smismans 2003; Ketola 2013). As 
Ketola notes, while the previous communication coincided with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and reflected the broader debates at the EU level, this publication 
corresponded with the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 that detailed 
the principles of liberal democracy such as respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, rule of law and liberty (Ketola 2013: 40). The purpose of the document was 
to demonstrate the importance of civil society both at the EU and national levels, to 
show challenges that they faced and to initiate a dialogue and to enhance their 
contribution to European integration (Commission of the European Communities 
1997: 1). 
 As the Communication highlighted for the first time, there was a strong 
emphasis on the political importance of these organizations- (i) citizenship, and (ii) 
democracy promotion: 
 
For many people, membership of, or volunteering for, voluntary organizations and 
foundations, provides a vital means through which they can express their sense of 
citizenship, and demonstrate an active concern for their fellows and for society at 
large. 
 
Voluntary organizations and foundations foster a sense of solidarity and of 
citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy. …Their 
contribution to the effectiveness with which representative democracy functions 
should not, however, be underestimated…they now play an essential part as 
intermediaries in exchange of information and opinion between governments and 
citizens, providing citizens with the means with which they may critically examine 
government actions or proposals, and public authorities in their turn with expert 
advice, guidance on popular views, and essential feedback on the effects of their 
policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 5-6). 
 
Besides the contribution to citizenship and democracy promotion, the 
document emphasizes the increasingly important role of these organizations as 
partners. Unlike the previous document, the partnership interpretation of civil society 
is not only articulated at the EU level, but also at the member state level. Therefore, 
the role of civil society has been valued in promoting democracy and citizenship and 
developing partnerships both at the member state and EU levels. The document 
highlights the significance of the partnership between public authorities and the civil 
society sector by integrating voluntary organizations in planning services and policy 
making at all levels (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 11). 
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From 1998 onwards, the EU policy on civil society has acquired a new 
dimension with start of the accession negotiations with CEECs. Section 3.2. 
demonstrates in detail the relationship between the enlargement and civil society 
within the context of the Central and Eastern European expansion. However, at the 
same time, the Commission’s discussion paper in 2000 and white paper in 2001 
clearly shows how civil society support has become a key component of the accession 
process for CEECs (Ketola 2013: 41). 
Another document, entitled The Commission and Non-governmental 
Organizations: Building a Stronger Partnership published in 2000, recognizes 
“fostering participatory democracy”, “representing views of specific groups of 
citizens to the European institutions”, “contributing to policymaking”, “contributing 
to project management”, and “contributing to European integration” as motivations 
for cooperating with NGOs (Commission of the European Communities 2000; Ketola 
2013:41-42). The document intended to improve and strengthen the relationship 
between the European Commission and the NGOs (Commission of the European 
Communities 2000: 2). Furthermore, dialogue and consultation between the European 
Commission and NGOs has articulated a key part of democratic decision-making and 
the process of policy shaping. 
The document shows how the EU promotes a twin-track approach to civil 
society. On the one hand, NGOs as an important component of civil society is a tool 
to foster participatory democracy both within and beyond the EU. It recognized that 
“belonging to an association provides an opportunity for citizens to participate 
actively” into a democratic system of government (Commission of the European 
Communities 2000: 4). On the other hand, NGOs are seen as “vital partners” for the 
Commission both within the EU and beyond and contribute to policymaking and 
deepen European integration. Accordingly, the development of partnerships between 
the European Commission and NGOs has extended to policy dialogue, policy 
delivery, projects and program management (Commission of the European 
Communities 2000:5). 
 In 2001, the Commission published the White Paper on European 
Governance, which is regarded as the key document in terms of structuring 
relationship with the civil society (Finke 2007; Greenwood 2007; Ketola 2013; 
Zihnioğlu 2013). The document is concerned with the lack of confidence and the 
growing gap between the EU institutions and citizens. As a response to these 
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problems, the Commission promotes the idea of “good governance” consisting of 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence as key 
components of its strategy (Commission of the European Communities 2001a). The 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance proposes involvement of civil 
society actors in the policymaking process as a way to connect the EU with its 
citizens. In this regard, civil society is attributed a fundamental role. 
 The document shows how the EU follows its dual approach to civil society.  
First, civil society provides the basis for the establishment of democracy at the EU 
level by mobilizing people and supports disadvantaged people (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001a: 14). Second, civil society as a partner in European 
governance shapes EU policies and contributes to policymaking. 
 
3.1.2. The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy 
 
The analysis of the policy documents in section 3.1.1 demonstrates that the 
EU’s policy towards civil society has two facets that are considered complementary to 
each other (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015:129). The first facet of the EU policy regards 
civil society as an agent of democratization and good governance where EU’s civil 
society promotion strategy is justified on the basis of its contribution to 
democratization (Ketola 2011; 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). According to 
Ketola, “The approach suggests that EU policy purports a liberal democratic logic, 
where civil society functions as a bulwark against the excesses of the state and as the 
means to enable individuals to exercise their democratic voice outside elections” 
(Ketola 2011: 792). 
The second facet of the EU’s civil society policy reflects the partnership 
interpretation of civil society and the development of new modes of governance 
(Fagan 2005; Börzel 2009; Fagan 2010; 2011). This partnership interpretation of civil 
society emphasizes the important role of civil society assisting in the development of 
public policy and the enactment of regulation (Fagan 2005:531). The EU supports 
civil society through partnership with the state and other actors to transform their 
strategies and involve them as key actors in European governance. In this regard, the 
EU regards civil society as a fundamental component of policymaking. In addition to 
promoting democracy, promoting dialogue plays a key role in the EU’s approach to 
civil society (Ketola 2013). In this respect, civil society organizations are valued for 
their capacity to lobby and work with governments as well as to implement and watch 
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the EU policies. 
Although the EU’s approach to civil society reflects a certain understanding of 
Europeanized civil society, civil society across European countries is characterized by 
diverse traditions. Several studies show that understandings of civil society (i.e. the 
role and importance of associations), types of civic participation, and relationships to 
the state are very different and have developed very different traditions of civil 
society across the European countries (Putnam 2002, Wallace et al. 2012, Boje 2010; 
Rumelili and Boşnak 2015:129). For example, Sweden is characterized by a strong 
state and a strong civil society; the trade unions have been important actors in the 
administration of the state where state and civil society collaborated closely with each 
other, and Sweden scores high in all forms of social capital, both in formal associative 
behaviour and informal social relations (Trägårdh 2007; Pichler and Wallace 2007). 
In the Southern and Central European countries participation in civil society 
organizations are rare (Howard 2008;Boje 2010; Howard 2011). In these countries, 
more informal forms of participation have dominated. In post-communist Europe, the 
legacy of communist institutional systems, mistrust of organizations, the existence of 
friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment led to low levels of 
membership and participation in voluntary organizations (Howard 2008; Howard 
2011). Pichler and Wallace (2007) showed that informal forms of civic participation 
have been significant in these countries and have led to different relationships 
between the state and society. Churches, in particular the Polish Catholic Church, 
have played significant roles as a civil society actors by hosting various informal 
groups in Central European countries (Buchowski 1996; Celichowski 2004). In 
Central European countries, civic attitudes developed through participation in these 
types of informal networks and civil society developed as an oppositional force 
against the state through the Catholic Church (Wallace et al. 2012: 4). The model of 
and participation in civil society has a different tradition in CEE, where it has defined 
itself in opposition to the state. In Nordic countries, and Western Europe, however, 







3.2. The EU Civil Society Policy in the EU’s Enlargement to CEE 
 
The experience in CEE suggested that enlargement locates the EU in a 
position to shape large part of applicant states’ domestic structures and various 
policies. In this context, for the first time, the EU explicitly promoted civil society in 
its enlargement strategy. As previous EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn 
stated, from big ban enlargement onwards, civil society took place at the heart of the 
EU’s enlargement agenda. Rehn (2008:3) defines the role of civil society and its 
importance in the enlargement process as follows: 
You (civil society) are the bridge between the EU institutions, national authorities and 
citizens...raise awareness of the successes and challenges of EU 
enlargement...strengthen confidence between citizens in the EU and the aspirant 
members. …support the reforms... civil society organizations have spread the 
European sprit by promoting the basic values of democracy, human rights, good 
governance and the rule of law. 
  
For these reasons, civil society has become an increasingly important actor in 
the EU’s enlargement policy. The involvement of the civil society in the process of 
European integration advanced on the grounds of promoting democracy. The analysis 
of policy documents show how the EU has employed a twin-track approach to civil 
society through projects in civil society programs both in CEE and Turkey within the 
context of enlargement. 
In 1993, the European Council set out the Copenhagen criteria, making 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities and a 
functioning market economy central objectives of the EU enlargement policy. The EU 
has based its approach on the assumption that vocal civil society is key for 
democracy. In this context, democracy assistance under political criteria supports the 
development of civil society not only as a part of the democratization process but also 
the Europeanization process. This suggests that civil society has to democratize, 
therefore Europeanize, as a condition of EU membership. 
Financial assistance has been at the heart of the EU’s civil society 
development policy towards CEE. Now, the EU follows the same pattern in the 
current enlargement policy for candidate countries, in various policy areas for 
member countries, and in the European Neighborhood Policy. The EU’s assistance to 
CEE and direct funding to civil society showed how financial assistance to civil 
society has become an important instrument in the accession process. The EU has 




 and non-PHARE programs. This is the most 
straightforward way for external actors to support the development of civil society; 
however, as discussed extensively in Chapter 2 the appropriateness of this approach 
and effectiveness of external funding has been questioned both by academics and 
policy makers. 
The following section shows the way in which EU promotes civil society in its 
enlargement policy, and the EU’s approach to civil society development through the 
examination of the civil society programs in CEE. The policy documents illustrate 
that the EU’s twin-track approach, which originates from the EU level has been 
transferred to the enlargement context. Section 3.2.1. demonstrates how the EU 
operationalizes its approach through its policy documents in CEE. 
 
3.2.1. EU Support for Civil Society Development in CEE 
 
The development of civil society in CEE is understood as a part of the 
democratization process. In order to help the candidate countries to meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the EU works closely with civil society organizations 
and assists civil society. 
The main mechanism to support civil society was through the PHARE 
program. There were two types of civil society development programs: multi-country 
programs that were managed from Brussels and made aid available to similar NGOs 
and their counterparts in the EU and national programs that were run locally by 
foundations, and governmental bodies (Local and Regional Development Planning 
1998: 31). 
 
Three Programs that Support Civil Society 
The first program, called The Democracy Program, was established in 1992 to 
support civil society activities that strengthen pluralist democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights in CEECs (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998:31; Raik 
2003: 206). The program supported parliamentary practice and organizations, 
transparency in public bodies and management, development of NGO representative 
structures, civic education, human rights and minority rights (Local and Regional 
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 The PHARE program is the EU’s main financial instrument to assist the CEECs in their transition 
from centralized systems to a decentralized economic system and democratic society. The program was 
started in 1989 first for Poland and Hungary and then extended to all applicant countries in the region. 
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Development Planning 1998: 31). This program was run by the Human Rights and 
Democratization Unit and worked closely with Link Inter-European NGOs (LIEN). 
The program regarded civil society as an important component of democratization 
and supported democracy related activities. Yet, the support for democracy has 
constituted about one per cent, a small amount of the total PHARE assistance (Local 
and Regional Development Planning 1998: 31; Smith 2001: 49; Wedel 2001: 87). 
The second program, entitled “The PHARE Partnership Program” was 
initiated in 1993 and focused on socio-economic development and cooperation among 
the private sector, local governments and NGOs and supported the reform process in 
the region (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 6). The EU has 
encouraged partnership both with state institutions and their counterparts in the EU 
countries. In this program, the EU has supported various types of NGOs
12
 as well as 
small number of organizations such as universities, institutes, private organizations 
and public bodies (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 6). In later 
stages, with the experience of the implementation and transition process, there was 
strong emphasis on “local and regional development”, “the promotion of civil 
society” and “increased access for civil society” rather than economic development 
(Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 32). 
The third program, labeled “The LIEN” was established in 1994 and was 
designed to promote integration of disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, 
women, handicapped, elderly, and homeless people in the population (Commission of 
the European Communities 1999b: 42). In particular, the aim of LIEN was to support 
NGOs to work on behalf of the marginalized groups, to improve permanent support 
and to encourage their inclusion into the society (Commission of the European 
Communities 1999b: 42). The main fields of activity were chosen according to EU 
expertise. The EU’s expertise is very strong in these areas. As I will illustrate in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, focusing on EU’s expertise has implications on the EU’s 
compulsory impact on civil society development in applicant countries. The fields of 
activity for EU assistance have been based principally on the EU’s priorities such as 
sections of the acquis as well as the Copenhagen criteria rather than their original 
expertise in the candidate countries. This sometimes led the countries to shift their 
original focus to obtain the EU funding. 
                                                        
12
 The program includes trade associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, environmental 
organizations, educational and training organisations. 
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In 1999, the Partnership programs and the LIEN were merged into a new 
program titled “ACCESS”. ACCESS was an institution-building program to 
strengthen civil society in the candidate countries and prepare them for EU 
membership. Therefore, EU assistance became more specially focused on pre-
accession strategy- the EU membership process. As a consequence, primarily civic 
activities that were related to adoption and implementation of the acquis in the area of 
consumer and environmental protection, and social and health issues have been given 
priority. The second priority was to promote social integration of the marginalized 
groups. This does not only show how program towards civil society have been shaped 
by the EU priorities but also reflects the way in which the EU sets the agenda of the 
civil society organizations in the candidate countries. 
 
3.2.2. The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy in the Context of the CEE 
Enlargement 
 
As the presentation of the main civil society development programs shows, 
there was an active EU approach to civil society in the context of the CEE 
enlargement. The previous enlargements before CEE did not call for an active EU 
policy approach to civil society. This is both related with EU’s internal developments; 
i.e., the discussions on democratic deficit and the potential of civil society to remedy 
this deficit and the prominent role of civil society in the accession process; i.e., the 
EU uses civil society as an agent to Europeanize candidate countries by promoting its 
values and principles. The EU has done so in pursuing principles of democracy, 
human rights, particularly promotion of minority rights and dialogue between 
stakeholders. These principles are evident in various programs, implemented in 
projects and reflect the rationale of the EU’s policy on civil society. 
The civil society policy in the CEE context was explicitly based on 
development of civil society to promote democracy and allow countries to become 
active partners in the EU policymaking processes. On the one hand, it is assumed that 
a vibrant civil society perpetuates the EU’s principles and values and provides a 
linkage between the EU and candidate countries. In this respect, civil society 
organizations are valued for strengthening mutual understanding. For example, as 
shown in section 3.2.1. , the PHARE Democracy program and ACCESS relied on this 
understanding.  On the other hand, civil society is articulated as a partner in European 
governance. The EU promotes partnership with the state and other actors to involve 
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them in political processes. Therefore, civil society as a partner of the state is included 
in policy making, cooperating with the state and implementing and observing EU 
policies. For instance, the EU has promoted the partnership model through the 
ACCESS program. This conception of civil society envisages a model of participative 
civil society in decision-making processes. 
Equally important is the increasing focus on the promotion of dialogue in EU 
civil society policy. Both in multi-country program and national program, there was 
an emphasis on communication and networking between civil society organizations 
for an effective civil dialogue. As part of this dialogue, the principle of partnership is 
promoted between the EU and candidate countries in civic activities. For example, the 
PHARE partnership program is intended to promote dialogue. 
As this section illustrates, civil society is expected to contribute to 
democratization in candidate countries. That is, civil society acquires a role and acts 
as a connecting point between the EU and candidate countries. Moreover, civil 
society is expected to engage and influence decision-making processes as a partner in 
European governance. Despite the differences in instruments, there are considerable 
similarities in the EU’s rationale for civil society engagement across the EU level and 
the enlargement context. 
Although the EU is motivated by a certain logic, the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the EU’s enlargement strategy have restrained the potential of the 
EU’s policy towards civil society. Several studies note that CEE enlargement was 
characterized by a tough approach including annual monitoring processes of 
development, the implementation of larger acquis and stronger political, economic, 
legal and human rights conditionality (Smith 1999; Pridham 2005). However, fast 
adaptation of the EU legislation came at the expense of the marginalization of society. 
 
3.3 EU Civil Society Policy in the Turkish context  
 
Similar to CEECs, financial assistance has become the main instrument of the 
EU to foster civil society in Turkey. The EU has targeted Turkish civil society 
through various financial instruments such as the pre-accession funds and the 
Community programs. For example, several programs have focused on the 
development of civil society and capacity building and enhancement of freedom of 
association and freedom of assembly in candidate countries (Zihnioğlu 2013: 49). 
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The EU’s interest in supporting civil society is legitimized on the grounds of 
its contribution to democracy and its role in developing the dialogue between Turkey 
and the EU as a way to prepare Turkey for EU membership (Interview Delegation of 
the EU to Turkey, Sector Manager 1, 2011). In its Recommendation of the European 
Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (2004), the European 
Commission has displayed a three-pillar strategy to frame the role of civil society. 
Within this strategy, civil society has two main functions. First, civil society has a key 
role in reinforcing and supporting the reform process with Turkey under the 
fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria (Commission of the European Communities 
2004b: 8). Second, civil society has a role in strengthening political and cultural 
dialogue between member states and Turkey by bringing people together 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 8). 
This section reviews civil society activity and demonstrates the rationale 
behind EU civil society policy that is expressed in the recommendation. The analysis 
of EU policy documents shows that there are overlaps across the EU’s internal policy, 
the CEECs and Turkey. Section 3.3.1. shows the operationalization of the EU 
approach by analyzing civil society programs in Turkey. 
 
3.3.1. EU Support for Civil Society Development in Turkey 
 
The first program for civil society development was initiated in 1996 under 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In line with the measures d’accompagnement -
accompanying measures- (MEDA) Framework Agreement, Turkey received EU 
funding under the MEDA program between 1996-2001 and civil society organizations 
were among the main beneficiaries. This program provided financial assistance to ad-
hoc applications from individual civil society actors. EU assistance more specifically 
focused on individual NGO projects such as women and youth empowerment, 
consumer protection and cultural integration (Özdemir 2007: 10). Similar to the 
Central and East European experience, these civil society actors comprised a different 
range of actors and the EU mainly promotes issues in which it has enormous 
expertise. As empirical chapters will highlight in detail, different sectors of civil 
society benefitted from these programs. 
The second program for civil society development was launched in 2002 and 
continued until 2005. Following the Helsinki European Council of 1999, Turkey 
granted a candidate country status for EU membership and started to benefit from the 
 69 
pre-accession financial assistance. Although pre-accession financial assistance was 
not designed precisely for civil society, Turkish civil society was among the recipients 
of this program. With the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy, the EU put a greater 
emphasis on the acquis communautaire and intended to integrate civil society actors 
with projects that have relevance for the compliance of the acquis. Eighty- four 
projects were implemented to complement the harmonization process within the 
scope of 2002, 2003 and 2004 programs (Zihnioğlu 2013: 44). The EU civil society 
policy strives to trigger reforms to create an enabling environment for civic activity in 
Turkey. As indicated in various EU documents, the objective of these reforms is to 
develop a strong civil society. 
For this purpose, civil society development programs are primarily intended to 
support the capacity building of Turkish civil society. For example, under this 
program, the STGM was established in 2002 with a budget of €3.4 million. Following 
the success of the program, it was transformed to the Association of Civil Society 
Development Centre, a permanent structure that strengthens the organizational 
capacity of Turkish civil society and ensures development of civil society around 
Turkey (Özdemir 2007:10; Interview STGM Ankara 2011; Zihnioğlu 2013: 44). The 
STGM has become a prominent actor in Turkey, and provides a variety of programs 
to develop Turkish civil society through advocacy, campaign, research, training and 
lobbying activities. 
More importantly, civil society development programs not only aim to 
enhance the capacity of civil society but also foster democratic development. Civil 
society programs aspired to promote the EU values and principles by making direct 
reference to democracy, dialogue and partnership. Civil society development 
programs such as Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process, 
Improving Cooperation between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening 
the NGOs’ Democratic Participation Level (SKIP) and Strengthening Freedom of 
Association for Further Development of Civil Society illustrate the dual objective of 
facilitating partnerships and promoting democracy in Turkey. 
The program for Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process was 
launched in 2006 with a budget of €3.4 million to “contribute to the consolidation and 
broadening of political reforms and EU alignment efforts through strengthening civil 
society in Turkey in the pre-accession process” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005: 1). The project supported various civic initiatives such as the 
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promotion and protection of culture, women rights, social inclusion of disadvantaged 
people, protection of consumers, strengthening the protection of children’s rights, the 
environment, and combatting violence against women (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005; Özdemir 2007: 10; Ketola 2013: 50-51; Zihnioğlu 2013:45). The 
project document was justified on the basis of its contribution to ongoing reforms, and 
support of the processes of democratization by involving civil society into the pre-
accession process. 
Complementary with these programs, the EU has offered a new focus for civil 
society to facilitate cooperation between civil society and the public sector. For 
instance, the project entitled Improving Cooperation Between the NGOs and the 
Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs’ Democratic Participation Level was 
launched in 2005 with the objective to improve cooperation between civil society and 
the public sector as well as to enhance democratic participation within the framework 
of the EU alignment process (Özdemir 2007: 10; Ketola 2013: 50-51; Zihnioğlu 
2013:45). These aims were achieved through an implementation of an action plan on 
the public sector and civil society cooperation. The project priorities were aligned 
with the objectives of the accession process (Communities of the European 
Commission 2003:1-2; Ketola 2013: 49) and legitimized on the basis of democratic 
development and preparation to the accession process: 
 
A well-developed and functioning civil society is an essential element of a democratic 
system and efficient NGOs have key roles to play in expressing the demands of 
citizens by encouraging their active participation as well as raising their awareness. 
Furthermore, many elements of the acquis communautaire are based on the existence 
of operational NGOs operating within the related policy area. Therefore, it is 
necessary to promote a working “Civil Society- Public Sector” relation within the 
context of the pre-accession efforts undertaken.  
                                                    (Communities of the European Commission 2003: 2). 
                  
Likewise, Strengthening Freedom of Association for Further Development of 
Civil Society Program aims to “enhance participatory democracy through 
strengthened NGOs” (Communities of the European Commission 2004a: 1). The 
program is composed of three main components: building capacity for civil society; 
raising awareness for civil society and the public and providing support to build 
cooperation between Turkish civil society and their counterparts in the EU 
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(Communities of the European Commission 2004a: 4-5; Ketola 2013: 50). Similar to 
the previous initiatives, the project is justified as important to comply with the first 
pillar of the Copenhagen criteria. 
 Various civil society development programs emphasized the importance of 
reinforcing civil society through various measures such as capacity building activities, 
cooperation between public bodies as well as European civil society actors. Similar to 
the EU’s internal policy and previous enlargement, civil society is articulated as an 
instrument of democratization and Europeanization. The next section outlines the 
Civil Society Dialogue program to highlight the logic of the EU. 
 
Civil Society Dialogue Programs 
  In addition to supporting democratic development, the EU has also paid 
attention to bringing citizens from the candidate countries and the EU closer. The 
experience of the 2004 Enlargement has shown that there is a growing gap between 
the EU and the public and neither the EU nor candidate countries are sufficiently 
informed about the opportunities and challenges of EU membership. For this purpose, 
in 2004, the European Commission proposed the idea of a “civil society dialogue” 
which was endorsed by the European Council on 17 December 2004: 
“Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with every candidate state 
in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. With the aim of enhancing mutual 
understanding by bringing people together, this inclusive dialogue also will involve 
civil society” (Quoted in Communities of the European Commission 2005: 2-3).  
 
In 2005, The Communication of the Civil Society Dialogue between the EU 
and Candidate Countries (2005) emphasized that future enlargement of the EU 
should be supported by enhanced dialogue in order to better inform public opinions 
from the EU and candidate countries (Communities of European Commission 2005). 
This document places vibrant civil society at the heart of the enlargement policy.  
The document highlighted the aim of the civil society dialogue as follows: 
 To strengthen contacts and mutual exchange of experience between all sectors 
of civil society in the member States and Candidate countries; 
  To ensure better knowledge and understanding of the candidate countries 
concerned within the European Union, including their histories and their 
cultures, thus allowing for a better awareness of the opportunities and 
challenges of future enlargement; 
  To ensure a better knowledge and understanding of the European Union 
within the candidate countries, including the values on which it is founded, its 
functioning and its policies.  
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                                                (Communities of the European Commission 2005: 3-4). 
 
Complementary to democracy, there was strong emphasis on dialogue in Civil 
Society Dialogue I. In this respect, civil society is seen as a key agent to foster 
cooperation and knowledge between the EU and Turkey through common activities. 
Furthermore, through this communication, civil society is given the key role of 
partner in the European governance: civil society assists countries’ social 
transformation and prepares citizens for the enlargement. It is expected that a better 
informed public could be the driving force of the accession process. The program 
funds three main areas: development of civil society, social dialogue, employment 
and social affairs and community programs. In this way, the EU funds supports, 
legitimizes, and professionalizes NGOs by raising the level of public awareness about 
the EU.  The Civil Society Dialogue I was seen as a continuation of existing activities 
and establishment of new networks. 
 In 2006, under the Civil Society Dialogue I, the EU provided around €4.33 
million to promote the following grant schemes: Small Projects Program: 
Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue, Civil Society Dialogue: Europa-Bridges of 
Knowledge, Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO Events in 
the EU, and Civil Society Dialogue: Culture in Action Program (Yurttagüller 2009: 
10). Similarly, in 2007 and 2008, the financial support to Civil Society Dialogue 
programs was increased to €21.5 million to implement five programs- Youth 
Initiatives for Dialogue, Towns and Municipalities Grant Scheme, Professional 
Organizations Grant Scheme, Universities Grant Scheme and Cultural Bridges 
Program. The first phase of the Civil Society Dialogue project was completed in 
November 2009. 
One of the influential projects that was recently completed in 2009 under the 
first phase Civil Society Dialogue- EU- Turkish Chambers Forum (2006-2009) aims 
to “strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between the Turkish chambers and their 
counterparts in the EU as a members of civil society; thus promoting the integration 
of EU and Turkish business communities” (Communities of European Commission 
2006b: 1; Interview Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs, Expert Director 
2011). The program intended a strengthening of the communication between Turkish 
chambers and the European counterparts by helping them to learn about their 
experiences. In this respect, the Turkish chambers were regarded as important civil 
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society actors and dialogue was justified on the basis that their roles were in providing 
information and working “as catalyzers” among business and law makers 
(Communities of the European Commission 2006b: 5). The project was built on two 
components. The first component was designed to establish EU-Turkey Chambers 
Development Forum for “partnerships-building”. The second component set out the 
EU-Turkey Chambers Partnership Scheme. There were different activities ranging 
from awareness rising to establishing communication networks. Activities included 
partnership-building events, EU training seminars, publications, and general public 
relations work for more visibility. In this way, the project promoted the establishment 
of long-term partnerships through sustainable dialogue and enhanced cooperation. 
More importantly, it enabled Turkish chambers to actively provide input to the EU 
accession negotiations and allowed them to become more inclusive partners. 
Following the success of the Civil Society Dialogue I program, the second 
phase of Civil Society Dialogue II was initiated in October 2010. Promoting Civil 
Society Dialogue Project II aimed to advance dialogue with different sectors working 
in the area of Culture-Arts and Agriculture Fisheries with a budget of € 4.2 million. It 
also provided financial support for small and local NGOs in Turkey and EU member 
states through the Micro Grant Scheme. Forty-one NGOs from different cities have 
been supported for the organization of seminars, workshops and other activities. For 
instance, three projects under this scheme have been completed. Under a program 
entitled A Half Does Not Make a Whole, The Association for Supporting Entrepreneur 
Business Women of Ankara organized an international workshop in June 2010. 
Similarly, another project called One Hand Has Nothing Civil Society Has Everything 
held a conference in Samsun on the effect of EU culture and policies in establishing 
European citizenship; its international partner from Croatia also participated in the 
conference. 
The Civil Society Dialogue was extended in other sectors and more recently 
“Civil Society Dialogue III” was launched in 2013 in the field of political criteria and 
the media. The overall indicative amount under the Civil Society Dialogue III grant 
program is € 6,150,000 for political criteria and € 3,000,000 for media (Rumelili and 
Boşnak 2015:133). The goal of the Civil Society Dialogue III program is to create 
strong connections and high levels of cooperation between civil society in Turkey and 
their counterparts in the EU on the themes of political criteria, media and EU policy. 
Civil Society Dialogue also encourages participation of Turkish civil society in 
 74 
different Community programs. Following table 3.1 shows Civil Society Dialogue 
Programs I, II and II between the EU and Turkey. 
 
Table 3.1: Civil Society Dialogue Programs I, II and III between the EU and 
Turkey 
 
Civil Society Dialogue I 





Period 2008 - 2009 2010 - 2012 2014 - ongoing 
Themes 
• Towns and 
Municipalities  
• Professional  
   Organizations  
• Universities  
• Youth Initiatives 
• Agriculture & 
Fisheries  
• Culture & Arts  
• Micro Grant Scheme 
• Media  
• Political Criteria 
Total Number of 
Projects 119 97 55 
Budget (MEUR) 19.3 5.3 7 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
EU Affairs 2015)  
 
Starting from 2007, the main financial instrument for Turkish civil society to 
access EU funding is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). IPA 
supports reforms in the candidate countries through financial and technical assistance 
and prepares them for EU membership. For the period 2007-2013 IPA I was designed 
to provide assistance through five components: assistance for transition and institution 
building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resource 
development and rural development (Delegation of the European Commission to 
Turkey 2007; Zihnioğlu 2013:46). For the period 2014-2020 IPA II set up a new 
framework for pre-accession assistance. Unlike IPA I, IPA II has a strategic focus and 
the principle of ownership is promoted through country strategy papers (Commission 
of the European Communities 2014). Similar to IPA I, one of the priority sectors for 
funding in IPA II is civil society. 
In accordance with the IPA, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) 
which functions as an independent body but is administratively attached to the under 
secretariat of the Treasury of Turkey takes the responsibility for the budgeting, 
tendering, contracting, payments, accounting and financial reporting of procurement 
in the context of the EU funded programs (Ketola 2013: 120; Zihnioğlu 2013:46-47). 
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The CFCU is founded with the objective to transfer the contracting authority from the 
European Commission to the Turkish government. It functions as an independent 
body but is linked to the EU Secretariat General and the National Aid Coordinator. 
Thus, project proposals for EU funding including the civil society program calls can 
be directly submitted to the CFCU and funding channels through a governmental 
body. 
The EU has also opened some Community Programs to Turkey to promote 
cooperation and exchange experiences in different policy areas. Turkey has been 
participating in Community Programs such as the Education Program, Culture, and 
Social Policy Programs. 
 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Turkey 
Programs 
Although human rights are a priority area under all EU financial assistance, 
the EU has a separate financial program for human rights. The EU has launched the 
EIDHR solely for human rights issues and since 2002 Turkey has benefitted from the 
EIDHR. EIDHR is the principal mechanism of support for civil society activities in 
the promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries. As key beneficiaries 
of EIDHR, civil society organizations in Turkey benefited from EIDHR funds. In this 
respect, EIDHR helps “civil society to promote human rights and democratic reform, 
to support the peaceful conciliation of group interests and to consolidate political 
participation and representation” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey [b]). 
Within this context, there are five main objectives of the EIDHR: (i) increasing 
respect for human rights in countries and regions where they are most at risk; (ii) 
helping civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reforms; (iii) 
supporting actions in human rights fields covered by the EU guidelines; (iv) 
supporting international and regional frameworks for protection and promotion of 
human rights and (v) improving electoral processes (Commission of the European 
Communities 2010). Since 2010, the call for proposals has shown that assisting 
human rights defenders at the local level has become a prime objective of the EIDHR 
program alongside the stronger emphasis on the its role in policy making processes. 
An examination of the call for proposals shows that priority activities 
predominantly reflect areas of EU Guidelines on human rights, therefore, human 
rights actors that are involved in priority areas benefited more from the EU funding 
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(For detailed discussion see Chapter 7 on human rights organizations). The main 
priority areas covered the empowerment of civil society in its action in a broad area of 
human rights. These included the fight against torture and impunity, improved access 
to justice, human rights education and training programs, enhancing political 
representation and participation in an organized society, particularly for 
underrepresented groups including women, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvestite, 
Transsexual (LGBTT), Roma and youth (Council of the European Union 2009). 
More importantly, the call for proposals for Turkey highlights the EU’s 
approach to civil society within the EIDHR. First, like other civil society programs, 
civil society is a tool to improve human rights records and democratic credentials. In 
this respect supporting civil society is regarded as a contribution to “the development 
and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” (Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). Moreover, 
civil society has a significant role in the reform process in Turkey. The Delegation of 
the EU to Turkey indicated that EIDHR “support has been instrumental in 
complementing Turkey’s reform efforts through enabling better participation of 
organized citizens in the reform process” (Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). 
Second, interrelated with the first one, civil society is seen as a partner of the EU to 
support Turkey in its preparation for EU accession. In this regard, civil society has a 
stronger role in policy making. The Guiding Principles expressed that a specific 
objective of EU support is: “strengthening civil society’s involvement in the making, 
implementation and monitoring of human rights policies at local and national levels” 
(Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). Thus, the EU integrates human rights 
organizations in all levels of policymaking processes. 
The EIDHR is a thematic financial instrument that overlaps and complements 
other civil society assistance instruments in Turkey. However, in contrast to IPA, 
EIDHR has a thematic focus in line with its own broad objectives and is independent 
in its budget and embedded within EuropeAid. The EIDHR is operated through the 
calls for proposals; the EIDHR projects in Turkey can be funded through two main 
ways: Global grant schemes, which are open to all countries, and country support 
schemes managed by country delegations. Therefore, under EIDHR, funding is not 
distributed through governmental bodies and civil society organizations directly 
assisted by the EU bodies. The independence of EIDHR is framed as its key strength- 
providing assistance independent of the consent of governments. 
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3.3.2 The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy in the Context of Turkish 
Accession  
 
Civil society is the cornerstone in the enlargement process. It plays an 
instrumental role in the accession to the EU where support to civil society is also 
preparation for EU membership. The first pillar of the Copenhagen criteria contends 
that the candidate country should be a democratic country and should respect human 
rights and minorities. In this respect, the development of democracy is associated with 
the existence of a dynamic civil society. Therefore, the EU promotes civil society to 
help Turkey comply with the political criteria. 
In Turkey, civil society engagement is in line with the broader policy 
aspirations. The EU channels assistance to civil society through various financial 
instruments. Civil society programs reflect the EU’s priorities in civil development by 
making strong references to democracy, human rights, dialogue and partnership. The 
EU policy to civil society has two facets that are considered complementary to each 
other. 
The first facet focuses on development of democracy through civil society. 
For this purpose, the initial program on civil society (Civil Society Development 
Program) supports capacity building initiatives to develop the institutional structure of 
civil society. In these programs, civil society is defined as broadly as possible. 
However, certain issue areas are prioritized in relation to EU expertise. The civil 
society groups are expected, through their involvement in civil society development 
programs, to utilize not only issues concerning EU enlargement but also EU priorities. 
The EU’s policy to strengthen civil society is justified on the basis of a certain logic, 
where civil society is defined as a key player in the democratic game. In this logic, 
democratization in Turkey is closely related with the existence of open civil society 
and active citizens. In this process, civil society is expected to develop their capacity 
so they can fulfill certain functions and contribute to democratic development. 
The second facet of the EU policy focuses on the role of civil society as 
partners in civil society dialogue programs that strengthen contacts, mutual 
understanding and the exchange experience between the EU and candidate countries. 
The logic behind these programs is the lessons learnt from the previous enlargement 
processes. In this context, civil society is seen as a mechanism to understand political 
and cultural experiences; incorporation of culture is a key component of the civil 
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society dialogue. There are awareness-raising activities of policies and values. In 
general, these programs complement civil society development program, but learning 
is at the heart of the civil society dialogue. Civil society is defined in a broader and 
more inclusive way and as a linking actor between the EU and citizens. It is assumed 
that civil society will inform the public and flourish better understanding. In addition, 
networking is the main strategy in civil society dialogue. There are various activities 
for NGOs and network building is the main tool for strengthening civil society 
dialogue. In the case of Turkey, the most important principle of the civil society 
dialogue is not only the cooperation and collaboration with other civil society actors 
but also with the Turkish state. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
The question of how the EU impacts civil society development requires an 
understanding of the rationale and motivations behind the EU policy towards civil 
society. The policy has implications for understanding Europeanization outcome. 
The concept of civil society was entered into the EU policy circle during the 
early 1990s. It is critical to understand the concept of civil society in the policy 
language of the EU since it is this concept that is being transferred into different 
political and cultural contexts during the enlargement process. In section 3.1, the 
evolution of EU policies within EU context lead to two main conclusions. First, the 
increasing talk about the importance of civil society in policymaking reflects positive 
connotations of civil society where civil society is seen as an important instrument in 
democratization and efficient policymaking. Second, civil society has been deemed 
crucial for the EU since they have the potential to close the gap between EU 
policymaking and the citizens and bring EU policymaking closer to the public. 
The examination of three different contexts, namely- the EU, Central and East 
European and Turkish- in relation to civil society reveals similar conclusions in the 
EU’s approach to civil society despite the differences in the focus in civil society 
programs. The civil society development is associated as a part of good democracy, 
and governance as well as successful policymaking at the EU level. A comparison 
between the EU approach to civil society in CEE and Turkey also highlights 
similarities. In both contexts, the EU introduces civil society within policy 
frameworks, in a context of ongoing democratization processes. This is 
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operationalized through the EU assistance to civil society. As section 3.2 and 3.3 
illustrate, in its enlargement process, the EU has two complementary pillars for 
strengthening civil society. The first pillar enhances capacity building and 
institutional structure of NGOs. The second pillar focuses on dialogues and previous 
experiences. The policy of civil society dialogue can be found both in CEE and 
Turkish contexts and based on learning processes. 
The efficiency of EU policy on civil society has been a controversial debate 
both in academic and international policymaking circles. The EU has been criticized 
along two lines. On the one hand, opponents argue that a neo-liberal model of civil 
society based on a specific type of organizational structure has been promoted by the 
EU. On the other hand, critics stress that civil society development is not a technical 
process. In this context, the EU cannot simply transfer a “blueprint” model of civil 
society without considering domestic contexts, namely, the effect of historical 
legacies on civil society. The remaining chapters investigate the impact of the EU on 




HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY 
 
The last few decades witnessed the remarkable rise of civil society in Turkey. 
Civil society became a magical idea for Turkish politicians; NGOs presented 
themselves as champions of civil society; media coverage increased their visibility 
and international donors such the United Nation (UN), the EU, and the World Bank 
continuously referred to the vital role of civil society in social and political 
transformations. Likewise, an academic interest in Turkish civil society mainly 
emerged in the post 1980 period (Göle 1994; Toprak 1996; Yerasimos et al. 2000; 
Kubicek 2002; Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Çaha and Karaman 2004; Seckinelgin 
2004; Şimşek 2004a, 2004b; Kadıoğlu 2005; Kubicek 2005; TÜSEV 2006; Toros 
2007; Heper and Yıldırım 2011). 
In various analyses, an important distinction was drawn between the “new” 
history of civil society and a long history of associational life (TÜSEV 2006: 35; 
İçduygu 2011: 382; Kuzmanovic 2012: 11-12). While the new history of civil society 
is distinguished by the period after 1980 and the emergence of a dynamic civil society 
activity, the long history of civil society as associational life is affiliated with the 
existence of various Ottoman institutions and a long tradition of philanthropy and 
Kemalist civil society organizations that were established in the early years of the 
republic. Studies have examined civic life in the last period of the Ottoman Empire 
(Çaha 2001; Çaha and Karaman 2004; Grigoriadis 2009: 42-44), practices of civil 
society activity in the early period of the Republic (Toprak 1996; Grigoriadis 2009: 
44-46), social uses of the concept of civil society (Seufert 2000), shifting meanings 
and practices of civil society (Kuzmanovic 2012), its role in social transformation and 
democracy (Seçkinelgin 2004; Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Seçkinelgin 2004; Şimşek 
2004a, 2004b) and the impact of the Europeanization processes on civil society (For 
detailed literature review and discussion see section 2.1.3.). However, there is no 
detailed analysis of the inherited characteristics of Turkish civil society, and relations 
 81 
with different actors. Most of the explanations tend to focus solely on the 
characteristics of a state- society relationship within a particular period of history. 
In this respect, this chapter extends the focus of the analysis not only on 
characteristics of state-society relations in a particular period of time but also the 
other characteristics of civil society with the aim to identify historical legacies in 
relation to civil society. As defined in Chapter 2, historical legacies are perceived as 
the inherited characteristics of civil society and particular aspects of the past that 
molded civil society in Turkey. For this purpose, through long-term historical analysis 
and process tracing, this chapter identifies six key legacies that shaped civil society in 
Turkey: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been 
chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive legal environment 
characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of 
rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state 
tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, 
and the presence of diverse connections with external networks. 
I argue that these legacies of the past still shape civil society, its relations with 
different actors, and the impact of the EU. For this purpose, this chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first section identifies key characteristics of civil society in 
the Ottoman period. The second part focuses on the same characteristics and analyzes 
continuity and change from the early period of Republic. The final section 
concentrates on developments in civil society between the early 1980s and late 1990s. 
 
4.1. Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire   
 
 Civil society has been a much debated and contested topic both in academia 
and policy circles. There are two lines of the debate in Turkish studies in relation to 
civil society. In the first line of the debate, scholars have argued that weak civil 
society could be attributed to the legacy of the strong state tradition and religion 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Mardin 1969; Özbudun1996; Heper 2000; 
Grigoriadis 2009:43; Kuran 2012). According to Heper (2000: 78):  
 
The absence of civil society in Turkey was an inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, 
where political, economic and social power coalesced in the center. Within the upper 
strata, status and wealth were attached to offices, and not to lineages or families. 
Bureaucratic position, thus, had the greatest weight in determining policy. The elite 
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justified its appropriation of policymaking based on its presumed cultural 
preeminence and superior knowledge. 
 
Similarly, Mardin has underscored the dominance of the state and highlighted that “by 
refusing to allow existing social groups to become differentiated and to attain social 
autonomy, the state made these structures dependent upon it for support” (1969: 269). 
Equally important were the explanations related to Islamic religious beliefs 
and the lack of institutional structures that impeded the emergence of the civil society. 
Some researchers argue that, contrary to Christianity, Islam has prevented the 
existence of civil society independent from the state, lacked institutional structures 
equivalent to the church to balance the state power and therefore in non-Western 
patrimonial societies and in tribal societies, civil society is not compatible with 
Islamic tradition (Gellner 1994; Grigoriadis 2009; Kuran 2012). 
 In the second line of the debate, other scholars have argued that civil society 
was not entirely absent in the Ottoman Empire (Norton 2001; Çaha and Karaman 
2004). Accordingly, Islamic foundation (vakf), religious orders (tarikat), guilds 
(esnaf/lonca) and a community system (millet) were all “quasi-civil society 
formations” in Ottoman history (Çaha and Karaman 2004; Grigoriadis 2009: 43; 
Zencirci 2014: 3). For example, the vakf were non-profit organizations that undertook 
social functions similar to civil society organizations particularly with regard to 
educational and judiciary issues. As philanthropic organizations, they were relatively 
independent institutions, not state owned but indirectly dependent on the state. 
Equivalently, the tarikat was an autonomous entity and functioned outside state 
control and performed social activities such as education. In a similar vein, the lonca 
was an autonomous body that organized the relationship between the tradesmen and 
the central government. Finally, the millet system that existed for non-Muslim 
minorities developed an “advanced network of social organizations” in addition to 
religious, educational and charity foundations (Grigoriadis 2009: 44). Chapter 7 
discusses the millet system from the perspective of human rights civil society. 
 Despite a different focus of attention, both of these debates emphasize strong 
state tradition and its implications on civil society in Turkey. As stated by Özbudun 
(1996:133), the Ottoman state tradition was characterized by “a strong and centralized 
state, reasonably effective by the standards of its day, highly autonomous societal 
forces, and occupying a central and highly valued place in Ottoman political culture.” 
In this regard, the Ottoman state tradition was distinguished by two counter trends. On 
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the one side, the Ottoman political culture was described as a patrimonial bureaucracy 
where legitimacy depended on the personal rule of the sultan. In this tradition, the 
power was concentrated in the hands of the sultan and a small number of bureaucratic 
ruling elite strongly attached to the Ottoman state (Mardin 1969). The sultan was 
delegated religious and executive power to the ruling institution- military (askeri). 
This means that the sultan would determine a man’s status in the society, therefore, he 
exercised unlimited personal rule. The patrimonial bureaucracy was also highly 
motivated to “keep under control any sources of power that appeared outside the 
boundaries of the legitimate power structure” (Mardin 1969: 259). This in turn created 
a culture that opposed and was hesitant to different “threatening” rival principalities 
and functioned according to the norms of the state. 
Furthermore, in line with a patrimonial system, the sultan and the state not 
only had unlimited power over its subjects, but also had absolute power over 
economic life (Heper 2000:65). In the Islamic world, this patriarch’s duty of the 
sultan was known as the duty of hisba, meaning the sultan was responsible for the 
welfare of his subjects (Mardin 1969: 260; Heper 2000: 65). The land was also 
concentrated in the hands of the sultan. The land system, tımar, granted the state lands 
to military elites in return for their services to the Empire. Therefore, the state and 
society were considered as inseparable and “the welfare of society depended on the 
well-being of the state” (Heper 2000:66).  
On the other hand, legitimacy did not only rest in the personal rule of the 
sultan. During the second part of the fourteenth century, the state and sultan started to 
differentiate from each other. Meanwhile, a new legislation emerged, the tradition of 
the sultan (orf-i sultani), and the sultan was urged to follow reason and prioritize the 
state interest, not Islamic law. Therefore, the sultan was not perceived as identical to 
the state anymore. After that, the state was responsible for the order and the sultan 
became only a symbol for the state (Heper 1985: 35). In other words, for the first time 
the orf-i sultani tradition had introduced a secular aspect to the Ottoman state policy. 
Consequently, the adab tradition promoted secularism, and the dominance of the state 
in the Ottoman Empire. The adab tradition empowered the development of a strong 
centralist bureaucratic state tradition. This bureaucratic elite became the ruling power 
in the Ottoman Empire and later in the early Republican period. 
The strong and centralized state tradition alongside bureaucratic elites also 
shaped society in a particular way. In this respect, one of the most important 
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characteristics of the Ottoman Empire was the sharp cultural divide between “center 
and periphery” or “palace and rural” (Mardin 1969; 1973). The center refers to the 
ruling institutions such as the palace, the civilian bureaucracy and the military. 
Culturally, this group was different from the rest of the population. As Heper (1980: 
85) indicates, the center denotes “the groups or persons that support or maintain the 
autonomy and superiority of the government in the political structure”. In contrast, the 
periphery refers to the citizens and groups that were culturally different and believed 
in an “Image of Good Society” promoted mainly by a Sunni Islamic religious 
tradition (Mardin 1975: 15-32). The culture of the periphery was heterogeneous, and 
it did not have any particular kind of identity. From the nineteenth century, the 
cultural gap between the center and periphery increased as the center became more 
aware and influenced by Western culture (Heper 2000: 66). This later paved the way 
for an ideologically divided society where the elite considered themselves superior to 
the rest of the population. 
Turkey’s European aspirations have a long history, which dates back to the 
Ottoman Empire. Historical precedents of European symbolism started with the 
initiation of the Tanzimat in 1839. Since then, Europe has been an important symbol, 
a model and a reference point for Turkey. For example, a campaign for recognition of 
a European Ottoman identity had characterized the Ottoman foreign policy agenda 
(Grigoriadis 2009:2). In this respect, the invitation from the Concert of Europe was 
significant for the Ottoman Empire because, symbolically, for the first time Turkey 
was regarded as a European power (Grigoriadis 2009: 185). It is important to 
underline that the West and Europe were used interchangeably at that period. In the 
Tanzimat era, the model of the Western European state had been at the center of the 
Ottoman modernization process. Inspired by the centralized European model, 
Tanzimat leaders attempted a strong concentration of power, so called centralization, 
as a way of transforming the state and securing the territorial integrity of the Empire. 
The abolition of traditional checks and balances, the reform of the military and civil 
bureaucracy and introduction of Western technology further empowered the state and 
its potential to control the society (Grigoriadis 2009: 68-69). 
Modernization was also inspired by the “Western European polity notions” 
(Kuzmanovic 2012: 15), which had profound effects for the civil society. Europe and 
the West was an important symbol with regard to the restructuring of society. For 
example, Europe and the West was a model for the development of secular civil 
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society structures and a strong reference point at that time. However, Tanzimat had 
failed to introduce the intended social, political and economic reforms and further 
strengthened the state apparatus at the expense of society. The declaration of the first 
Ottoman Constitution in 1976, Kanun-ı Esasi, ended the Tanzimat period and 
introduced representative institutions toward a political liberalization. Yet, the 
following years witnessed the struggle between the authoritarian regime of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks, a group of intellectuals who strived to limit 
authoritarian rule (Toprak 1996: 90). The 1908 Young Turk revolution had aimed to 
bring the Ottoman Empire closer to Europe through political, economic, and social 
change and ended the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The implementation 
of the Young Turk agenda, especially the formation of the Committee for Union and 
Progress that established the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu) 
was motivated by the Western European polity notions (Kuzmanovic 2012: 15). 
There was strong reference to the French social order and Western principles. One of 
the principal new civil actors that emerged in this period was the women’s movement.  
The women’s movement contributed to the emergence of a consciousness regarding 
women’s rights through journals and associations. As I will show more 
comprehensively in Chapter 5, the women’s movement made strong references to the 
West and Europe and European values. This is how Europe and Western principles 
became important symbols and reference points in early periods of Turkish history. 
The Second Constitutional period started with the introduction of the 1909 
Ottoman Law of Associations, which regulated activities of civic groups, political 
parties and workers’ groups (Toprak 1983; Alkan 1998: 46). One of the most 
important consequences of the Second Constitutional period was the mushrooming of 
the associational activity. In the period between 1908 and 1918, 12 political parties 
and 37 political or social associations were founded alongside 157 chambers of 
commerce in different provinces, several chambers of industry, 51 small business 
associations, different organizations of entrepreneurs and artisans, and sale-credit 
cooperatives (Toprak 1996: 90). 
 Although the 1909 Law of Associations set the legal framework for 
associational activity and relatively liberalized the political atmosphere, it was shaped 
with a particular understanding. In this context, Article 120 on freedom of association 
was a good illustration. According to Article 120 (Alkan 1998) on freedom of 
association:  
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Ottomans could enjoy the right of assembly, on the condition that they obeyed the law 
on the subject. Societies were forbidden that aimed to injure the territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire, change the form of the Constitution or of the government, act 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, or bring about a separation among the 
various Ottoman elements, or which were contrary to public morals. The formation of 
secret societies in general was also forbidden.
13
  
      
Therefore, Article 120 is an example of the introduction of a restrictive legal 
infrastructure. In this respect, Article 120 emphasized community over the individual, 
unity over diversity, and an understanding of law that privileges integrity and 
solidarity, which was later inherited by the Turkish Republic. Similarly, Article 18 
(Alkan 1998) regulated the financial-administrative infrastructure of associations in a 
restrictive way. Accordingly, the associations could not accept grants without a 
government license (Article 18), and members of the associations could not donate 
more than twenty-four liras annually unless there was permission from the 
government (Article 8 in Alkan 1998). Therefore, financial-administrative structures 
were developed under the strict control of the state, were dependent on government 
permission and subject to state control. 
 A further element lacking in this period was the existence of international 
connections with other civil society actors. It is important to highlight that in that 
time, forming international connections between civil society actors in other countries 
was not a common practice not only in Turkey but also in other countries as well. 
Nonetheless, as I will present in subsequent sections and other chapters, the lack of or 
weak connections with international counterparts, which became more visible in the 
later years of the Republic was more pronounced in Turkey. This lack of connections 
can be explained by the historical context that shaped the civil society and two 
interrelated factors. One explanation is the premature status of civil society and the 
restrictive legal-institutional framework that inhibited cooperation between 
international civic actors. Other explanation is related with the perception of the state 
bequeathed from the Ottoman Empire and later empowered in the Republican era as a 
consequence of the defeat Sévres Syndrome. In this understanding, the state was 
skeptical towards any activities that challenged its hegemonic status. The activities 
were seen as a threat for the survival of the state and intervention in domestic affairs. 
                                                        
13  The Ottoman Constitution. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed 
on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown. 
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 In the period between the War of Independence and its aftermath, 
associational activity continued with a total of 45 political parties and organizations 
(Toprak 1996: 90). Yet, associational activity ended with the foundation of the 
Republic in 1923 and the inception of single party domination. During the first decade 
of the Republic until 1946 all opposition groups were silenced. The following section 
presents the development of civil society between 1923 and 1980, and its 
characteristics within this period. The section demonstrates that in the early 
Republican period civil society was characterized by continuities rather than change. 
 
4.2. Civil Society in the Early Republican Turkey and Multi-Party Period (1923-
1980)  
   
The new Republic that was founded in 1923 was heavily influenced by the 
modernization efforts initiated in the Ottoman Empire and left little space for the 
development of civil society in Turkey (Grigoriadis 2009: 44). Modernization efforts 
tried to diminish the influence of Islam dogmas that were perceived as a source of 
backwardness and synthesized the Western and Islamic traditions. The vision of Ziya 
Gökalp (1876-1924) in particular, a leading philosopher from the Ottoman period, 
was the most influential among the new elite as he argued for merging Western 
civilization with Turkish culture. His political-social theory titled “Turkish-Islamist-
Westernist Modernizm” summed up his “social ideal” as follows: “We are of the 
Turkish nation (millet), of the Islamic religious community (ümmet), of Western 
civilization (medeniyet)” (Parla 1985:25). He made a distinction between the culture 
and civilization. For Gökalp, Turks should borrow Western civilization but maintain 
their culture. This means that he proposed keeping peculiarities of Turkish tradition 
and values of Turkish society while following innovations of the Western world in 
terms of institutions and development. For some, this presents the source of the 
“paradox” (Ketola 2013:60), which in turn created a “two-tier” civil society, the 
development of civil society. 
 The founder of the modern Turkish Republic and first president, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, was inspired by Gökalp’s ideas and followed a dynamic reform 
agenda on the basis of Gökalp’s vision. For instance, the highest political authority, 
the Caliphate, was abolished and powers of the Caliphate were transferred to the new 
parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 
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 The secular elite was at the center of the Westernization project and 
dominated the reform process. In following Gokalp’s ideas through reforms, 
individual interest was subordinated at the expense of collective interest and the 
power was accumulated at the center, which in turn created a strong functioning state. 
In the 1930s, six key principles of Kemalism were introduced and codified in the 
Republican constitution. The six principles of Kemalism are Republicanism 
(representative democracy, and rule of law), secularism (separation of religious and 
political institutions), populism (elite working for the interest and on behalf of the 
society), etatism (state centered economic development), nationalism (based on 
citizenship rather than ethnic orientation), and reformism (introduction of new and 
dynamic institutions of governance) (Yeğen 2001: 57). The principles of Kemalism 
were so important they were taught to all citizens in the schools, and therefore, left no 
other alternative views to develop in the public sphere. Kemalism played a key role in 
shaping the relationship between civil society and the state. 
Even though the reforms emphasized sovereignty of the people and marked an 
important break from the Ottoman Empire, as Özçetin et al. (2014:5) explain,“ the 
young Republic inherited the political reflex of the Ottoman tradition” (emphasis 
added). From the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state 
was the dominant and assertive force not only in political and economic life but also 
in associational life (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223; TÜSEV 2006: 36). The strong 
state tradition that was furthered by Kemalism prevented the development of vibrant 
civil society and created a weak model of civil society that mainly depended on state 
institutions. This strong Kemalist tradition also imposed a “particular model of 
Turkishness” (Seckinelgin 2004:174) and certain types of organizations flourished 
that supported those principles. As in the Ottoman period, the hegemonic status of the 
state was uncontested where the state emphasized that the primary concern in state-
society relations is the protection of the state interest and unity. 
In terms of a legal-institutional framework, the freedom of association was 
formally recognized in the 1924 Constitution, but in practice the state controlled the 
civic sphere and limited any activity that would challenge its interests. For example, 
Article 70 and Article 79 (Alkan 1998) highlighted freedom of association: 
 
Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press, 
freedom of travel and of contact, freedom of labor; freedom of private property; of 
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Limitations upon freedom of contract, labour, property, assembly, association and 




Yet, the 1938 Law of Associations introduced serious limitations on the formation of 
associations. For example, the law contained a description on high treason and Article 
9 added a comprehensive list of the prohibitions and forbidden associations (Alkan 
1998: 56-57). Likewise, Article 28
16
 of the 1938 Law of Associations restrained the 
development of an independent financial-administrative infrastructure by introducing 
heavy restrictions and arbitrary financial control by the government. 
 Compared to the post-Ottoman period, division in civil society was further 
deteriorated. In this era, civil society was mainly divided along two lines. On the one 
hand, there were Kemalist civil society actors, which were based on the official state 
policy and coopted by the state. These organizations in turn supported the state’s 
policies and empowered its hegemonic position. On the other hand, there were non-
Kemalist organizations that were based on different views of civil society. The state 
in turn supported those civil society organizations that had a Kemalist and secular 
orientation and left no room for the other types of organizations that were based on 
different conceptions of civil society. Therefore, we see the development of a 
homogenous civil society and the dominance of Kemalist organizations in the public 
sphere. During this period, the development of civil society was shaped under strict 
state control. The various organizations that were outside the state ideology, such as 
tarikats and opposition political parties, were banned and the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP) took over the functions of the Ottoman state 
bureaucracy and enjoyed power until 1946 (Mardin 1973: 304-305). State-controlled 
civil society organizations such as chambers of commerce, professional associations, 
and trade unions as corporatist models dominated the political landscape (Grigoriadis 
2009: 45). Therefore, the political reflex of the state remained unchanged and there 
                                                        
14
 The Ottoman Constitution. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed 
on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown. 
15 The Ottoman Constitution. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed 
on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown. 
16
 The Ottoman Constitution. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed 
on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown. 
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was a pattern of continuity both in the state structure and in civil society 
organizations. 
 Europe and the West as an important symbol continued to dominate the 
political spectrum. Like the Tanzimat period, the conscious Westernization process of 
the Kemalist elite was inspired by the Western European polity notions (Kuzmanovic 
2012: 15). Europe and the West as a model were especially important with regard to 
the development of civil society. One illustration was a Kemalist Women’s 
organization, the Turkish Women’s Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği-TKB). In this 
context, European/ Western women were a model for the organization. For example, 
representative of the organization said that the “modern woman in the West has been 
an important model since the establishment of the organization.” (Interview TKB 
2011). She added that although TKB made connections with the women in the East, 
they rejected invitations to participate in the activities during this period, because 
European women were a model for Turkish women and they did not want to be 
resembled to Eastern women (Interview TKB 2011). 
 In the early Republican period, international connections were also restricted 
and shaped under the auspices of the state control. The legal framework limited 
establishment of associations that had international connections. For example, Article 
10 of the 1938 Law of Associations stated that foreign associations outside the 
country could not open branches in Turkey (Alkan 1998: 57). Furthermore, Article 10 
prohibited establishing international connections with foreign associations. In some 
sense, the second paragraph of Article 10 eased the restrictive framework and stated 
that international associations could be established if there was national interest in 
cooperation, yet the decision was made by the Council of Ministers. However, the 
Council of Ministers had the sole authority to decide on the establishment or closure 
of the associations. Furthermore, some organizations took part in the international 
conventions. For instance, in 1926 under the leadership of a leading feminist, Nezihe 








Transition to the multi-party period (1946-1960) 
  In 1950, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi- DP) won the elections and 
politicians represented by the DP tried to challenge the dominant role of the state elite 
with a loose form of secularism. As Mardin (1973) argues, for the first time, political 
power established the link with the periphery where their vote was coming from the 
rural peasantry. 
Only for a short period of time, the DP leaned towards more liberal reform 
compared to the CHP, and broadened the spectrum of popular participation by 
integrating the periphery of Turkish society (Grigoriadis 2009: 29). In particular, the 
1946 Law of Association relatively liberalized the political environment and eased the 
restrictions on the establishment and operation of the associations. This led to a boom 
in the number of associations and labor unions. During this time, a number of 
associations multiplied approximately eight times to exceed 17,000 (Özbudun 
2000:129). For the first time in Turkish political history, in 1952, the first labor 
federation, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu- TÜRK-İŞ) was established and had civil society activism and a non-
political stance. However, like its predecessor, the DP oppressed civil society 
organizations that had a critical view of its policies. For example, the DP repeatedly 
prevented TÜRK-İŞ to become a member of the International Trade Union 
Confederation (Özçetin et al. 2014: 7) and thus restricted establishing external 
connections. Furthermore, the press was oppressed by restrictive legislation. More 
importantly, during this period, top-down and a suspicious approach by governmental 
authorities limited broader political participation. For example, the Law of 
Associations was amended in 1952 to enable courts to outlaw activities of 
associations and protect the properties of associations even before they were ordered 
to be dissolved (Zihnioğlu 2013: 104). This in turn created a weak civil society, which 
resembled the early Kemalist period. In this respect, while the organizations that 
supported government policies were enabled, organizations with oppositional voices 
were disabled and oppressed. 
The DP won again in the 1954 and 1957 elections, but the downfall of the 
party started with the unpopularity of Adnan Menderes, the prime minister. Similar to 
the CHP before the DP, Menderes and the DP started to function like an authoritarian 
party and assumed that the government constituted the state (Ketola 2013: 64). 
Following on the deterioration of economic performance and the worsening of the 
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relationship between the government and the opposition, on 27 May 1960, the 
military stepped in. The 1960 military coup led the execution of DP politicians and 
the arrest of political activists. Nonetheless, the 1961 Constitution provided a legal 
framework for the development of civil society and enhancement of rights. For 
instance, it assured the right to establish associations (Article 29) and the right to 
congregate and march in demonstrations with prior permission from the authorities 
(Article 28) (Özbudun 2000). The 1961 constitution also increased the autonomy of 
universities. For example, civil rights were promoted and students were given the 
freedom to organize their own associations at the universities. It also gave social 
rights to trade unions such as rights to free unionization, to strike and of collective 
bargaining (Özbudun 2000: 129). In sum, political activities such as the activities of 
new parties, trade unions, and religious groups had more freedoms and individual 
human rights were protected compared to previous constitutions (Grigoriadis 2009: 
29). 
However, the political environment was not stable and there were coalition 
governments between the CHP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi- AP). In 1965, the 
AP won the elections with a clear majority but soon struggled with the new Right- 
Left politics in Turkey (Sunar and Sayarı 1986). The extreme polarization and 
ideological division of society along a left-right continuum characterized this period.  
The new Right-Left politics influenced the development of civil society during this 
period. During these years, the Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation of Turkey 
(Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- DİSK) established and followed 
a more independent and socialist action in its activities (Blind 2007). The DİSK 
affiliated with the leftist circles. However, when the fighting between right and left 
groups deteriorated and destabilized the county, a second military coup took place on 
12 March 1971. The 1961 constitution was amended and severely limited the political 
freedoms on behalf of the state integrity and unity. Zihnioğlu (2013: 107) states that, 
“the changes covered basically every political and social institution in Turkey, 
including the trade unions, the press, universities, the Council of State and the 
Parliament”. 
After the second military coup, the military and secularist elite considered 
civil society as a threat to the country’s stability. Therefore, the civil society arena 
was limited and any activities that were outside the state policy were not tolerated. 
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Between 1971 and 1980 Turkey was politically unstable with clumsy 
governments. By the end of the 1970s, the political situation worsened, there was 
violence between militant leftist and state-tolerated rightist groups and the 
government could not control the situation (Karpat 1988: 145-146). 
At the end, for the third time, the army responded with a coup and took over 
political power on 12 September 1980. As the following section shows, the new 
Constitution that was approved in 1982 brought severe limitations on human rights 
and liberties and banned all political activities. Furthermore, the changes in the Law 
on Associations further restricted and limited the space of civil society (Kubicek 
2001: 36).  
 
4.3. Civil Society in Post- Republican Period (1980-1999) 
 
According to the National Security Council, the purpose of the 1980 military 
coup was to restore the political, social and economic crises predominating in the 
second half of the 1970s (Zihnioğlu 2013: 109). The makers of the 1982 Constitution 
did not envisage a vibrant civil society that plays a key role in the political processes. 
In his speech, Kenan Evren, introduced the draft constitution before the constitutional 
referendum on 7 November 1982. Evren expressed the military junta’s opinion on 
associations: 
The new Constitution lays down a principle valid for all institutions. Each institution, 
whether a party, a school, or a professional organization, should remain in its own 
functionally specified area. In other words, a party will function as a party, an 
association as an association, a foundation as a foundation, and a trade union as a 
trade union. Political activity is reserved for political parties. No institution which is 
not organized as a political party may engage in political activity. On the other hand, 
political parties should not interfere in areas reserved for trade unions, associations, 
professional organizations, and foundations. Every institution will function within its 
framework. (Quoted in Özbudun 2000: 131).  
 
Therefore, a goal of the 1982 Constitution was to prevent the politicization of 
associations. It banned all organizations from pursuing political objectives, which was 
seen as responsible for polarizing society and spreading violence in the mid 1970s. 
The military re-writing of the 1982 Constitution brought severe limitations on 
individual liberty and empowered state authority to restore the order. The 
maintenance of law and order and preserving state authority had been at the center of 
the military intervention. The objective of the 1982 Constitution and its respective 
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laws were to protect the state by hindering the development of civil society and 
limiting rights and freedoms. 
Particularly, the authoritative and restrictive nature of the constitution was 
embedded in Articles 33 and 34 in relation to the activities of civil society 
organizations (Zihnioğlu 2013: 111). Articles 33 and 3417 stated that: 
Associations cannot pursue political goals, cannot have political activities, neither be 
supported by the political parties nor support them, can not act jointly with the 
syndicates, professional institutions and foundations. (Article 33) 
 
Associations, foundations, syndicates and professional organizations cannot meet or 
march on issues other than their interest or objective. (Article 34) 
 
  Furthermore, the Law of Associations was promulgated in 1983 and as 
Özçetin et. al (2014:8) emphasizes, it “limited the rights of civil servants’ 
membership in associations and gave the state absolute authority to stop and control 
activities of associations”. The Constitution expressly prohibited involvement in 
political activities, banned all professional associations and trade unions, closed down 
political parties, detained their leaders, oppressed leftist and extreme right parties and 
abolished all connection and mechanisms of joint actions between political parties and 
groups (Özbudun 2000:131; Zihnioğlu 2013:110). Thus, as was evident in different 
periods to varying degrees, the legal and institutional environment was restricted for 
the operation of civil society. At the same time, associations forced to depend on state 
institutions and remained under the strict control of the state. 
After the 1980 military coup, political, economic, and social transformations 
changed the political landscape in Turkey and impacted the development of civil 
society. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi- ANAP) won the elections and 
Turkey’s new economic liberalization policies and the shift from an import orientated 
to an export orientated economic model together with the rise of political Islam 
reshaped the political arena (Grigoriadis 2009: 45-46). Göle describes the difference 
between the pre-1980 period and post-1980 period as follows: “Whereas the 
modernizing elites of the earlier decades took as their basic mission the secularization 
of Turkish politics and the transmission of Western values to that polity and to 
society, the technocratic elites of the 1980s defined their goals less in terms of 
                                                        
17
 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html [Accessed on: 15 January 2010]. 
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educating people then of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality.” 
(Göle 1994:213). 
 Significantly, the military junta’s intention to “restore” the political order and 
“stabilize” the country led to the revival of Islam in Turkish politics and society. In 
order to end the right-left division, the military regime collaborated with moderate 
Sunni Islam. This policy of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk –İslam Sentezi) sought to 
utilize Islamic values against leftists groups and Kurdish nationalists (Kadıoğlu 1996; 
Grigoriadis 2009: 50; Ketola 2013: 66). Particularly in the Özal era, political Islam 
did not only rise in the public sphere, but was also promoted by the active government 
policy. For instance, the establishment of İmam Hatip Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları) 
was supported. These schools advanced religious education and gave rise to religious 
civil society which promoted political Islam (Grigoriadis 2009: 50). Tünay (1993) 
argues that the post-1980 developments created an atmosphere and a new equilibrium 
for “the Turkish new rights attempt to hegemony”. Furthermore, Tünay (1993:11) 
states that “a shift towards development based on export orientation, restructuring law 
and order, emergence of new individualism, deterioration of distribution of wealth, 
and the rise of the new-right politics pointed to an emergence of a new balance of 
power in Turkey”. These developments opened a new space for the civic activity and 
brought new dynamism for the civil society. 
 Scholars have argued that the post-1980 period and the 1990s constituted a 
turning point and a break up in the history of Turkish civil society (Göle 1994 ;Toprak 
1996; Özbudun and Keyman 2002; Şimşek 2004; TÜSEV 2006; İçduygu 2007; 
Keyman and Öniş 2007). Despite the restrictive constitutional and legal framework, 
the number of civil society organizations proliferated, their areas of interest 
diversified and therefore the spectrum of civil society expanded and civil society 
space became “more diffused” (Seckinelgin 2004:174). 
 Keyman and İçduygu (2003) identified four main processes that facilitated the 
social and political changes in Turkey in the mid-1980s onwards. The first process is 
the emergence of alternative modernities where new actors, new mentalities and new 
identity claims have developed since the 1980s (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 222; 
Kuzmanovic 2012: 12). The secular and state-centric model of modernity was no 
longer efficient to regulate the societal relations and the hegemony of this model was 
challenged by alternative claims. Within this context, the emergence of new actors 
alongside new discourses created an interest in civil society as an alternative 
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framework. In addition to Islamic discourse, an array of new actors, from women’s 
groups to environmental groups, human rights groups to Kurdish groups that utilize 
the language of rights and democratization have been grown. Therefore, the late 
1980s witnessed the tolerance of different groups with different cultural backgrounds 
(Şimşek 2004:112) and issue areas. The second process is the legitimacy crisis of the 
strong-state tradition in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223; Kuzmanovic 2012: 
13). The new developments in the post-1980 period showed the inability of the state 
to deal with problems. The third process to facilitate social and political changes is the 
EU accession process (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223-225; Kuzmanovic 2012: 14) 
that is extensively discussed in the following chapters. The fourth process is the 
process of globalization, specifically globalization of markets and the intensification 
of global communication (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 225; Kuzmanovic 2012: 15). 
Globalization has pointed out the limits of national politics and the necessity of 
collaborative relations to resolve global matters such as environmental degradation, 
poverty and multiculturalism. Within this context, civil society organizations have 
become important actors in political processes. Another international development 
has been the 1996 UN Habitat II conference held in İstanbul. The Habitat Conference 
created an opportunity for, and mobilized Turkish civil society organizations and 
other stakeholders to participate in the global movement of civil society as well as 
increased the awareness of civil society organizations on different matters such as 
social justice and sustainable development (TÜSEV 2006: 14). It notably provided a 
bridge for networking between Turkish civil society organizations and their 




 This chapter situated civil society in a historical context and showed historical 
legacies in relation to civil society. These legacies, defined as inherited characteristics 
of civil society, are not only important to demonstrate past and present traditions of 
civil society but more importantly have implications on the EU impact. Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 will discuss the interplay among the historical legacies and the EU in different 
sectors of civil society. The path-dependent character of civil society is the main 
conclusion of this chapter. This means that despite the growing number of 
organizations, its diversification, increased autonomy, and strengthening of civil 
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society, the inherited characteristics of civil society have not changed to a great 
extent.  
 The legacy of strong state tradition was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. 
As I have shown, throughout the different periods, the unity and survival of the state 
has been the main concern in Turkish political history. Civil society activities that 
were seen in contrast to the state’s interests were not tolerated and suppressed. 
 The legacy of restrictive legal and institutional framework was prevalent and 
continued to shape the operation of civil society. All constitutions since the Ottoman 
Empire introduced freedom of association to varying degrees. For instance, while the 
1961 constitution was very liberal in nature, the 1982 constitution was the most 
authoritarian in nature. Yet, as shown by the 1909, 1924, 1961, 1971 and 1982 
Constitutions and respective articles, freedom of association was limited and state 
controlled. In addition, in terms of financial structure, the state closely monitored civil 
society organizations and they remained under the strict control of the governments. 
 The presence and prevalence of the legacy of Europe as an important symbol 
of framing was evident. Europe and the West are used interchangeably and has been 
an important symbol in Turkish politics since the Tanzimat period. This does not 
mean that the usage of Europe and its nature has not changed throughout the different 
periods. On the contrary, the usage of Europe is subject to change. However, it 
remained as a model, as an important symbol in the debates of civil society. 
  The legacy of the ideologically divided civil society sphere is one of the 
peculiarities of civil society in Turkey. Since the Ottoman period, civil society has 
been ideologically divided and the legal framework has not eased the cooperation 
among civil society actors. In the Ottoman period, the society was divided between 
the center and the periphery; in the early Republican period, civil society was divided 
between Kemalist and non-Kemalist organizations, the transition to multiparty 
politics did not change the cleavage and the society was divided between government 
supported organizations and other organizations; after 1960 it was divided along left-
right axis and since 1980, the division has been based on a Kemalist-Islamist or 
Kurdish-Kemalist continuum. 
 The legacy of limited and diverse external connections is also an inherited 
characteristic of the civil society. Although cooperation started in earlier times for 
some organizations, the constitution did not only make it difficult to open foreign 
civil society branches in Turkey, but also governments strictly controlled civil society 
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and impeded establishing external connections. One of the key implications of 
historical legacies is on the EU impact. These legacies are important not only to show 




WOMEN’S CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY 
 
Women’s civil society, with a particular focus on women’s NGOs, provides a 
challenging case for scholars and policymakers for understanding the potential and 
limits of the EU influence. This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the 
Europeanization of civil society, discussed extensively in Chapter 2, with a new and 
original empirical study on the re-evaluation of EU impact on women’s civil society, 
systematic analysis of mechanisms, their interplay with domestic factors, and 
reconsideration of how transformative the European integration on women’s NGOs in 
Turkey is. The interaction between the EU and civil society challenges the orthodox 
top-down approach of Europeanization studies, and shows that the Europeanization 
outcomes are shaped by the interaction between the EU and domestic factors, and the 
EU has not necessarily led to uniform impact across different sectors of civil society; 
legacy-based explanations account for the variation of the EU impact. 
My argument is a stronger degree of Europeanization of women’s civil society 
is achieved when the EU meets facilitating historical legacies are grounded in two 
main literatures. The first one is the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey, which 
focuses on the transformative impact of the EU on Turkish civil society. The second 
is the literature on women’s studies in Turkey, which has scrutinized the relationship 
between the EU and the women’s movement in Turkey. While the former has 
extensively examined the compulsory and enabling pathway on civil society this 
domain of the literature has not been sufficiently concentrated on connective 
pathways of the EU influence. The latter has focused on the literature on the women’s 
movement in Turkey and the relationship between the EU and women’s groups. Some 
scholars have prioritized the role of the EU as a key factor, for example, Kıvılcım -
Forsman (2004) shows that the gender equality laws, and the new Civil Code, are 
largely driven by the Turkish harmonization process of the EU acquis. Others have 
argued that reforms in the new Civil and Penal Code as well as Constitutional 
amendments were primarily driven by the advocacy and lobby of the women’s groups 
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(Kardam 2011). Another group of scholars has stressed that the women’s 
organizations’ demands were empowered by EU pressure (Arat 2008; Aldıkaçtı-
Marshall 2008). Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2008) has argued that the EU has created 
favorable conditions for women’s groups to influence the drafting processes of law. 
More recently, Özdemir (2014) has analyzed the role of the EU in triggering 
legislative reforms by considering its interaction with other domestic and external 
factors. However, in current literature there is no comprehensive analysis of the 
Europeanization of women’s NGOs, the interplay between direct and indirect forms 
of EU involvement nor an exploration of interaction between domestic and EU 
factors. 
This chapter fills these gaps and contributes to both literatures. I argue that the 
EU has differential impact on different sectors of civil society and a stronger degree 
of the Europeanization of women’s civil society is achieved when the EU meets 
facilitating historical legacies. I substantiate this argument with original empirical 
evidence and show the role of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact. 
By using categories of the EU impact from Diez et al. (2006; 2008), I have examined 
different processes of the EU influence on women’s civil society. My study of 
compulsory and enabling pathways indicate similar findings across different sectors 
of civil society. While I will examine both pathways in relation to the women’s civil 
society, most of the analysis will focus on the connective pathway that led to diverse 
outcomes. As I emphasized in Chapter 2, most of the research on civil society judged 
the EU influence on the basis of the changes on the operation of civil society and the 
EU’s legitimization power. Although I will present evidence from these aspects, in 
this thesis I judged the EU impact not only on the operation of civil society but also 
their role in the policies as well as their interactions among actors. For this reason, I 
will mostly base my analysis on the connective impact, which is not inclusively 
surveyed in the literature. I will show how interaction of domestic factors and EU 
factors led to different outcomes of Europeanization. Finally, I will demonstrate how 
legacies matter and function as a facilitating condition of the EU impact. 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, I should emphasize that women’s 
NGOs are not a homogenous group in Turkey. The group in my fieldwork includes 
the main women’s NGOs in Turkey, namely, Kemalist women NGOs, feminist 
women NGOs, Islamist women NGOs and Kurdish women NGOs. There have been 
various attempts to categorize women’s civil society in Turkey. The selection of 
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women NGOs informed by two general criteria: (i) national women NGOs, and (ii) 
advocacy women NGOs that focus their expertize on different aspects of women’s 
issues. Therefore, I focus on one particular type of women’s NGOs- active national 
women NGOs that perform advocacy functions in different areas. 
In the first section, I provide an overview of the historical evolution of 
women’s civil society in understanding particular characteristics that shaped the 
women’s movement in Turkey. This section shows peculiarities of women’s civil 
society and argues that historically women’s civil society has had strong activism, 
some form of relations with the state and early international links even in the Ottoman 
period. The second section applies a model of EU influence on civil society 
development and demonstrates different dimensions of the EU impact in women’s 
civil society. The third section shows the role of historical legacies in the explanation 
of the EU impact by invoking a plausibility probe. These results suggest that the 
successful transformation of women’s civil society has depended on domestic factors 
that act as facilitating conditions. In other words, development of women’s civil 
society has been both influenced by the EU and by particular legacies such as strong 
activism and mobilization, institutionalization and long international ties. The final 
section summarizes the findings and looks at the implications for the EU’s civil 
society approach from women’s civil society in Turkey. Overall, empirical findings 
substantiate the conclusion that the EU and legacies of the past shape the development 
of women’s civil society in Turkey, and act as facilitating conditions for the 
transformation of civil society. 
 
5.1. Major Developments in Women’s Civil Society  
 
This section reviews the history of women’s civil society and identifies sector 
specific characteristics of the women’s NGOs in the pre-1999 period, before Turkey 
was recognized as a candidate country in Helsinki. While Chapter 4 has specified 
overall legacies of the past, in a similar manner this section identifies inherited 
characteristics of women’s civil society. I will show that throughout the different 
periods of the history, women’s civil society has been dynamic, has prioritized 
women’s issues despite the differences, and has collaborated with the state under the 
national women’s machinery and formed transnational connections. 
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5.1.1.Women’s Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923) 
 
Women’s civil society has strong roots in Turkey and an insightful analysis of 
the women’s movement has showed that strong activism of the women’s movement 
was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Before the 1980s, many scholars believed 
that the women’s movement started with the foundation of the Republic as a top down 
project. They argued that there was no women’s movement in the Ottoman period, 
and women’s struggle and all the rights on the status of women were granted after the 
establishment of the Republican regime in 1923. However, this assumption was 
challenged with the development of a feminist research agenda in Turkey after the 
1980s (Demirdirek 1998; Yaraman 2001; Çakır 2007; 2010; Çaha 2010). Many 
scholars have demonstrated that contrary to common belief, the women’s movement 
was powerful enough to demand rights regarding women’s status in society. 
Therefore, we now know that the women’s struggle and mobilization is not a new 
phenomenon in Turkish political history; it goes back to “pre-Republican times”- the 
last decade of the Ottoman Empire (Tekeli 1995; Arat 2008). During this period, 
women demanded new rights and promoted modernist values in Turkish society. 
Scholars agree that the period before the Tanzimat was static regarding 
women’s issues. Women were seen as a commodity and the Harem18 belonged to the 
Sultan. Women had no political, social or legal rights. In her book, The Ottoman 
Women’s Movement (Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi), Çakır argues that Ottoman women 
were not only objects of modernization and politics but also active subjects in the 
struggle for emancipation (Çakır 2010). To support her argument, Çakır traces 
Ottoman feminism in women’s journals, organizations, activities and discourses in the 
Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918). She shows the inception of the women’s 
movement with the start of the modernization process, Tanzimat, in the Ottoman 
period. Çakır’s argument has important consequences in understanding Ottoman 
history, the status of women and transformation of the dominant discourses in relation 
to the women’s issues. Çakır clearly shows that Ottoman women demanded certain 
rights and they used journals, magazines and associations to raise awareness of 
women issues, initiated arguments on feminism, and proposed solutions for women’s 
problems. Also, she indicates that in the modernization process, women were at the 
                                                        
18 In Ottoman Empire Harem was described as follows: “(1) Part of a palace, mansion, or house in 
Islamic countries that was regarded as an intimate sphere and thus forbidden to strangers. (2) All the 
females living in the harem. (3) The imperial harem in the Ottoman palaces.” (Somel 2003: 115). 
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center of the debates between traditionalists and reformists. This led to the formation 
of a specific image of women in Turkish society. Elements of that image are still 
evident in recent debates between Kemalist and Islamist women. As Çakır indicated, 
the women’s movement also shows the ideology and social characteristics of the 
Ottoman time (Çakır 2007: 68). By using various publications, Ottoman women 
raised awareness about their rights in public opinion. 
Furthermore, women established various associations to discuss women’s 
problems. As Çakır illustrates, the associations created a collective action since 
individual claims transformed into socially organized demands (Çakır 2007: 68). 
Membership of Ottoman organizations mainly consisted of elite and middle class 
educated women who lived in urban cities. These organizations reflected two 
important characteristics of the Ottoman women’s movement. On one side were 
organizations of women interested in national issues such as economic conditions, 
improving the national economy and encouraging consumption of the national 
product. On the other side were issue specific organizations that dealt with various 
aspects of women’s problems. Some organizations only focused on the issue of 
education, such as the Association for the Protection of Ottoman Turkish Ladies 
(Osmanlı Türk Kadınları Esirgeme Derneği) and the School for Seamstresses (Biçki 
Yurdu). Other organizations promoted the importance of women’s consciousness by 
organizing conferences. The Ottoman women also created associations for 
participating in business life and philanthropic associations that aimed at healing the 
wounds of the Balkan Wars (Çakır 2007:72). In addition, there were various ethnic 
women’s associations, which benefitted from the flexible structure of the Ottoman 
Empire to mobilize their constituencies such as the Beyoğlu Greek Beneficial 
Association of Women (Beyoğlu Rum Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i Nisvaniyesi), the 
Beneficial Union of Turkish and Armenian Women (Türk ve Ermeni Kadınlar İttihat 
Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi), the Association for the Elevation of Kurdish Women (Kürt 
Kadınları Teali Cemiyeti), and the Association for Mutual Co-operation Amongst 
Circassian Women (Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti) (Çakır 2010: 103-104). 
However, after the establishment of the Republic these organizations were affected by 
rising Turkish nationalism. 
Even though there were several associations regarding the women’s issues, 
Women’s World (Kadınlar Dünyası) played an influential role in shaping the 
Ottoman women’s movement. Women’s World actively struggled for the rights of 
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women such as equality and recognition of women’s rights in public law through its 
publications. Another feature of the journal was its writers, composed of women from 
all segments of society. It was the official journal of the Association for the Defense 
of the Rights of Ottoman Women (Osmanlı Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti), 
established in 1913 (Çakır 2010: 107). This association had different activities, and in 
terms of the ideological currents of the time, reflected feminist values. 
As I have exemplified in Chapter 4, Europe has been an important symbol and 
a model for civil society. The publications of women’s periodicals and activities of 
associations in the Ottoman era clearly illustrated how the European and Western 
women’s movement was a model and a reference point for the Ottoman women’s 
movement. One prominent example was the activities of the feminist publications. 
For instance, Women’s World published numerous articles on feminism (Demirdirek 
1998; Çakır 2007; 2010; Arat 2008) and made strong references to women suffrage 
movements in Western Europe. Demirdirek (1998) explains how the Ottoman women 
were following the women’s suffrage movements in Europe and demanding women’s 
right to vote, therefore, using Western movements as a model to demand their rights 
at home. There were strong references to their “sisters in the West”. 
A striking characteristic of the Ottoman women’s movement was the 
collaboration and solidarity among women. Ottoman women from all segments of the 
society (through Women’s World) regularly mobilized around the women’s issues 
through various magazines by writing and sharing their experiences as well as 
demanding their rights. As İştar (2006: 65) argues, these magazines became a 
platform of communication and solidarity among Ottoman women where they shared 
their ideas, experiences and problems. Moreover, women cooperated during the War 
of Independence (1919-1923), and this collaboration has important implications for 
today’s women’s movement. Ottoman women did not only collaborate among 
themselves but also had established external connections with their counterparts. For 
example, the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Ottoman Women had 
linkages with the women’s movement as well as feminist writers, who contributed to 
the awareness of the women by writing articles in Women’s World (Arat 2008: 390). 
Furthermore, feminists in other countries increased awareness of their own public 
about the Ottoman feminist movement. By examining Women’s World, Çakır (2007) 
discovered that Grace Ellison from The Times and Odetta Feldman from the Berliner 
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Tageblatt came to İstanbul and in return informed their own public about the 
experiences of the Ottoman women’s movement (Çakır 2007: 72). 
Another significant characteristic inherited from the Ottoman Empire was the 
relationship between state and society. Chapter 4 extensively discussed the Ottoman 
state tradition, and how the development of civil society and activism have been 
paralyzed by this strong state tradition. In the Ottoman convention, civil society had 
no influence over the state. As Grigoriadis (2009:67) points out, “the pursuit of 
individual interest was dismissed as divisive and harmful for the common good”. This 
negative perception was the predominant attitude towards civil society that 
legitimized excessive control over civil society actors, and later shaped state policies 
towards civil society actors. Although the women’s movement was strong, women’s 
organizations also had activism within the limits of the state and were influenced by 
the state’s ideology. Women’s civil society was not something separate from the state. 
Nevertheless, women’s civil society both resisted and cooperated with the state. For 
example, one of the principle objectives of the Association for Defense of the Rights 
of Ottoman Women was to integrate women into economic life and social life. 
Besides its different awareness - rising activities such as entering the post office to 
draw attention to the right to enter public offices (Çakır 2007: 72), the organization 
actively lobbied for the integration of women into economic life in public institutions, 
and secured placement for two women at the İstanbul telephone company (Arat 2008: 
390). In a similar vein, during the War of Independence, Turkish women cooperated 
with the nationalists against the Ottoman state. A well-known woman, the novelist 
Halide Edip Adıvar mobilized large constituencies to raise awareness and protested 
against the occupation. 
In sum, during the Ottoman period, Muslim women published journals such as 
Demet (İstanbul, 1908), Mehasin (İstanbul, 1908-9), Kadın (İstanbul, 1911-12), 
Kadınlık (İstanbul, 1913) and Kadınlar Dünyası (İstanbul, 1913-21) and demanded 
legal reforms in marriage and new rights in education and the economic sphere (Arat 
2008: 389-390). In this period, women succeeded in passing a family code that 
improved the marriage contract for women and polygamy was legally discouraged 
(Arat 2008: 390). As we have seen, women’s activism has a strong long-standing past 
in Turkey. 
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5.1.2. Women’s Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party Period 
(1923-1980) 
 
In the early Republican and multi-party period (1923-80), the state initiated 
reforms and pursued a modernization agenda. Similar to the last period of the 
Ottoman empire, the new Republic was mainly motivated by secularist principles and 
Turkish nationalism, where women were defined in the framework of a “modern 
ideology”. As Seckinelgin (2004: 155) argues, “the position of women must be seen 
central in this process; it was used as one of the most important interventions to 
initiate this process”. Women’s formal emancipation succeeded early, as a part of the 
modernization and civilisation project. In 1926, the Islamic legal code was replaced 
by the civil code and introduced new legal rights for women such as equal rights in 
marriage, divorce and the custody of children (Arat 2008: 392). In 1934, women 
gained the right to suffrage, and the status of women was improved in education and 
employment. The Republican reforms and Kemalist ideology socialized women in a 
particular way and Turkish middle-class women adopted these roles and enhanced the 
Kemalist female identity (Durakbaşa 1998). For instance, Durakbaşa (1998) 
illustrated that Kemalist fathers brought up their daughters as exemplary Republican 
women and supported them to ensure that their daughters were educated to participate   
in the public sphere. At the same time, these men continued to endorse moral codes in 
the family. As Kandiyoti rightly points out, Turkish women were now “emancipated 
but not liberated”(Kandiyoti 1987: 320). In practice, there was little difference 
between the traditionalist and modernist patterns in relation to the gender roles. 
During early Republican and multi-party period, women collaborated with the 
state, and until the 1980s women did not challenge the restrictions caused by the state 
(Arat 2008: 392). The state policy reflected the secular state-building project where 
women were thought to benefit from the various reforms introduced by Atatürk. For 
instance, Atatürk encouraged Western clothing for women, discouraged veiling and 
banned polygamy in marriage. As Tekeli (1997) argues, these reforms were mainly 
directed to the public sphere and neglected the patriarchal family structure in the 
private realm. Therefore, the Turkish form of “state feminism” mainly concentrated 
on the public sphere and the secular role of women. It was aligned with the state 
ideology and strongly supported by the principles of Kemalism. Therefore, female 
activism was promoted Kemalist state values and was conducted within the 
boundaries of the state. 
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In the early years of the Republic, women had actively demanded political 
rights, yet, their activities empowered the state rather than their feminist identity. In 
his analysis, Zafer Toprak (1986; 1988), showed that women started the struggle for 
political rights after the establishment of the new Republic. Nezihe Muhiddin, a well 
known feminist in the Ottoman women’s movement and publisher of the journal 
Women’s Way (Kadın Yolu)  and her friends attempted to establish the first women’s 
political party called the Women’s People’s Party (Kadınlar Halk Fırkası) in 1923. 
However, the Women’s People Party was not officially recognized because the 1909 
election law forbade women from participating in politics. Instead, women were 
advised to establish an association by the Kemalist elite. They founded the TKB in 
1924 with the aim to advocate political rights, particularly, to support women’s 
participation in politics as well as to enhance social rights. The existence of horizontal 
relations was not common during the early Republican period, due to the decline in 
the number of women’s organizations and strict control of the state over civil society. 
During this period, only state supported organizations were allowed to function. Yet, 
the TKB established branches around Anatolia to raise awareness of activities of the 
association and to enhance solidarity between women. 
Europe was an important symbol for the TKB. Like the visionaries of 
Kemalist modernizers, Ziya Gökalp, the association borrowed elements of Western 
civilization for the women’s movement but maintain their culture. This case illustrates 
how Kemalist women’s associations re-interpreted Western values and principles for 
their own use. They made strong references to Western women as a model for 
progression. For instance, as highlighted in Chapter 4, a representative of the TKB 
explained how the organization had made strong references to Western women as a 
model. 
The women in the organization were interested in establishing connections with the 
women in Western countries. They followed their activities, made connections, 
participated in their activities and exchanged information. They also had connections 
with Eastern women but most of the time, the TKB did not participate in their 
activities since they imitated European Women as a model for progression and did not 
want to be regarded as Eastern women. (Interview TKB 2011). 
 
The TKB established international connections and participated in the 
International Alliance of Women in 1926. A delegation from the association 
represented Turkey in the international women’s congress in Paris, and in the 
following years other activists from the association were involved in other 
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international feminists conventions (Durakbaşa 1998; Zdanowski 2014:56). However, 
the association was indirectly closed in 1935, following the XII Congress of the 
International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship conference, 
which took place with the justification that its mission was fulfilled and women had 
been granted political rights and the right to vote in elections. 
Strong state tradition and a focus on nationalism and modernization continued 
to characterize the Republican women’s civil society. Women’s issues and 
particularly educated modern women had an important place in this context.  
Women’s civil society aligned with the Kemalist ideology and activist women and 
their groups were seen as representatives of the secular state. As Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 
(2013: 49) stresses, “in the absence of the autonomous feminist movement during the 
1940s and 1950s many women, especially in urban areas, mainly put their efforts 
toward supporting the new administration and remained royal to the secular project”. 
Therefore, the relationship between the state and women’s civil society were 
intertwined until the 1980s. 
Due to a volatile political environment and successive military coups, 
women’s issues were sidelined until the 1980s, but women continued to mobilize 
within political parties and student movements during the 1960s and 1970s. Political 
parties from right, left, and nationalist stances opened women’s branches. 
Furthermore, women in socialist groups and socialist parties discussed women’s 
issues. However, women’s issues were discussed in relation to other themes such as 
the oppression of the working class and socialism as a solution to women’s problems. 
The Progressive Women’s Association (İlerici Kadınlar Derneği) was founded in this 
environment led by a class-conscious leadership of the Workers Party of Turkey 
(Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP) and reached many women in Turkey. Equally important 
were influential trade unions and youth organizations at the universities. Importantly, 
a women’s student movement at the universities developed new strategies of 
mobilization, which were later used in the 1980s in the independent women’s 






5.1.3. Women’s Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999) 
 
Similar to other issue areas, the 1980s witnessed an emergence of an 
independent women’s movement and rising awareness on women’s issues in Turkey. 
The most important characteristics were the independent feminist discourse from the 
official ideology and leftist views, and “variety of feminisms”. In the 1980s, with the 
relaxation of the political climate after the 1980 military coup, women’s groups 
started to develop a new identity, which was different from the state, and became 
more sceptical towards the state. In this way, the women’s movement diversified 
along different strands. After the 1980s, different issues have been brought up by the 
feminist movement, such as the elimination of violence and discrimination against 
women, the misrepresentation of women in the media, the controversy against 
virginity tests, demand for increase in literacy and education levels of women, 
sanctions against honor crimes, advancement of women’s human rights, adoption of a 
quota in political participation and increase in representation of women in the 
parliament. The motto the “personal is political” characterized the women’s 
movement in the 1980s. 
Despite their ideological differences, the women’s movement has mobilized 
around different issues from the 1980s onwards. One issue for mobilization was an 
petition campaign for the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Types of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that Turkey signed in 1985. Within this 
context, women criticized the Civil Code and the Penal Code and demanded equal 
rights under the law and initiated a petition campaign in 1986 (Kardam 2007:195). 
Arat (2008: 397) claims “feminists of diverse persuasions united over their 
dissatisfaction with the legal framework”. Another issue was the mobilization against 
domestic violence. In 1987 the women’s movement organized various 
demonstrations. Particularly, the “No to Battering March” was organized in 1987 
following a decision by a judge who ruled against a woman’s appeal for divorce on 
the basis that women need to be beaten to be controlled; consequently, a national 
campaign for the struggle against violence against women was started (Toktaş and 
Diner 2011: 61). Therefore, women in Turkey were united and cooperated among 
various issues. 
  The relationship between the state and women’s organizations has taken 
different forms. Traditionally, civil society organizations were tightly controlled in 
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Turkey. As Chapter 4 outlined in detail, with the 1980 military coup and authoritative 
1982 Constitution, the state restricted various groups, movements and political 
parties. However, after the military coup, the new government by Özal did not feel 
threatened by the new women’s movement in Turkey, because the government did not 
take the women’s movement seriously and did not attach critical importance to 
women’s organizations (Kardam 2005: 42), but indirectly, the state opened up space 
for women’s mobilization. During this time, women’s organizations and the state did 
not have much interaction. Nevertheless, in 1987 Turkey had established the first 
public institution called the “Advisory Board for Policies with Regard to the Women” 
within the State Planning Organization to raise gender awareness with the 
involvement of representatives from public agencies, NGOs and universities. 
  Another characteristic is the existence and use of external networks in 
women’s civil society. Women’s organizations started to establish formal links with 
international organizations, discover their rights and use the CEDAW process and 
regulations strategically to promote their demands. In 1986, women’s groups 
organized a campaign for the implementation of CEDAW and demanded their legal 
rights. Women’s activism together with pressure from the UN’s CEDAW opened the 
way for the adoption of the Law on the Protection of the Family (Law No. 4320) in 
1998. The law enacted new measures for the protection of women from domestic 
violence and penalized domestic violence against women and children. Under this 
law, domestic violence was no longer considered as a private matter but became a 
critical problem in the public sphere. 
  The 1990s was characterized as a period of institutionalization and an 
emergence of new actors in relation to the women’s civil society. In the 1990s, the 
women’s movement led the establishment of civil society organizations in the form of 
foundations and associations. One important characteristic of the 1990s was various 
initiations to institutionalize the women’s movement. For instance, in 1990, the 
Women’s Library (Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı) was founded 
in İstanbul. Also, universities established research centers and departments of 
women’s studies. Purple Roof (Mor Çatı) the first independent women’s shelter was 
established to find secure accommodation for battered women and symbolized the 
solidarity of the women’s movement. The establishment of the Association for 
Supporting and Training Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme 
Derneği-KA-DER) reflects another example of the institutionalization of the women’s 
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movement and formation of civil society organizations in the form of associations. 
Another important characteristic of the women’s movement in Turkey, which 
became more pronounced during this period, was the cleavages between women’s 
groups, specifically the Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish identities of these groups. This 
period characterized the formation of the identity of the women’s movement and its 
institutionalization as well as fragmantation. Nonetheless, the cleavage in women’s 
movement after the 1990s profited from  Kurdish and Islamist feminism and “their 
criticism against Kemalist feminists for being ethno-centric and exclusionary of other 
identities” (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 47). Especially, there was the formation of an 
independent women’s movement out of the Kurdish movement in southeastern 
Turkey. Diner and Toktaş (2010:48) express the impact of the Kurdish conflict on 
women as follows: “On the one hand, the environment of violence and insecurity 
increased the vulnerability of Kurdish women in the region; and on the other hand, it 
led to the politicization of Kurdish women, as these women became actively involved 
in political parties and organizations and participated in meetings, demonstrations and 
protests, even sometimes ending up in prison”. During this period, Kurdish women 
started to appear in the public sphere. For example, the Saturdays Mothers brought 
awareness on the issue of missing people under police custody. The establishment of 
Women’s Center (Kadın Merkezi-KAMER) marked a turning point in the Kurdish 
women’s movement. KAMER is one of the largest and most respected feminist 
organizations, very active in 23 cities in the east and southeastern regions of Turkey. 
The women in KAMER argue that violence starts in the family; therefore, the first 
goal of KAMER is to prevent violence and raise awareness inside the family. It is 
important to highlight that from the 1990s onwards the interaction between KAMER 
and Turkish feminists has increased (Akkoç 2002). For example, all women’s 
organizations that fight violence against women meet annually to discuss different 
issues (Interview Mor Çatı 2011). 
Similarly, political Islam brought another dimension to the women’s 
movement in Turkey. Islamists women demanded a place in the public sphere with a 
Muslim identity; the headscarf symbolized their appearance in the public sphere. 
Moreover, women have actively participated in Islamist political parties in Turkey. 
The ban on wearing headscarves at universities united Islamist women under the same 
umbrella. Women from religious backgrounds have protested this situation and 
increased women’s political participation in the public sphere. For instance, some 
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associations similar to Women Against Discrimination (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın 
Hakları Derneği-AK-DER) and platforms like Rainbow İstanbul Women 
Organizations’ Platform (Gökkuşağı İstanbul Kadın Platformu-GİKAP) were founded 
to end discrimination against women who wear headscarves (Interview AK-DER 
2011). Both Kurdish nationalism and political Islam have challenged Kemalist 
feminism. 
Women from different segments of society continued to mobilize around the 
women’s issues during the 1990s. For example, in 1992, women activist’s demands to 
make changes in the legislative framework led to a nationwide campaign by women 
platforms in İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara to demand changes in the discriminatory 
clauses of the Civil Code (Özdemir 2014:127). 
  In 1990, there was an institutionalization of women’s issues under the state 
machinery and cooperation between the state and the women’s organizations in 
Turkey. The dynamics of this engagement first formally developed with the 
establishment of the Directorate of Women’s Status and Problems (Kadının Statüsü 
Genel Müdürlüğü –KSGM), the National Women’s Machinery in 1990 to watch the 
implementation of the CEDAW and the “Forward-looking Strategies for the 
Advancement of Women” which were adopted at the 1985 UN Conference in Nairobi 
(Ecevit 2007: 196). This process was not initiated by the women’s movement in 
Turkey. Nevertheless, it put the gender issues, particularly gender equality, on the 
national agenda and created a framework for negotiation and cooperation between the 
parties. Although initially the women’s organizations were suspicious about the 
establishment of the directorate and raised their concerns on the grounds that it would 
be a mechanism to control gender discourse and direct the activities of organizations 
with the “national viewpoint”, the directorate gradually gained recognition of the 
women’s organizations (Acuner 2002; Ecevit 2007: 196; Arat 2008: 398-399). 
Arguably, women’s cooperation with the directorate has been successful on two 
issues. The first was the mobilization and active lobbying of women’s organizations 
for the amendments of the Civil Code and Penal Code, which discriminate against 
women and reinforce their dependency. The second was the preparation process of the 
country report for the Fourth World Congress in Beijing in 1995 and collaboration 
between the women’s organizations and the directorate. Likewise, the drafts of the 
National Plan for Action following the Beijing conference and the draft CEDAW 
reports in 1998 were involved proposals from women’s organizations, revised and 
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shaped by their recommendations (Ecevit 2007: 197). An expert from KSGM 
explained the relationship as follows:  
Since the establishment of this unit, we worked together with women’s NGOs. The 
women’s movement in Turkey is strong and very dynamic, and these organizations 
both have knowledge and are aware of the sensitivities of Turkish women. They have 
been participating in CEDAW reports since the beginning and in some instances 
really pushed hard for gender related issues (Interview KSGM a 2011). 
 
5.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact 
 
  This section examines how domestic factors and different forms of EU 
pathways impact women’s NGOs in Turkey. In all categories of EU influence, the EU 
has impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its 
accession context and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society.  
As emphasized throughout this thesis, the previous research has overwhelmingly 
focused on two dimensions of impact, changes in the legal framework and EU 
funding, and the legitimizing power of the EU, which has affected the operation of the 
civil society. Yet the third form of impact and its findings is interesting. While I will 
examine the compulsory and enabling impact in relation to women’s NGOs, my 
analysis mainly concentrates on the connective impact, which presents original 
findings 
  Before moving to the EU pathways I will start by summarizing the outcomes 
of the EU influence. First, regarding the compulsory pathway, there have been various 
outcomes of Europeanization on women’s civil society. On the one hand, significant 
legal changes in the Law of Associations, the Turkish Civil and Penal Code, the 
Municipality Law and the Turkish Labour Law have removed legal restrictions on the 
operation of women’s civil society. On the other hand, through funding, the 
compulsory pathway could lead to different types of Europeanization outcomes: (i) 
compulsory impact, when women’s groups prioritize the EU’s agenda over their areas 
of expertise or adapt their projects in line with the EU policies; (ii) the enabling 
impact, when projects enabled women’s civil society to follow and promote their 
agendas and policies; and (iii) the connective impact, when EU projects have 
advanced the partnership between actors. Although the approximation of gender 
legislation continues, the post-2005 period has resulted in implementation related 
problems and skepticism.  
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  Second, the enabling pathway has empowered women’s NGOs vis-à-vis the 
state by using the EU as a “legitimization device”. In this context, women’s NGOs 
have referred to the EU legal framework to integrate gender mainstreaming as a key 
component into gender related laws. In the post-2005 period, this type of impact has 
been vulnerable due to the downturn in EU and Turkey relations.  
  The connective pathway has functioned along three dimensions. In the first 
dimension, the EU has facilitated cooperation between domestic women’s civil 
society actors. For example, the Civil Code Women’s Platform in 2001, the Women’s 
Penal Code Platform in 2002 and the Women’s Platform for the Constitution in 2011 
has showed cooperation. Additionally, the condition of cooperation in the EU projects 
has led to the establishment of partnership between domestic civil societies. In the 
second dimension, through its accession context, the EU has fostered collaboration 
between women’s NGOs and the state institutions. For instance, cooperation between 
women’s NGOs and the KSGM during the reform process, the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women and the 
cooperation on a new constitution with civil society within this committee, and 
cooperation with the Family and Social Policies Ministry on a new law have 
illustrated different cases of collaboration with the state. Similarly, in the EU funded 
projects, women’s civil society has established partnership with the state. In the third 
dimension, participation in external networks such as European Women’s Lobby 
(EWL) has provided credibility, legitimacy and leverage, access and resources to 
women’s civil society. Finally, external networks in the EU projects have fostered 
mutual understanding between domestic women’s civil society and their counterparts 
in European countries. Altogether, these outcomes have shown that the EU has a 
strong impact on women’s civil society. The following sections will describe in detail 
how different pathways of the EU together with the domestic factors have led to 






5.3.1. Compulsory Pathway 
 
  The first pathway that the EU influences civil society is the compulsory 
impact. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the compulsory pathway is performed through the 
acquis communautaire and the financial incentives on the basis of conditionality. 
However, in practice, various forms of the Europeanization outcome occur 
simultaneously. The findings of the compulsory pathway are also in line with the 
broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society where “the EU membership 
candidacy has altered the political and societal context in which specific factors 
operate” (Diez et al. 2005:5). I will show that the EU pressure has changed the 
framework in which they operate, and is therefore, transformative in the sense that it 
provided space for activities of the societal actors. In contrast to these studies, an 
assessment of the post-2005 period shows that the transformative power of the EU has 
ruptured by implementation related issues, which emerged as an important obstacle. 
 The compulsory impact has occurred in two different ways. Firstly, the EU 
pressure on the state to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria has resulted in 
extensive legislative changes regarding women and the freedom of association and 
assembly in Turkey. Since 1998, annual Progress Reports stress the legal restrictions 
on the freedom of association and assembly as well as progress regarding the 
protection and promotion of women’s rights and the approximation of gender equality 
legislation. The first Progress Report paid attention to the status of women and 
emphasized that “domestic violence is widespread” and the Civil Code “still retains 
discriminatory provisions” (Commission of the European Communities 1998b: 17). 
These warnings were also in line with the demands of the women’s movement and the 
CEDAW committee. 
 The most significant outcomes of the Europeanization of women’s NGOs 
have been extensive legal changes in the Law on Associations, the Turkish Civil 
Code, the Turkish Penal Code, Municipality Law and the Turkish Labour Law that 
have been taking place since 2001, which have influenced the political context in 
which civil society functions. Similar to other issue areas in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
as well as the broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society (Diez et al. 
2005; İçduygu 2007; 2011; Arat 2008; Toktaş and Diner 2011; Ketola 2013; 
Zihnioğlu 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), there has been general consensus on the 
positive impact of the Law on Associations, which eased the restrictions on NGOs 
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among interviewees (Interviews Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği 2011; Kadın 
Haklarını Koruma Derneği 2011; Amargi 2012 Kardelen 2012; Selis 2012).19 The 
2004 law lifted requirement that seek permission when opening branches abroad, to 
hold meetings with foreigners, to inform local officials of assembly meetings and 
allowed NGOs to receive funding from abroad. Particularly, two main legislative 
changes in Civil and Penal Codes are illustrative in understanding the 
Europeanization of women’s NGOs. As the previous section demonstrates, the reform 
of the Turkish Civil Code in 2001, was among one of the top priorities in the 
women’s movement. Historically, women’s NGOs have criticized discriminatory 
measures and for demanding changes in the Turkish Civil Code. However, in spite of 
the joint efforts of the women’s movement and CEDAW obligations, the reform 
process remained inconclusive (Özdemir 2014: 126). In 2000, the government 
prepared the draft law of the Civil Code by integrating women’s demands, yet, the 
question of property in the draft law faced objections from the Nationalist Movement 
Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) parliamentarians and Virtue Party (Fazilet 
Partisi) during discussions of the draft Civil Code in the Grand National Assembly. 
Feminists wanted to change the separation of property regime in the original 
document with a new one on the shared property, because in cases of divorce, women 
would have the right to share the property during the marriage and their labor would 
be recognized in this way (Arat 2008: 403). As the section 5.3.3 on connective 
pathways will demonstrate, the women’s movement launched widespread campaigns 
for a gender-sensitive reform of the civil code. Finally, the new Civil Code was 
adopted with the shared property regime in November 2001. 
 Another illustration has been the reform of the Turkish Penal Code between 
2004-2005 for the EU accession process. In a similar vein with the campaign for the 
new Civil Code, the women’s movement launched a new campaign called the 
“Campaign on the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective” 
under the coordination of Women for Women’s Human Rights New Ways (Kadının 
İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler- KİH-YÇ). The Penal Code was critical because it 
regulates several forms of gender-based violations such as violence against women, 
and governs women’s rights from a liberal perspective (Arat 2008: 407-408; Özdemir 
                                                        
19
 During the different interviews, women’s NGOs from Kemalist (Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği), 
feminist (Amargi), Islamist/conservative (Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği) and Kurdish (Kardelen, 
Selis) orientation said that changes in legal framework are the most important outcomes of the EU 
impact. 
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2014: 127). Changes in the Penal Code have been transformative in many ways; 
changes are shaped by the women’s movement demands that are long rooted in their 
struggle: crimes associated with sexual violence are now defined as crimes against 
individuals in contrast to crimes against public morality; punished with heavier 
sentences; sexual harassment, sex attacks and rapes were criminalized; martial rape 
and harassment at the workplace were recognized as crimes; penalties for domestic 
violence including sexual violence towards children were increased; virginity tests 
were criminalized and in the case of honour killings, the “unjust provocation” article 
for reduction in sentences was amended and reduction was abolished in honour 
killings (Arat 2008:408; Özdemir 2014:129). 
 Although legislative reforms lifted the main legal obstacles regarding civil 
society activity in general, and removed discriminatory provisions in the Penal and 
Civil Codes, the post-2005 period has witnessed implementation problems. Gaps in 
the laws persist and many law enforcement officials stress preservation of family 
unity rather than protecting survivors of domestic violence. These problems remained 
as main challenges despite the fact that the Commission has repeatedly emphasised 
them in the Progress Reports on Turkey. 
 As the previous section indicates, these changes have not solely occurred as a 
consequence of the EU pressure but were driven by the dynamic women’s movement, 
which has strong historical roots. The EU impact has triggered these reforms and 
created and altered the legislative context in which civil society operates by enabling 
various societal actors to follow their agendas and push for their demands. 
  The compulsory pathway also occurred through the financial assistance to 
civil society. As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between funding and 
categories of the EU pathway is extremely complicated at the empirical level. Starting 
from the late 1990s, the EU provided financial aid to the women’s civil society that 
participated in the awareness of women’s issues on an ad-hoc basis (e.g. MEDA 
Program) and the establishment of capacities and cooperation with various actors in 
the development of gender policies (e.g. Civil Society Development Program and 
Civil Society Dialogue Program) and protection and promotion of women’s rights 
(e.g. EIDHR). After Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country in 1999, the EU 
intensified its funding for civil society actors that participated in the implementation 
of EU policies. It is important to note that the call for proposals in relation to 
women’s issues mainly reflected the EU’s policy priorities such as empowerment of 
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women and women NGOs, promoting gender equality in working life, establishing 
women’s shelters for combating domestic violence, and gender equality in education 
(e.g. MEDA, Civil Society Development, Civil Society Dialogue). The provision of 
financial assistance is compulsory if it is established through concrete conditions. The 
EU has shaped women’s issues and gender policy in a specific way and prioritized its 
own agenda. For instance, violence against women has been a key priority area. One 
indication of the compulsory impact is how women’s civil society organizations 
undertake projects according to available funds and priority areas of the EU. When 
organizations prioritize EU-funded projects over their areas of expertise or adapt their 
projects according to EU policies, the compulsory impact has been effective. During 
the interviews, women’s NGOs highlighted that there are many women’s NGOs in 
Turkey which have shifted their area of expertise in order to get funding from the EU. 
On other occasions, the outcome of the funding could belong to other categories of 
EU influence as well- enabling and connective (For detailed discussion see section 
2.2.2. in Chapter 2). 
On the one hand, calls for proposals may provide an opportunity to promote 
their agendas and empower their policies. In this way, women’s actors that engaged in 
priority areas benefited more from the EU funding and were enabled by the EU 
initiatives. For example, the EIDHR is a principle instrument for support to civil 
society activity in the promotion of human rights and democracy. KAMER is a 
foundation originally established in Diyarbakır with the aim to protect and promote 
human rights and women’s rights especially in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. 
Two of the key areas of activity of the KAMER Foundation are honour killings and 
domestic violence. The KAMER foundation implemented a project titled We Can 
Stop This under the EIDHR “to contribute to the prevention of murders committed in 
the name of honour, through supporting potential victims in Southeast and East 
Anatolian Turkey in their challenge to survive as well as to develop a permanent 
methods for preventing through establishment of preventative networks” (Delegation 
of European Union to Turkey 2008: 32). As the representative of KAMER 
Foundation said, “this project [referring to “We Can Stop This”] created a favourable 
context to implement KAMER’s goals” (Interview KAMER 2012). Therefore, in this 
case, the EU has enabled KAMER to follow its own priorities. 
On the other hand, women’s NGOs have become partners in EU funding 
schemes. To give an example, under the “Project on Building Bridges for Prevention 
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of Violence Against Women” that was financed by the EIDHR Turkey Programme, 
Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) collaborated with three partner 
organizations in Turkey: Purple Roof, the İzmir Women Solidarity Association and 
the Van Women’s Association. As one of the interviewees who has been a partner in 
the project said:  
 
We had not conducted any EU project before. It was our first experience as a partner 
in an EU project. One of the key outcomes of the project is to organize a training of 
trainers programme. Within this context, WAVE provided experts for activities. 
Partnerships with European organizations did not only allow us to learn from their 
experiences but also provided a chance to explain our activities.  
                                                  (Interview İzmir Women Solidarity Association 2011)  
 
This case is an illustration of how EU funding promotes partnerships between 
Turkish women’s NGOs and counterparts in Europe through the connective pathway 
of the EU. It also shows that contrary to traditional scholarship, the EU has not seen 
only as a one-way process. It is an interactive process, where domestic actors engage 
in cooperation and learn from their experiences. 
 The EU-funded projects have been extremely important for women’s NGOs 
since they are mostly dependent upon foreign funding like other civil society 
organizations in Turkey. When I asked interviewees about the EU funding, all of them 
responded positively and said that there is a financial obstacle for funding civil 
societies in Turkey and the EU is an alternative for applying and receiving funding. 
However, empirical evidence on women’s NGOs also reveals that this type of 
impact has been heavily criticized. The funding procedure is often too bureaucratic, 
and women’s actors try to find other sources of funding and shift to other resources 
like the Swedish International Development Agency, the UN and the Turkish private 
foundation, the Sabancı Foundation. Additionally, women’s NGOs do not always 
work in the areas that the EU has requested. 
One of the predominant women’s NGOs- Mother Child Education Foundation (Anne 
Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı-AÇEV) calls this “bureaucratic logic”- too much focus on 
regulations and paperwork (Interview AÇEV 2011): 
 
We worked in various EU projects. Sometimes we are the main beneficiary 
organizations, and other times we work as partners. We can clearly say that there is a 
difference between the intermediary actors and this difference affects our working 
environment, and the willingness to work with the EU again. We work very 
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professionally but if you ask my opinion after completing these projects, I would 
definitely tell you that we need to think about it more deeply. We need to think about 
the impact on our work. From our experience, we now see that the CFCU is very 
much work regulation orientated. They have a checklist and they just come here and 
tick the boxes. This does not result in success and also affects the impact. They do not 
trust us and CSOs feel lots of pressure and working under this pressure is not 
effective. 
 
5.3.2. Enabling Pathway  
 
Historically, Europe has been an important symbol for the women of Turkey. 
Since 1999, the EU has been a reference point for women’s NGOs for pressuring the 
state to implement legislation in relation to women’s issues. Thus, it has been an 
instrument for legitimization to develop and to implement gender related policies. The 
enabling pathway of the EU impact induced empowerment of women’s NGOs vis-à-
vis the state, but in post-2005 period this influence has been very vulnerable to 
fluctuations and downturns in EU-Turkey relations.  
In the previous section, I demonstrated that the Copenhagen criteria together 
with the EU’s gender acquis have facilitated major legal changes in Civil and Penal 
Codes and altered the political and social framework for functioning of societal actors 
by enabling women’s NGOs. The first two instances in this section concentrate again 
on the reform processes of the Civil and Penal Codes with a different focus to show 
how women’s NGOs have used the EU strategically and link their agendas to the EU 
and justify and legitimize their positions with reference to the EU. 
 The long-established women’s movement in Turkey criticized the patriarchal 
structure of the Civil Code and the inferior position of women, which were 
strengthened under this code. Since the Ottoman women’s movement, constitutional 
and legal issues have been at the center of women’s demands. Particularly, in the 
Republican period, from the 1950s onwards, several attempts have been made to 
amend the civil code, but it was mainly in the 1980s that the feminist movement 
criticized the code from a gender-sensitive perspective. The KİH-YÇ organization 
adopted the cause, mobilized international support and raised awareness in the 
international arena (Interview KİH-YÇ 2011). The women’s association KA-DER 
established in 1997 with the aim to develop women’s status in politics also endorsed 
the cause of reforming the code. The code was also supported by the KSGM. 
Therefore, there were multiple interacting facilitating factors in the domestic arena. In 
addition, in the international context, both the UN and the EU played facilitating roles 
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in this process. Women’s NGOs pointed out that there was some speculation in the 
international media about the reform of the Turkish Civil Code because of Turkey’s 
EU accession process. The interviewee from KİH-YÇ (2011) commented on this 
issue by pointing out how the women of Turkey strategically used the EU framework 
both in international and domestic arenas by referring to the EU to change the Civil 
Code:  
We can clearly say that this was not because of the EU. It is true that we use the EU 
tool to overcome the state’s resistance and refer to the Copenhagen criteria to increase 
the pressure on the state and amend the legislation. Moreover, we have used the EU 
framework to mobilize international support. Nonetheless, major legal reforms have 
taken place as a result of successful campaigns led by the dynamic women’s 
movement in Turkey. Turkey’s accession to the EU has accelerated the process, but 
not as a primary driving force. We, women of Turkey, are the drivers of the reform 
process. 
 
Women’s NGOs framed their priorities in relation to the EU to achieve 
success for their own causes and push the state to accept their proposals. 
As I emphasized in the previous section, the Campaign for the reform of the 
Turkish Penal Code was initiated immediately after the reform of the Turkish Civil 
Code in 2001 and women have used the EU framework for empowerment. Similarly, 
under the name of the Women’s Platform on the Penal Code, a group of thirty civil 
society organizations organized campaigns to ensure that the changes on women’s 
status would be reflected in the Penal Code. Until 2005, the Turkish criminal code 
regarded sexual crimes committed against women as crimes against public morality 
and social order, rather than violations against individual women’s rights (Interview 
Mor Çatı 2011). The activities of the platform were coordinated by the Women for 
Women’s Human Rights-New Ways. In 2002, the KİH-YÇ initiated a working group 
and included the representatives of women’s NGOs, bar associations and academics 
to represent different viewpoints and ensure participation.  
After the 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi- AKP) came to power, the new government formed its own 
committee and ignored the draft proposal of the feminists. In 2004, former Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan (now President) assailed the women’s platform at a media 
conference and said that “There were even those who marched to Ankara, carrying 
placards that do not suit the ‘Turkish women’. I cannot applaud behavior that does not 
suit our morality and traditions…A marginal group does not have any right to 
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represent the ‘Turkish women’” (Şen 2004). When former Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan intervened to criminalize adultery through the code in 2005, women’s groups 
established a European network for immediate action and explained to European 
counterparts how the proposed adultery law is in contradiction with the EU’s 
principles, values and policies. The controversy over the proposed adultery law 
prompted a crisis between the EU and Turkey, and the EU pressured the Turkish 
government to withdraw the adultery law. This case illustrates how women’s NGOs 
used the EU framework in order to justify their actions. In this context, it is possible 
to see a function of the EU as a legitimizer of women’s NGOs activism in preventing 
the adultery law.  
Another example of the use of an enabling pathway by the women’s NGOs is 
the demand for representation and the case of KA-DER. Several EU Progress Reports 
and the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
repeatedly emphasized that despite the positive changes in the legal framework, one 
of the vital challenges in Turkey regarding women is the low number of women in 
politics and the workforce and the significance of introducing quotas to boost female 
representation. 
In 1997, a group of feminist professional women established KA-DER, to help 
women promote their status in electoral politics. A key principle of the organization 
was its non-partisan approach towards different political backgrounds. KA-DER 
brings women together from different ideological perspectives. The general-secretary 
in KA-DER said that “this is the success and attractiveness of our organization…to 
empower women from different backgrounds both at local and national levels.” 
(Interview KA-DER 2011). Since the 1999 electoral campaign, KA-DER has 
prompted a quota for female representation in politics. KA-DER uses the EU 
framework to launch different campaigns in Turkey (Interview KA-DER): 
In 2003, the European Council recommended EU members states to promote women 
representation in politics and emphasized the importance of quotas. This 
recommendation was very critical to pursue our objectives in KA-DER. This helped 
us to launch a campaign for a 30 % quota for women in political representation. 
                                              
Therefore, in national elections, KA-DER used the European Council 
recommendation as a mechanism to legitimize its positions in Turkey. 
The Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler 
Derneği- KAGİDER) represents another illustration of enabling impact. In 2008, a 
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group of women entrepreneurs came together to establish an organization to help 
promote women entrepreneurs and women’s leadership in Turkey. KAGİDER 
strongly supports EU membership and established an office in Brussels to undertake 
lobbying activities with EU institutions. The general secretary of KAGİDER 
(Interview 2011) noted:  
In Turkey the participation of the women in the workforce is extremely low. We can 
see this in various progress reports (by referring to the European Commission’s 
progress reports). Promoting women’s employment and equal opportunities has been 
our priority in our campaigns.  
 
In the EU Lisbon summit, EU leaders set out a strategy to make Europe more 
dynamic and competitive. The Lisbon Strategy of the EU has recommended that 
the women's participation level in the labour market shall be at least 60 % 
by 2010.  Turkey has only managed to raise this rate slightly higher, a figure far 
below that of EU countries. In order to reach this goal, we need to create more jobs- at 
least eight million- for women and integrate them into the labour force. For this 
purpose, in March 2011 KAGİDER initiated a campaign to increase the employment 
rate of women in Turkey. The main objective was to raise awareness among various 
actors from politicians, employers to civil society and the media and to help them take 
action and to improve the employment rate for women of Turkey.  
 
This overview from different women’s NGOs shows that women’s NGOs 
used the prospect of EU membership to legitimate their positions in various debates. 
The EU functioned as a legitimate reference point in various debates and enabled 
women’s NGOs to justify their positions and recommendations on policy proposals 
and policy changes, to convince the state about their positions. These examples also 
demonstrate that, in practice, the enabling impact of the EU empowers women’s civil 
society in Turkey in relation to the state. By referring to different EU practices and 
experiences, women’s NGOs pressure the Turkish state to pursue necessary reforms 
and make arrangements in relation to women’s issues. 
 
5.3.3. Connective Pathway  
 
This section provides evidence of how the EU has facilitated contacts between 
women’s organizations by employing the partnership principle (For detailed 
discussion of the EU’s policy towards civil society see Chapter 3). The EU has 
impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: via its accession 
context and financial assistance, which are directly aimed to civil society. I provided 
evidence on how the EU has advanced women’s civil society to cooperate with the 
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state institutions, to take part in policy cycles, and to develop and empower networks 
both with other civil society actors and transnational networks. 
 
Internal Networks- Society-Society 
 
  During the course of history, the women’s movement has been very dynamic 
and strong in Turkey. Several issues have acted as mobilizing forces for women in 
Turkey. Thus, Turkey is characterized by a highly mobilized and active women’s 
movement. Historically, the Turkish women’s civil society has been divided and 
fragmented along ideological lines. In contrast to human rights organizations (see 
Chapter 7), women’s NGOs united and mobilized on the basis of women’s issues. 
  Turkey’s EU accession process has facilitated the cooperation and 
establishment of platforms among women’s NGOs. Platforms that were established 
between women’s NGOs promoted collaboration on several issues and enhanced 
shared values between actors. In addition, connections between actors foster positive 
dialogue and solidarity. The following examples show how the EU accession process 
has influenced cooperation between women’s NGOs.  The first is the establishment of 
the Civil Code Women Platform. In the beginning of 2001, 126 women’s NGOs came 
together and initiated a major campaign. As discussed in the previous sections, the 
“shared property” was the most controversial issue during the reform process, and 
there was strong resistance from the government. As a result of the successful 
campaign, the opposing groups had to accept demands of the women’s movement. A 
total of 126 women’s NGOs from different segments of the society were united for 
this common purpose (İlkkaracan 2007). The new Civil Code abolished the 
supremacy of men in marriage and established gender equality in the family. 
  The second is the establishment of the Women’s Penal Code Platform in 2002. 
Following the success of the Civil Code campaign, in 2002, the KİH-YÇ launched a 
new campaign titled Campaign on the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a 
Gender Perspective. In 2002, KİH-YÇ established the Women’s Working Group on 
the Penal Code, which was composed of representatives of NGOs, bar associations, 
academicians from all around Turkey (İlkkaracan 2007). The working group prepared 
its own draft report and lobbied intensively, yet, with the election of AKP in 2002, a 
new draft of the Penal Code was prepared in 2003, which failed to reform the 
discriminatory clauses of the code (Özdemir 2014:128). As a consequence, in 2003, 
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the women’s movement started a major campaign and expanded the working group 
into the national platform, held several awareness raising activities and lobbied 
extensively. In the words of Pınar İlkkaracan, an activist and co-founder of KİH-YÇ, 
“The campaign succeeded in achieving a holistic reform to transform the philosophy 
and principles of the Penal Code in order to safeguard women’s rights, and bodily and 
sexual autonomy” (İlkkaracan 2007: 7).  
  The third is the establishment of the Women Platform for the Constitution in 
2011. The platform is composed of more than 200 women’s NGOs and led by KA-
DER to lobby their demands for the new constitution. 
  The EU has also promoted cooperation between civil society actors through 
projects. In this way, the EU has intended to promote regular interaction among 
different parts of society (Zihnioğlu 2013: 66) and facilitate partnership between 
actors. EU programmes have made partnerships with other organizations a condition 
for funding. For example, the Civil Society Development and Civil Society Dialogue 
programmes have required partnerships and cooperation between civil society 
organizations in Turkey.  
  In 2011, the Progress Report on Turkey “…gender equality, combating 
violence against women, including honour killings, and early and forced marriages 
remain major challenges for Turkey” (Commission of the European Communities 
2011:31). Under Strengthening Capacity of National and Local NGOs On Combating 
Violence Against Women Grant Scheme, KAGİDER has established a partnership 
with the ARI Movement Social Participation and Development Association. The 
Linking and Empowering Generations to Combat Violence against Women and 
Discrimination project intended to develop capacity building of local women’s NGOs 
and the women’s movement working in the field of violence against women and to 
contribute to the prevention of violence against women by raising awareness of young 
women and men in universities on women’s problems, violence against women and 
discrimination. 
 A representative of KAGİDER (Interview 2011) summarizes the benefits of 
partnership as follows:  
As a consequence of the projects, we have a transfer of knowledge. We exchange 
views on various issues. More importantly, this is a mutual learning process. We learn 
from each other. We benefited from this partnership. It mainly strengthened 
collaboration between us. 
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Internal Networks- State- Society 
 
  There are different types of interactions between the state and civil society. As 
Arat (2008) argues, the relationship between the state and women’s organizations has 
been shaped by contestation and collaboration. This section shows that the EU, both 
through its accession process and financial assistance, has further promoted 
partnership between the state and society, which in turn has empowered women’s 
civil society and its power to influence policy processes. While women’s civil society 
has resisted the patriarchal state structure and policies, at the same, it has cooperated 
with the state and pushed the state to follow gender-sensitive policies and established 
a partnership with the state institutions. 
   The EU’s influence on women’s NGOs has been stronger compared to 
environmental and human rights NGOs. In the following section, I will present new 
empirical evidence from women’s NGOs to show these dynamics during the 
accession process.  On the one hand, I will show how the women’s NGOs and state 
cooperated and established harmonious relations during the accession process. On the 
other hand, I will demonstrate how women’s NGOs resisted and criticized the state. 
 
National Institutions and Women’s NGOs 
 
  The EU has pressured Turkey to initiate reforms regarding women and 
integrate civil society into these processes. Since the 1980s Turkey has established 
various institutions to increase gender awareness in public policies. The EU accession 
process has prompted the foundation of institutions to support alignment with the EU 
acquis as well as to develop a collaborative relationship between the women’s NGOs 
and the state. The continuing cooperation between women’s NGOs and the KSGM 
during the reform process in the 2000s, the establishment of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women (from 2009 onwards) 
and the collaboration on a new constitution with civil society within this committee, 
and cooperation with the Family and Social Policies Ministry on a new law on the 
prevention of violence against women – illustrates three empirical cases on how the 
EU accession process has opened avenues for consultation and collaboration between 
the state and civil society. 
  First, the KSGM and women’s NGOs collaborated during the process that led 
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to the new Civil Code and Penal Code in the early 2000s. The KSGM that was 
established in 1990 upon the ratification of the CEDAW has been the most important 
institution in restructuring relationships with women’s NGOs. The KSGM was 
originally tied to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; however, in 1991 it was 
moved to the Office of the Prime Minister. The relationship between the KSGM and 
women’s NGOs is significant in Turkey. Under the KSGM, they established a 
harmonious relationship by producing reports on gender policy including the 
CEDAW reports and the national action plans for gender equality. More significantly, 
starting from 1997, women’s NGOs, the KSGM and academics worked on the draft 
law, in which proposals from women’s NGOs have been vital in shaping the draft 
law. The KSGM played an active role between women’s NGOs and the Civil Code 
Commission at the Parliament. The consultation between the KSGM and women’s 
NGOs and their input in the Civil Code Commission at the Parliament was key in 
achieving gender sensitive changes in the new Civil Code (Kardam 2006: 15). Similar 
to the process that led to new Civil Code, women’s NGOs participated in the technical 
work on drafts of the Penal Code. Therefore, the KSGM benefitted from the 
involvement and expertise of the women’s NGOs in Turkey. The process that led to 
the new laws clearly demonstrated how interaction between the state institutions and 
civil society could foster constructive relationships between two parties, and 
empowers women’s NGOs, and their role in policymaking. 
  Second, the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Equal 
Opportunities between Men and Women (from 2009 onwards) and interactions on a 
new constitution with civil society actors within this committee illustrates the 
collaboration between state institutions and women’s NGOs. The idea of establishing 
a commission at the Parliament has been present within the women’s movement as 
well as the National Women’s Machinery since the beginning of the 1990s, but it was 
not implemented by the Parliament. As Turkey became an official candidate to the 
EU in 1999, parliamentary attention in establishing such a commission substantially 
increased due to the pressure from the European Commission and European 
Parliament. In the 2008 Progress Report, the European Commission underlined that 
the “ Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality have still to be established. 
Women’s civil society organizations have requested the establishment of a fully-
fledged committee that could play an essential role in mainstreaming women’s issues 
in all policy areas.” (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 20-21). In 
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addition, women’s NGOs established connections with the women’s parliamentarians 
from different political parties and lobbied for the proposal. Consequently, on March 
2009, an Equal Opportunities Commission was established after a period of 
discussions on the name of the commission. The name of the commission was forced 
to change from a “Gender Equality Committee” to the “Equality of Opportunity 
Committee” by the AKP. The women’s movement objected to the name of the 
commission and argued that “If the Committee is called “Equality of Opportunity”, 
then we will be hindered by legal regulations. The discrimination and rights violations 
that women experience will be ignored.” (Özcan 2009). Despite the naming debate, 
many interviewees pointed out that the foundation of the committee was a critical step 
for gender equality because Turkey had lacked a Commission at the parliamentary 
level which assesses proposals and amendments from a gender equality perspective 
(Interviews KA-DER 2011; KAGİDER 2011; Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği 
2011; Mor Çatı 2011; TKB 2011). 
  Despite the criticism, women’s NGOs cooperated with the Equality of 
Opportunity Committee on various issues. One of the vital areas that both the EU and 
women paid attention to was the preparation of the new constitution. Women’s 
platforms such as the Women’s Constitution Platform and other organizations 
prepared proposals on the new constitution. This process is a vital opportunity for 
women’s NGOs to push forward legal changes from a gender equality perspective; 
the process still continues. Civil society organizations were welcomed to the 
consultation process that took place at the Parliament by the Equality of Opportunity 
Committee. The Commission not only took the opinions and recommendations of the 
women’s organizations in those meeting, but has also shared all the views and 
suggestions expressed by NGOs and published a detailed report including the 
proposals of the civil society (TÜSEV 2013). 
  Third, the cooperation between women’s NGOs and the Family and Social 
Policies Ministry on a new law on the prevention of violence against women 
represents another example of collaboration between actors. The EU Progress and 
European Parliament Reports repeatedly listed domestic violence as one of the most 
important problems of women in Turkey, and stressed the shortcomings of the law on 
domestic violence. The new law that was adopted in 2012 provides important 
measures to protect victims of violence. According to Nazan Moroğlu, the coordinator 
for İstanbul Women’s Associations and women’s activists, “Irrespective of their 
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marital status, the law encompasses all women – married, single, divorced, young, 
old, those with a fiancé or a boyfriend,” which she described as a “historic law” in 
terms of expanded rights for victimized women (Hürriyet Daily News 2012). 
However, she emphasized that the law is not without its shortcomings, since the 
“legal provisions see women merely as “family members” rather than individuals”- a 
criticism that was brought by the women’s movement. A Ministry of State position 
for Women and Family Affairs started the reform process. In 2011, it was transformed 
into the Ministry for Family and Social Policies, which frustrated the women’s 
movement and described it as a step backwards for gender equality. The women’s 
NGOs were very active during the process, presenting their proposals and promoting 
their positions. Nazan Moroğlu (Hürriyet Daily News 2012) explained the role of the 
women’s movement in this process, and cooperation between the Ministry for Family 
and Social Policies and women’s NGOs as follows:  
Women’s NGOs have a written history. For the first time, all women’s NGOs were 
united. Some 237 women organizations worked together day and night following the 
process, step by step. [Family and Social Policies] Minister Fatma Şahin wanted to 
have contributions from NGOs. It is, however, difficult to bypass the male-dominated 
bureaucracy. Although several changes were made despite our objections, I believe 
that we as women’s NGOs have played an important role in the adoption of the law. I 
can say that this is a success [that stems from] the strong lobbying activities of female 
lawyers and women’s associations. 
   
  As I have shown above, the EU impact depends on responses of the civil 
society actors. In this case, collaboration with the state institutions have led to the 
empowerment of the women’s NGOs. Women’s NGOs have actively shaped policies 
and become key actors in gender policies. The EU process has opened new avenues to 
women’s NGOs to initiate and contribute to policymaking processes. 
The EU accession process has also developed consultation between civil 
society and state institutions. The Women’s Policy Machinery already provided a 
window of opportunity for the women’s NGOs in Turkey. There is already regular 
consultation through Women’s Meetings and producing shadow reports that are 
supported by CEDAW mechanisms. In addition to this mechanism, the EU also 
promotes consultation as an instrument to develop relationships between the state and 
CSOs. For instance, the EU progress reports are an instrument to improve the 
relationship between women’s civil society and state institutions.  In order to publish 
progress reports, the European Commission granted the following role to the CSO-
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watchdog of polices and implementation processes. The European Commission’s 
Progress Report (2007: 18) welcomed “Cooperation between public institutions and 
civil society has improved and regular meetings are held with public institutions and 
women’s NGOs to monitor the implementation…”. The EU officials consult NGOs 
for the preparation of the annual progress reports. In this way, NGOs can take priority 
issues and act as a watchdog in the EU accession process. State institutions cannot 
neglect issues that are promoted by civil society actors. This is important because 
civil society becomes active and equal participants of the policy cycles. Therefore, the 
consultation process between the public institutions and civil society has important 
consequences for the development of women’s NGOs, because through consultation 
they start to participate in the policymaking process. Throughout this process, public 
institutions have started to see women’s NGOs as partners rather than rivals. They 
have started to exchange views and cooperate on certain issues. For example, there 
are regular meetings with CSOs at the Ministry of the EU, and they exchange views 
on different issues, and various policy areas (Interviews Ministry of the EU, Director I 
and II 2011). 
One significant issue that needs to be further elaborated is the cooptation of 
women’s civil society in Turkey. Following the several elections victories of the 
AKP, Islamic women’s NGOs and Government Organized Non-Governmental 
Organizations (GONGOs) have become widespread and more visible in Turkey. In 
the case of cooperation, civil society and the state recognize each other’s capabilities   
and cooperate on common ground. Yet, civil society is both closely related but 
independent from the state (Jones and Marsden 2010: 49). However, cooptation 
occurs when NGOs lose their autonomy and become regulated by the state (Jones and 
Marsden 2010: 49). The relationship between the AKP and Islamic organizations
20
 
can be described as cooptation, because these organizations promote the AKP’s 
interests and policies and therefore are not autonomous from the political party. The 
AKP in turn has not only enabled these Islamic organizations but also used these 
organizations instrumentally to push their policies. For example, many Islamist 
women’s organizations support social policies on the empowerment of family rather 
than gender equality (Interviews AK-DER 2011; Hazar Education Culture and 
Solidarity Association 2011). In turn, these organizations participate in various 
                                                        
20
 It is important to emphasize that not all Islamic organizations are cooptated by the ruling party.   
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meetings with the state, and represent Turkey in international meetings. For example, 
one recent incident is the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO)
21
 candidacy process. As I explained in the 
previous section, women’s NGOs played an influential role in ratifying the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence, known as the İstanbul Convention. However, the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policy have decided on three NGOs that will participate in the 
GREVIO process. These three organizations
22
 are well known for their close links to 





  The EU has also used projects as instruments to develop the relationship and 
partnerships between the state and civil society. The various EU projects have made 
partnerships with the state institutions a condition for the EU funding. In Chapter 3, I 
have shown how this particular understanding of partnership has translated from the 
EU level. The EU intends to promote its governance approach by integrating civil 
society organizations into policymaking. The extent of cooperation differs both with 
the objective of the projects and the willingness of the actors. 
  Strengthening civil society in the pre-accession process has been the key 
objective of the EU’s civil society policy in the candidate countries. In line with this 
objective, the Combating Violence against Women program is aimed at preventing 
violence against women by funding civil society organizations, developing capacity 
building, providing services for victims and increasing awareness in the society 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006c: 4). According to these objectives, 
the Commission identified various priority areas. One of them is the establishment of 
new local organizations, networks, and partnerships. Under this program KİH-YÇ 
completed a project called Women’s Solidarity Network Against Violence. As a part of 
this project, KİH-YÇ collaborated with the General Directorate of Social Services in 
dealing with violence against women, and in improving services of women’s groups 
                                                        
21
 GREVIO monitors the implementation of the Istanbul Convention.  
22
 AK-DER, Women and Democracy Association (Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği -KADEM) and 
Women Healthcare Professionals Solidarity (Kadın Sağlıkçılar Dayanışma Derneği -KASAD-D). 
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and community centers on the local levels. 
  In an interview the volunteer from KİH-YÇ (2011) explained the relationship 
with General Directorate of Social Services as follows:  
In Turkey, women’s organizations have been key actors in raising awareness about 
combating violence against women and helping victims. Women’s NGOs provide 
services instead of the state institutions, but are never seen as equal partners. At the 
core of the EU project, cooperation and collaboration is vital to achieve the 
objectives. The EU project has been instrumental in transforming the relationship 
with state institutions and in being an equal partner in the processes.  
 
Mor Çatı has implemented different shelter projects. Since 2009, Mor Çatı 
continues to run an independent shelter project with the support of the Şişli 
Municipality and the European Commission Delegation to Turkey. When I asked a 
volunteer of the Mor Çatı about experiences of working with the state institutions, I 
observed a trend of collaboration and contestation- negative trend so called a 
formation of symbolic relationship- between these actors. The volunteer from the Mor 
Çatı (2011) expressed that:  
Now we cooperate with the state on various issues. It really depends on the type of the 
project and the context. If we are the main beneficiary, we cooperate more easily. For 
instance, we cooperated with Şişli municipality to increase the capacity of women’s 
shelters. It went well. When the beneficiary is the state institution, cooperation is 
more difficult. They invite us for the meeting but sometimes do not consider us as 
partners. We have a more symbolic relationship - a relationship just because the 
project says ‘you have to have a partner from women’s NGOs’. 
 
Also, the state institutions like the KSGM implemented projects under the pre-
membership financial assistance program. The KSGM conducted the Women’s 
Shelters Guide project and cooperated with women’s NGOs to combat violence 
against women. The aim of this project is to promote and support partnerships with 
women NGOs that plan to open shelters for women. An expert from the KSGM 
(Official 2, 2011) said that : 
In order to prepare this project, we benefited from the expertise of the women’s 
NGOs. They provided us valuable input and support. We mainly exchange views, 
discuss strategies and enhance our dialogue during the projects. They definitely 
become our partners.  
 
  The partnership requirement of the EU programs has resulted in an effective 
partnership between the state and the society. Women’s NGOs have become 
important policy players and work closely with state institutions through EU 
programs. There are signs of a rapprochement between the parties. Yet, 
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rapprochement is not solely shaped by the EU programs. Women’s civil society 
succeeded in cooperating with the state institutions and pushing the state to follow 
reforms related to women’s rights both by mobilizing large constituencies at the 
domestic level and using external networks to pressure the state. Simultaneously, 
women’s civil society resisted the patriarchal policies and criticized the state. The EU 




  The EU has impacted the development of women’s NGOs through promotion 
of external networks. While the EU accession context provides an opportunity to 
participate in external networks, EU programs have made the development of external 
networks between countries a condition for funding. Issue-based external networks 
are an important peculiarity of the European governance. The EU actively promotes 
the participation of civil society actors in transnational networks and European 
umbrella organizations. It is expected that civil society organizations will learn to 
promote dialogue, network, exchange experiences with their counterparts and will 
transfer EU practices to the national level as well as foster mutual understanding 
(Interview Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Sector Manager II, 2011). At 
other times, participation in these external networks will allow Turkish women’s 
NGOs to use their membership to obtain information, provide contact points, and 
learn from their experiences. 
  A good example of how women’s NGOs benefitted from external networks is 
the participation of Turkish women’s NGOs in the EWL, the largest alliance of 
women’s organizations in Europe. The EWL has become an increasingly powerful 
actor for the women’s movement because within the EU accession context, women’s 
NGOs from candidate countries obtained the right to become members. Women’s 
NGOs established the Turkish Coordination of the EWL in 2004. KA-DER is the 
EWL- Secretariat for the Turkish Coordination. The Turkish Coordination of the 
EWL united in their opinion that “memberships to the EWL represent an historical 
step in the collaboration and solidarity between women of Turkey and women in 
Europe. We, the women of Turkey, are members of the EU now.” (Interview- Turkish 
Delegate to the EWL 2013). More importantly, since 2004, the Turkish Coordination 
of the EWL actively participated in various activities within the framework of the 
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EWL. External networks developed between the EWL and Turkish Coordination has 
also enabled women’s NGO’s to shape EU policies towards Turkey. Therefore, the 
EWL provides women’s NGOs credibility, legitimacy and leverage, the agenda of 
women, access, and resources. 
  Turkish NGOs have used these external networks to raise their national image 
and gain credibility. According to a former Turkish Delegate, “participation in the 
EWL allow[ed] Turkish women’s organizations to demonstrate their diverse strategies 
of mobilization, Turkish feminism and peculiarities of the women’s movement in 
Turkey” and thus raise the profile of the Turkish women’s movement in Europe 
(Interview Turkish Delegate to the EWL 2013). 
  Participation in such transnational networks also provided Turkish NGOs with 
added leverage against the government. For example, Turkish women’s NGOs’ 
successful campaign against the government’s attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004 
rested on both effective domestic organization and strong support from the EWL in 
Brussels (İçduygu, 2011). Turkish women’s NGOs established a European network 
for immediate action and explained to their European counterparts how the proposed 
law is in contradiction with the EU’s principles, values and policies. Subsequently, 
the EU pressured the Turkish government to withdraw its proposal to criminalize 
adultery. 
  The EWL set an agenda for women’s NGOs (Europeanization of national 
agenda), and facilitated mobilization of collective experiences to work on major 
issues affecting women. To give an example, the 50/50 Campaign for Democracy 
aimed to promote equal representation of women and men in politics. The 2008 
campaign was led by the EWL and supported by the European institutions, its 
members including Turkish coordination of EWL. The Turkish Coordination of EWL 
launched the campaign urging the ruling and opposition parties to take immediate 
steps to pass a parity law that would guarantee an equal number of female and male 
candidates for all elections, and provide a constitutional guarantee of equal 
representation of women. 
  In an interview, the previous Turkish Coordinator of the EWL (2013) pointed 
out the significance of parity law:  
“given the fact that Turkish women acquired the right to vote in the 1930s, the 
representation of women in politics remains very low compared to European 
countries. We demand a parity law, “parity democracy” in Turkey. We are actively 
lobbying together with our counterparts in European countries for a parity law. The 
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experience of France shows that a gender parity law has to be an integral part of 
gender equality.  Like France, we should take urgent steps to achieve a gender parity 
law and commit to gender equality”. 
 
Therefore, the campaign and interviewee point out how the EWL set a national 
agenda for women in Turkey to increase the legitimacy of the demands of EWL 
coordination in Turkey. 
  Finally, the EWL provides access and involvement as well as resources to 
women’s NGOs. The EWL Turkish Coordination has participated in the EWL 
Observatory on Violence against Women, an observatory that is composed of experts 
and identifies critical and emerging issues to contribute to the policy work of EWL on 
violence against women. The EWL also provides women’s NGOs resources; for 
example, the EWL coordination organized capacity building activities as a part of the 
EWL campaign Together for a Europe free from prostitution (2010-2012) regarding 
prostitution in Europe. Within this context, Turkish-EWL members discussed 
prostitution and violence against women in a capacity-building seminar, exchanged 
and obtained knowledge from experts who are coordinating the EWL campaign. 
 
External Networks-EU Projects 
 
  The EU has also facilitated the formation of external networks through its civil 
society programmes. Flying Broom (Uçan Süpürge) has identified early and forced 
marriage as a major social problem and conducted several activities to combat child 
marriages in Turkey. Since 2003, Uçan Süpürge has completed different projects, has 
come together with thousands of women from different provinces of Turkey to initiate 
debates on child marriages, raised awareness through film screenings and discussions, 
cooperated with different state institutions and parliamentarians, engaged with the 
members of the European Parliament as well the European Commission, and 
established a platform called the “Say ‘No’ to Child Brides” Platform. Uçan Süpürge 
framed child marriages not as a cultural problem but as a major girl’s rights problem. 
  As a part of the Civil Society Dialogue program (see Chapter 3 for details), 
under the EU-Turkey Intercultural Dialogue scheme, Uçan Süpürge has conducted a 
project on early and forced marriages in Turkey and Germany. The overall objective 
of the EU-Turkey Intercultural Dialogue is “to foster greater mutual understanding 
between EU and Turkey by increasing intercultural dialogue” (1). Within this scheme, 
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there have been strong references to “cooperation”, “cultural partners”, “intercultural 
dialogue”, “mutual understanding”, “tolerance” and “interaction”. The project has 
made “cultural partnership” with counterparts in EU member states a condition for the 
provision of funding. Uçan Süpürge has partnered with the International Women’s 
Film Festival Dortmund (DE), a Cologne based organization in Germany, to raise 
awareness about early and forced marriages both in Turkey and Germany through 
film screening with no dialogue. The representative of Uçan Süpürge (2011) said that:  
The theme of early marriages has grown into a pressing issue for both countries.” She 
explained how “Turkish people brought a ‘destructive tradition’ to Germany, that it 
became ‘a moving problem’, a common challenge that needs to be addressed together. 
 
  It is believed that non-dialogue short films will facilitate visual thinking on the 
issue. This project shows how the EU has established partnerships between 
organizations by utilizing culture, common problems to promote interaction and foster 
mutual understanding between countries. Consequently, Europeanization has resulted 
in partnership between organizations, which fostered dialogue. 
 
5.4 Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact 
 
 I argue that the EU has exerted a strong influence on women’s NGOs in 
Turkey and provided evidence that strong mobilization of women’s NGOs, 
collaboration with the state, and effective use of the external networks has led to the 
strong influence of the EU. My analytical framework suggests that the impact of the 
EU on women’s NGOs would have been weaker in the absence of these conditions, 
which are shaped by deeply rooted historical legacies. Legacies have become 
significant especially in the connective pathway and have influenced Europeanization 
outcomes of women’s NGOs. As the literature on legacies suggest (See Chapter 2 for 
more detail), legacies of the past not only constrain the range of current outcomes, but 
also enable them. Therefore, it is possible that certain aspects and characteristics of 
the past, especially those resulting from unique experiences of movements, can also 
function as a way to reinforce Europeanization. This section will show how historical 
legacies matter for the development of women’s NGOs and the EU impact by 
invoking a plausibility probe. 
In order to do this I consider the experience of women’s NGOs in the 
Republic of Cyprus as an illustrative case. Cyprus acceded to the EU in 2004, and has 
access to the framework for gender equality. The impact of the EU on women’s 
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NGOs appears to be limited. Hadjipavlou and Mertan (2010: 261) argue that “women 
from all communities had hoped that the entry to the EU would have made a 
difference… but this has not been the case up till now and it needs to be studied 
further”. 
First, the absence of a dynamic women’s civil society that promotes 
cooperation among civil society actors and supports policy initiation in favor of 
women’s issues hinders the EU’s impact. In contrast to Turkey, Cyprus never has had 
an active women’s movement, which could have mobilized around women’s issues 
and has been unable to use pre-accession context as an opportunity to promote 
women’s rights and enhance their visibility. Studies have pointed out the absence of a 
women’s movement in Cyprus could be explained by multiple historical factors such 
as colonialism, nationalism and a national problem (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010) 
that have inhibited the development of a women’s movement. These factors are 
deeply rooted in the history and have functioned as constraining factors for the 
development of the women’s movement in the island. The limited strength of 
women’s movement and mobilization on the basis of gender issues during the pre-
accession process inhibited EU’s impact on women NGOs in Cyprus. Although civil 
society space is fragmented and differentiated along their identities in Turkey, 
women’s NGOs are able to collaborate on various issues. Women’s civil society 
establishes platforms, campaigns for a common cause, initiates policy proposals and 
in successful cases are able to amend legislation in relation to the women’s issues. For 
instance, in Turkey, women’s civil society brought together a strong and diverse 
women’s movement coalition in favor of reform and induced amendments in 
legislation. In Turkey, the existence of a vibrant civic space has been a facilitating 
condition for maximizing the EU impact. 
Second, the lack of mechanisms that actively promote state society 
cooperation and the absence of a strong women’s agency in this network impede the 
EU’s impact. In 1994, the National Machinery for the Rights of Women was 
established in Cyprus as a requirement of CEDAW. Unlike Turkey, women’s NGOs 
have not played active roles under this machinery. In Cyprus, women’s NGOs are 
organically tied to political parties for material and social support and are refrained 
from engaging in gender issues (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010: 259; Sepos 2008: 
143). Women’s NGOs have not been able to develop independent positions both from 
the state and political parties.  In the pre-accession process, the women’s movement 
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was totally absent from the political arena. During the EU accession process, 
transposition of the gender equality framework has been explicitly recognized by 
officials of the National Machinery for Women’s Rights without social involvement 
of the civil society (Ioannou and Kentas 2011:98). Whereas in Turkey, the women’s 
movement has collaborated with the National Women’s Machinery to further gender 
equality policies, yet, at the same time resisted the state policies when it is against 
their interests. If women’s NGOs could not participate in women’s machinery to 
promote their rights and push the state to follow gender-sensitive legislation, the 
Europeanization processes would not have empowered women’s NGOs in Turkey. 
Finally, the dearth of transnational links with international NGOs and 
networks stands as an important barrier that limits the EU impact on women’s NGOs. 
In Cyprus, external networks with the women’s movement both in the region and 
elsewhere remained very limited due to the ethnic conflict that dominated the national 
agenda (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010). In Turkey, women’s NGOs established 
earlier international ties and pressured the state by using these networks. Such 
experience with the external networks is likely to ease interaction with European 
networks. As shown in the previous section, Turkish coordination of the EWL was 
founded in 2004, and women’s NGOs actively participated in the EWL before 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. In Cyprus, the Cyprus Women’s Lobby was 
established in 2008, much later than the accession to the EU. This means that the 
Europeanization processes are not only triggered by the EU; historical legacies have 
also played a key role in these processes. If there had not been an effect of historical 





The promotion of women’s civil society actors and gender mainstreaming has 
been at the center of the EU policy towards civil society. The main focus of this 
chapter has been to examine the ways in which the EU is triggering civil society 
development with a particular focus on women’s NGOs in Turkey. This chapter 
demonstrated that the EU has provided opportunities to women’s civil society through 
funding and enabled organizations to legitimize their actions and policies. More 
importantly, chapter showed that a stronger degree of Europeanization of women’s 
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civil society succeeds when the EU converges with the facilitating historical legacies. 
Therefore, this chapter highlights the significance of domestic factors such as 
historical legacies in mediating the EU impact, and the fact that Europeanization is 
not necessarily constrained by the historical legacies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY 
 
This chapter analyzes the dynamics of civil society and EU relations by 
investigating the various ways in which Turkey’s integration with the EU has 
influenced environmental civil society in Turkey. As Turkey applied for candidacy, 
Brussels became the driving force shaping the vision of environmental governance 
practices and the European Commission has become a key funder for environmental 
civil society. In the EU, environmental NGOs are active participants in environmental 
decision-making and policy processes. In an effort to contribute to the expanding 
literature on Europeanization of civil society, this chapter presents another original 
empirical study to understand the EU’s impact on environmental civil society and 
examine the mechanisms and interplay between domestic and EU level factors. 
I argue that the EU impact on environmental civil society has been ambivalent 
and has produced mixed effects. My argument is based on two main literature. First, 
literature on Europeanization of civil society has shown that the EU has altered the 
legislative framework, provided funding and enabled civil society actors in Turkey. 
Yet, this research agenda lacks an assessment of Europeanization of environmental 
civil society in Turkey as well as the influence of the EU on interactions between 
societal actors. The relationship between Europeanization and environmental civil 
society is only mentioned in a study on Europeanization of environmental policy (İzci 
2005; 2011). In this context, İzci has argued that accession negotiations provide 
opportunities for the environmental NGOs to strengthen their capacities, to participate 
in different processes, to improve access to information and enhance consultation 
with the government (2011: 195-196). However, İzci has not presented a detailed 
analysis of the EU influence on environmental NGOs. Second, the literature on 
environmental studies in Turkey has emphasized the importance of the EU for 
environmental civil society. For example, Adem (2005) has discussed how the EU, 
alongside other international organizations, established relations with environmental 
NGOs through “project-based work”. She has further highlighted challenges that the 
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relations bring such as “risk of projectizing” (Adem 2005: 80). Paker et al. (2013) 
have examined environmental organizations more comprehensively and focused on 
their relations with the state and with financial donors. In assessing the relationship 
between environmental organizations and financial donors and the state, Paker et al. 
have pointed out the positive impact of the EU process on consultation with the state 
and in the extension of funds. Additionally, Paker et al. have raised problems 
associated with the EU process such as the tendency of the state to exclude civil 
society from political processes and the detachment of environmental organizations 
from their supporters and constituencies due to EU funding (2013: 770). Overall, the 
current studies have not paid sufficient attention to Europeanization of environmental 
NGOs in Turkey. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the influence of the EU on environmental civil 
society. I argue that the EU’s impact on environmental civil society is ambivalent and 
haunted by the legacies of the past. While the EU has provided several opportunities, 
the moderate status of the green movement and activism, and the weak cooperation 
among environmental actors has functioned as constraining conditions of the EU 
impact. Furthermore, controversial relations between the state and society and the 
limited participation in European networks have displayed an ambivalent impact of 
the EU on environmental civil society. I will illustrate how the interplay between the 
EU and domestic factors produces such outcomes. 
The findings on compulsory and enabling pathways demonstrate similarities 
and indicate that EU impact is uniform across different sectors of the civil society. 
Yet, structured comparison of connective pathways shows diverse effects on civil 
society. I will show how Europeanization outcomes have depended on specific 
experiences of the past. The judgment of the EU impact is based on its power to effect 
interaction between actors and policies along with the social and political context of 
the operation of civil society. 
My study mainly focuses on one cluster of environmental civil society in 
Turkey. In an effort to follow an actor-oriented approach to civil society, I concentrate 
on national environmental NGOs in Turkey. While there are various types of 
environmental civil society organizations in Turkey, they will not all be used for the 
empirical analysis of the EU impact. In order to understand environmental civil 
society and the particular patterns of development that are associated with these 
organizations, I will point out other civil society actors, such as local environmental 
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movements (e.g. the Bergama Movement), environmental platforms (e.g. the 
environmental platforms), and Green political party within the general context of civil 
society development. In this context, “environmental civil society” refers to the 
various types of “environment related organizations including the greens, ecologists, 
nature conservationists, and environmentalists” (Adem 2005: 71).23 However, in this 
chapter, the analysis of the EU impact will be based only on environmental NGOs in 
Turkey. These environmental NGOs are considered to be the important and 
established ones in terms of size and capacity, experience of working with the EU, 
visibility, area of impact, and connections with internal and external networks. 
This chapter is structured in four sections. First, I will review the historical 
development of environmental civil society in Turkey to identify distinct 
characteristics that molded the environmental movement in Turkey. This part shows 
distinct characteristics and argues that traditionally, environmental activism has been 
moderate; it intends to participate in policymaking processes but has been restricted 
by the state’s behavior. In addition, environmental civil society is regarded as 
impotent due to lack of cooperation with internal and external networks. Second, I 
will map the mechanisms of the EU’s impact in environmental civil society and 
analyze if and how this impact has altered the situation of environmental civil society 
in Turkey. In the third section, I will illustrate historical legacies in detail that have 
conditioned the EU’s impact by engaging in counterfactual reasoning. Finally, I will 
summarize the findings and look at the implications of the EU’s civil society 
approach from the perspective of the environmental civil society in Turkey. 
Altogether, empirical evidence corroborates the conclusion that the EU and historical 
trajectories determine the Europeanization outcomes in Turkey. 
 
6.1. Major Developments in Environmental Civil Society 
 
This section examines the history of environmental civil society and presents 
distinct characteristics of the environmental civil society in the pre-1999 period, 
before Turkey’s candidacy period. I will demonstrate that parallel to historical 
legacies that have been identified in Chapter 4, environmental civil society has 
followed inherited characteristics in Turkey: Environmental civil society has limited 
                                                        
23 The nuance between these organizations –divided between environmental and ecological groups- 
will not be taken into account in this analysis. 
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resources, and similar to other civil society actors has operated in a restrictive legal 
framework. Moreover, environmental civil society has moderate activism and is 
unable to unite on the basis of environmental issues. It generally has controversial 
relations with the state and limited participation in external networks. It is also 
important to note that Europe has been an important reference point in Turkey, which 
has implications for Turkish civil society including environmental NGOs. 
 
6.1.1. Environmental Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923) 
 
 Starting from the Ottoman period, intermediary institutions depended strongly 
on the state. Traditionally, civil society in Turkey has been institutionally weak, 
underfunded, and has lacked various resources. Furthermore, there has been no 
financial and legal mechanism to support the development of civil society in Turkey. 
Unlike their European counterparts, civil society in Turkey has not been supported by 
the state (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). Similar to other types of issue-based NGOs, 
this limitation can also be found in the environmental civil society. 
When we trace the development of environmental civil society in Turkey, we 
find that although environmental civil society is a relatively new phenomenon; 
environmental initiatives go back to the last period of the Ottoman Empire. 
Environmental history is still a “fledging field” in Ottoman historiography (Dursun 
2007: 211) and the available sources for the history of environmental civil society 
have been very limited (Özdemir 2002). These studies on the history of the Ottoman 
Empire and environment find that there were two types of organizations that dealt 
with environmental issues. The first ones were the associations of environment 
directly interested in environmental issues and established by Ottoman elites. 
Environmental understanding was limited to the protection of natural sites and the 
formation of beautification associations. For instance, the Association of İstanbul’s 
Ancient Monuments founded by Prince Said Halim Pasha, was established with the  
 
objective of the “promotion of Istanbul’s works of art as well as its cultural and 
historical heritage and beauties, and to increase aesthetical consciousness of its 
people” in 1917 (Özdemir 2002 quoted in Baykan 2013: 8). A second one was the 
vakfs that performed civil society functions in the Ottoman Empire. Although vakfs 
did not explicitly deal with environment, an analysis of the constitutions of these 
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organizations demonstrates that they highlighted issues of environmental protection 
(Özdemir 2002). As discussed in the previous chapter, the feminist research agenda 
illustrated that during the Ottoman period the women’s movement was strong and 
demanded rights in relation to the women issues. Yet, activities were controlled and 
restricted by the Ottoman institutions. In contrast to the women’s movement, there 
was no environmental activism that raised environmental consciousness and 
awareness in this period. Due to its relatively recent inception, environmental 
activism does not have a long-standing past, and sources relating to this area are fairly 
very rare. 
Turkey inherited strong state tradition from the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, 
the development of civil society and activism have been paralyzed by the strong state 
tradition that it inherited from the Ottoman period (Heper 1965; Mardin 1969; 
Özbudun 1996). In the Ottoman convention, civil society had no influence over the 
state. In the beginning, classic Ottoman tradition and later the Tanzimat reforms, 
further strengthened the absolute power of the state by concentrating power and 
eliminating and restricting Ottoman institutions that were considered to be semi-quasi 
civil society organizations, such as vakfs and tarikat (Grigoriadis 2009: 43-44). As 
Grigoriadis (2009:67) notes, “the pursuit of individual interest was dismissed as 
divisive and harmful for the common good”. This negative perception was the 
predominant attitude towards civil society that legitimized excessive control over civil 
society actors, and later shaped state policies towards civil society actors. 
 
6.1.2. Environmental Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party 
Period (1923-1980) 
 
In early Republican Turkey and during the transition to the multi-party period 
the number of environmental organizations increased, but the characteristics of civil 
society in Turkey did not change. In the earlier years of the republic, organizations 
such as the Prince Islands Settlement Association, Association for the Beautification 
of Çamlıca, Society of Bosphorus Lovers, Association for the Reconstruction of 
Martyr Memorials, Association for the Protection of Trees and the Association of 
Protection of Animals were established by the upper-middle class (Dinçer 1996; 
Adem 2005). Additionally, the Turkish Forester’s Association (1924) was the first 
semi-governmental forestry NGO in the country established by professionals. 
Environmental devastation had intensified in the 1950s as a consequence of 
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urbanization, industrialization and internal migration; in response to environmental 
degradation, professionals, mainly technocrats, founded associations such as the 
Green Foresters’ Association of Turkey (1950), the Turkish Association for 
Conservation of Nature (1954), the Association of Assistant Forest Engineers (1951), 
the Ankara Anti Air Pollution Association (1969), the Society for the Protection of 
Nature (1975), and the Environmental Issues Foundation of Turkey (1978). The 
formation of beautification associations and of associations concerning major health 
and sanitation issues characterized the environmental activity in this period (Adem 
2005: 73). Despite the rise in the number of associations, environmental civil society 
remained weak, fragmented and controlled by the state. Although any kind of 
organization that was related to the environment represented “the embryonic stage of 
environmental activism” (Adem 2005: 73) and activities were very limited and 
controlled by the state, these associations played an important role in raising 
awareness and improving the environmental law in Turkey (Atauz 2000; Adem 2005; 
Paker 2013). 
 
6.1.3. Environmental Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999) 
 
In the 1980s, export-led industrialization and implementation of liberal 
policies led to large-scale infrastructure, housing, and transportation projects. Coupled 
with mass migration and unplanned urbanization these projects induced ecological 
devastation and an increase in environmental problems (Adaman and Arsel 2005; 
Ignatow 2005; Adaman and Arsel 2010). As environmental concerns intensified, the 
environmental movement developed both at the local and national levels. Local 
environmental movements such as Güvenpark (1986), Zaferpark (1987), Gökova 
(since 1986), Yatağan (1989-92), Aliağa (1989-92), Fırtına Valley (1999), Bursa 
(1992) thermic power plants, Akkuyu and Sinop, potential nuclear plants, Bergama 
goldmines and a number of dam projects (such as Ilısu and Munzur Dams) engaged in 
collective action. These movements raised important environmental problems in 
Turkey’s environmental agenda, pushed the state to change its policies and acted as 
agents of change. The establishment of the Green Party in 1988, which was inspired 
by its West European counterparts, was considered to be another major development 




 Although Green Party survived very shortly, this party succeeded in raising 
awareness of important environmental problems in Turkey’s environmental agenda 
such as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Furthermore, as Adem argues, most of the 
organizations in the 1990s benefited from the experience of the Green Party (Adem 
2005: 75). For instance, the Green Party was not only well integrated with local 
movements, but also utilized strategies such as signature campaigns, rallies, use of the 
legal system and establishing relationships with environmental organizations and 
Green parties in other countries (Şimşek 1993:63-68; Künar 1993; Duru 2002). In 
parallel with these developments, the institutional and legislative bases for 
environmental protection developed with the 1982 Constitution. Under Article 56, 
environmental rights were defined as the state’s as well as the citizen’s duty (Adem 
2005: 75-76). 
Another important characteristic of environmental civil society is the lack of 
cooperation among environmental actors. The environmental civil society has 
included participants from very diverse backgrounds and, as a result, has been unable 
to develop a “green political tradition” and solidarity and thus remains ineffective in 
Turkey (Atauz 2000:205; Duru 2013). Since the emergence of the environmental 
movement, the relations among various environmental actors have not been 
cooperative. Linkages and cooperation among civil society actors are weak as a result 
of ideological, cultural and social cleavages (Kuzmanovic 2010:434). This was also 
reflected in the environmental sphere. In Turkey, the environmental civil society has 
been scattered and environmental civil society actors compete with one another. This 
situation also had a negative impact on the development of the Green Party, where the 
disagreement between the greens and the environmentalists eventually brought the 
dissolution of the first Green Party (Duru 2002). 
Although civil society in Turkey was restricted by the 1971 and 1980 military 
interventions, in some way these interventions favoured the environmental civil 
society and environmental campaigns since environmentalists are not perceived as a 
“threat” by the state (Atauz 2000:199; Duru 2002; Paker et al. 2013). Despite the fact 
that the state has not perceived environmental civil society as a “threat” and generally 
has tolerated environmental civil society more than human rights organizations (See 
Chapter 7 on human rights civil society), the state has not promoted and contributed 
                                                        
24 The Green Party closed in 1994 and established again in 2008. Recently, the Green Party decided to 
merge with the Equality and Democracy Party. 
 147 
to the development of environmental civil society. Moreover, since the Republican 
period, the economic growth policies have been the main determinants of the 
relationship between the state and environmental civil society; as Aydın (2005:54) 
rightly points out the “state becomes responsive to the demands of environmental 
civil society organizations as long as they correspond to the priorities of economic 
growth”. A well-known example in the Turkish context is the different attitude of the 
state to the demands of civil society in relation to the nature of conservation and 
energy policies. It is important to highlight that the tension between economic growth 
policies and the conservation demands is not only peculiar to Turkey but is common 
in both developed and developing countries (Adaman and Arsel 2012: 323). 
In the 1990s, environmental civil society did not only proliferate and expand 
its activities, but also participated in the policymaking processes (Adem 2005; 
Keyman 2005; Paker et al. 2013). As Adem argues, this period could be seen as the 
period of professionalization, institutionalization, internationalization and expansion 
of project based work (Adem 2005: 78-81). Environmental foundations such as the 
Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection 
of Natural Habits (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları 
Koruma Vakfı- TEMA), Wild World Foundation- Turkey (WWF-Turkey), Greenpeace 
Mediterranean and Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society 
(Türkiye Çevre Koruma ve Yeşillendirme Kurumu-TÜRÇEK) expanded their 
activities, professionalized and specialized in specific issue areas, and broadened the 
understanding of environmental issues in Turkey. For instance, TEMA specifically 
focuses on the prevention of soil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss and climate 
change. The Buğday Association is active in supporting ecological living in Turkey. 
Its main goal is to raise awareness in ecological living both in the society and as a 
whole; to propose solutions to ecological problems and to support living in harmony 
with nature. The Nature Association (Doğa Derneği-DD) seeks to protect Turkey's 
bird species, important bird areas, key biodiversity areas and priority habitats through 
a national network grassroots programme. The TÜRÇEK has taken the status of  
“public benefit society” with the aim of preserving nature and the environment in 
Turkey. The Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and 
Cultural Heritage (Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı-ÇEKÜL) 
strives to foster and build a nation-wide awareness and network for the preservation 
of the urban and rural, built and natural environment. The Society for the protection 
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of Nature/WWF-Turkey works towards the implementation of environmental 
legislation and international agreements on nature conservation. Although these 
organizations are influential and address specific policy targets in the environmental 
agenda, they are small in scale and not very effective in policymaking. 
The UN has played a significant role in the internationalization of civil society 
and the establishment of international connections with the Second United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II Summit) of 1996. This conference 
provided an avenue for networking with other national and international 
environmental NGOs. The total number of environmental groups and activities grew 
steadily after the Habitat Conference. Another novel development was the 
relationship between transnational activist networks and environmental movements. 
In the 1990s, the Bergama resistance (e.g. anti-cyanide network), Akkuyu movement 
(e.g. anti-nuclear network), and the Ilısu Movement (e.g. human rights and cultural 
heritage network) made extensive use of transnational networks (Çoban 2004; 
Morvaridi 2004; Kadirbeyoğlu 2005). These transnational networks provided 
information, experience from similar conflicts in other countries and opportunities for 
networking between environmental civil society in Turkey and their counterparts in 
Europe. 
In the 1990s, cooperation and alliances among civil society organizations 
remained weak and fragmented. Overall, these organizations did not work together to 
influence various policies. As one environmental NGO representative succinctly 
summarized, “we, in general, have conflicting and competing interests, and we do not 
know how to work and how to produce together. There is a culture of competition in 
environmental civil society” (Interview TÜRÇEK 2011). This is yet another 
demonstration of continuity with the lack of cooperative relations among actors. 
Although the institutionalization of an environment policy started in 1974 with 
the establishment of the Committee for Coordination of environmental problems, a 
Ministry of Environment was established in 1991
25
 and passed a large body of 
environmental laws and regulations (Adaman and Arsel 2012; İzci 2012;Paker et al. 
2013: 763). While the state categorizes nature conservation as “harmless” and 
cooperates with environmental organizations at the policy level, in the case of energy 
                                                        
25
 In 1993 the Ministry of Forestry and the Environment  merged. In 2011, two new ministries- the 
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the Ministry of Forestry and Hydraulic Works- were 
established. 
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issues environmental NGOs often clash with the state. For instance, the DD is one of 
the members of the National Wetlands Commission under the coordination of the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry. At the same time, it is fighting against 
hydroelectric power plants and clashes with the Forestry and Water Works Ministry. 
It is also important to note that the institutionalized state machinery is not a 
monolithic entity and is composed of multiple, different, fragmented institutions and 
agencies (Adaman and Arsel 2010; 2012;Paker et al. 2013). In this context, 
environmental NGOs have a complex engagement and different modes of interaction 
with different institutions. There are two directorates in the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry: Nature Protection, and National Parks and Forestry. Furthermore, 
problems of coordination and jurisdiction complicate the issues. As Paker et al.2013 
illustrates and my interviews have supported, “Different departments can take each 
other to court, as in the case of State Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry (when they were separate entities)” Paker et al. 2013: 768). 
In other words, the environmental NGOs cooperate with some state institutions but at 
the same time conflict with others in addressing the environmental problems. This has 
a negative consequence on the relationship between institutions and environmental 
civil society. For instance, both the Nature Association and the TEMA Foundation 
show similar tendencies in their relations with the state bodies. 
The relationship between the state and environmental organizations should be 
considered in three different ways (Aydın 2005; Paker et al. 2013). In the literature 
this political accommodation is defined as “critical engagement,” which refers to the 
two-way process between the state and NGOs in which they recognize each other’s 
capabilities to solve societal problems (Aydın 2005: 60). There are three ways of 
critical engagement: (i) cooperation occurs when both actors recognize each other’s 
capacities and work in collaboration, (ii) conflict occurs when NGOs and the state 
have a contradictory relationship with each other and (iii) cooptation occurs when the 
state integrates selected NGOs in its own policy cycle. 
Environmental NGOs have been engaging in decision-making and policy 
processes by becoming commission members to relevant ministries and preparing 
scientific reports, and, thus, providing services to the public bodies. In this context, 
environmental NGOs have provided services (e.g. scientific knowledge and expertise) 
and in turn have participated in the decision-making processes as partners. For 
instance, the TEMA Foundation provided data about Turkey’s natural resources to the 
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Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. As a result, the Ministry began to work on 
forestation more efficiently (Interview TEMA 2011). Similarly, the DD prepared a 
database on bird species for various state institutions. Environmental NGOs also 
undertake lobbying activities to influence decision-making processes both in the 
national and the international domains. For instance, the TEMA Foundation issued a 
law on the conservation of soil and land management known as the “The Law on Soil 
Protection and Land Improvement”. The TEMA Foundation actively lobbied for the 
approval of this law. Lobbying activities include a petition campaign, use of media, 
seminars, and visits. In this case, the TEMA Foundation provided services and 
worked with state bodies in drafting this law. Moreover, governments more frequently 
consult with the environmental NGOs regarding environmental issues. However, 
consultation appears limited and exists mostly as a symbolic procedure. 
The government and private sector’s interests in energy sources clash with 
civil society demands on environmental protection (İzci 2012). The cooperation with 
the state on one issue does not guarantee further participation in policy making (Paker 
et al. 2013). The relationship between the state and society has also been  
 
controversial. There are various examples of this confrontational relationship. For 
instance, although the DD takes part in various commissions and provides scientific 
knowledge to state institutions, it has a contradictory relationship with the state. A 
well-known example is the court case between the State Hydraulic Works and the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry (when they were different institutions), and the 
involvement of the DD in this controversy. “During this process we presented 
scientific data on the importance of wetlands in court in order to intervene in 
investment decisions on hydroelectric power plants and influence water policies” 
(Interview DD 2011). Another example is the TEMA Foundation’s stance towards 2B 
legislation
26
. In this case, TEMA has been monitoring and working to influence the 
2B legislation process. 
The final mode of interaction with the state is cooptation. Traditionally 
cooptation is widely used when the state chooses to work with some organizations 
and exclude other organizations. This type of relationship is based on the selective 
understanding and limited inclusion of civil society by the state. In this case, the state 
                                                        
26
 2B legislation refers to the privatization of forestlands that opens forestlands for construction and 
sells them to private owners. 
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strategically chooses environmental organizations that will support its policies and in 
turn enable these organizations to participate in environmental governance. These 
organizations act as GONGOs. 
Historically, there has been weaker activism and participation in 
environmental civil society. As I have demonstrated in the previous sections, the lack 
of a strong environmental movement was inherited from the Ottoman period. In 
contrast to the women’s movement, environmental awareness has been rare and does 
not have a long history. One of the impediments of the development of environmental 
civil society is the cleavage among environmental actors.  Furthermore, the state 
tolerated environmental activism but did not develop it further. Overall, these 
inherited characteristics have shaped environmental civil society in Turkey. 
 
6.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact 
 
 The following section analyzes the different forms of EU influence on 
environmental civil society. The EU has impacted environmental civil society through 
its accession context and financial assistance. As discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter, the literature on the Europeanization of civil society and environmental 
studies has referred to two pathways of the EU: financial assistance and the EU’s role 
as a legitimization device. Yet, in depth-analysis of environmental civil society has 
been absent in the literature. More importantly, a connective pathway and its outcome 
have also not been studied in the context of Turkish environmental civil society. 
To start with the outcomes of the compulsory and enabling impacts are similar 
to the women’s civil society. First, the compulsory pathway has led to the change in 
the law of associations as well as environmental legislation and positively influenced 
the context in which civil society operates. At the same time, conditionality driven 
financial assistance to environmental civil society has produced various outcomes that 
belong to different types of Europeanization outcomes: (i) the compulsory impact, 
when environmental civil society adapts their issue area according to EU priorities; 
(ii) the enabling impact, when conducting an EU project enabled environmental civil 
society to follow their agenda; (iii) the connective impact, when a partnership is 
established between Turkish environmental NGOs, their counterparts in European 
countries and with state institutions. Yet, the environmental chapter has not closed, 
and both legal and implementation problems have surfaced during the post-2005 
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period. Second, in the case of the enabling impact, environmental NGOs have 
referenced the EU’s environmental acquis to push the state in following 
environmental priorities. 
  The connective pathway has facilitated cooperation between domestic 
environmental civil society actors. The establishment of Turkey’s Environment and 
Agriculture Alliance (Türkiye’nin Çevre ve Tarım İttifakı- ABce) is an example how 
the accession context triggered cooperation between domestic actors. Yet, ABce 
dissolved very rapidly due to the problems related to the environmental civil society 
in Turkey. The relationship between the state and environmental civil society has not 
changed to a great extent. Environmental NGOs have continued to participate in 
policymaking processes but this relationship has been molded by the state’s approach 
to environmental NGOs. While the state has been somehow receptive to conservation 
issues, in the case of energy, these actors clash with each other. In a similar vein, 
across three dimensions, namely society- society, state-society and external networks 
the EU programs have led partnerships between actors. In sum, Europeanization 
outcomes have been ambivalent on environmental civil society. In the following 
section, I will present new empirical evidence and interplay between the different 
forms of the EU influence and domestic factors to show influence of the EU on 
environmental civil society. 
 
6.2.1. Compulsory Pathway 
 
The first type of impact, which has been discussed in the literature on 
Europeanization, is compulsory impact. Similar to other sectors of civil society, 
compulsory impact occurred through the acquis communautaire and the financial 
assistance.  This means that the EU uses conditionality as a strategy in which a reward 
is given or withheld depending on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The outcome 
of such interventions has been EU-conform behaviour such as legislative adaptation 
or implementation (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005: 8). 
Firstly, the EU pressure to comply with the environmental acquis has induced 
legislative changing in environmental procedures and created opportunities for 
environmental civil society. In 2003, Turkey became a member of the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) and the European environment information and 
observation network. These memberships have created a management system that the 
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EU has been using for its member states. In addition to these memberships, in 2006, 
the Environmental Law was amended in line with the acquis and a national 
environmental approximation strategy was adopted (İzci 2011: 191). The 2006 
amendments to the 1983 Law on the Environment stipulates that public participation 
is a key principle of environmental policymaking, and requires state institutions to 
create participatory mechanisms for non-state actors. 
Turkey started the on-going negotiations on the environment chapter of the 
acquis in 2009. As studies on enlargement have shown (Hicks 2004; Börzel and 
Buzogány 2010 b), the EU environmental policy has created policy rights by legally 
involving public involvement in the policy processes. Access to the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) directives and environmental information are key 
components of the environmental chapter of the acquis communautaire. The EIA 
procedures aim to strengthen environmental protection and involve public 
participation as a fundamental principle of environmental policymaking across all 
stakeholders. However, the 2009 EU Progress Report indicated that despite the 
transposition of the EIA directives, public involvement has not been fully aligned 
with European standards (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 80). 
Furthermore, Turkey is not a party to the Aarhus Conventions, which grant public 
rights regarding access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters due to foreign policy concerns. 
Accordingly, although the EU has provided various policy rights to civil society 
actors, environmental organisations have not fully enjoyed those rights. This is also 
an illustration how the state’s interests and position disable environmental civil 
society in Turkey. 
Secondly, the compulsory pathway also functioned through the financial 
assistance to civil society. In the case of compulsory impact, civil society 
organizations have behaved strategically in an instrumental way and may have been 
directly affected by EU funds, technical assistance, training, and inclusion in 
consultation (Kutter and Trappmann 2010: 49). As Kutter and Trappmann (2010:49) 
argue, “the EU grants these opportunities as an incentive to engage with EU agendas 
and the implementation of EU rules”. In the case of Turkey, the EU has provided all 
of these instruments in developing environmental civil society and in supporting the 
accession preparation. As I show throughout this thesis, the compulsory pathway may 
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lead to different outcomes- compulsory, enabling and connective. The following 
examples show manifestations of compulsory impact. 
Starting from the late 1990s, the EU provided financial aid to the 
environmental civil societies that participated in the awareness of environmental 
concerns on an ad-hoc basis (e.g. MEDA program) and the establishment of 
capacities and cooperation with various actors in the development of environmental 
policies (e.g. Civil Society Development Program and Civil Society Dialogue 
Program). After Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country in 1999, the EU 
intensified its funding to civil society actors that participated in the implementation of 
EU policies. It is important to note that the call for proposals in relation to 
environmental actors mainly reflected the EU environmental policy’s priorities such 
as water management, waste and air quality, horizontal legislation and multilateral 
environmental agreements (e.g. LIFE, MEDA, Civil Society Development, Civil 
Society Dialogue Program).  Therefore, environmental actors that engaged in priority 
areas benefited more from the EU funding. One indication of the compulsory impact 
is how environmental civil society organizations conduct projects according to 
available funds and priority areas. When organizations prioritize EU-funded projects 
over their areas of expertise or adapt their projects according to EU policies, 
compulsory impact has been powerful. 
The EU programmes also enable environmental civil society in Turkey. The 
EU-funded projects have been extremely important for environmental NGOs since 
they are mostly dependent upon foreign funding like other civil society organizations 
in Turkey. A representative of the TEMA said that the EU funding on environmental 
NGOs is definitely an opportunity since there are alternative ways of funding now 
(Interview TEMA 2011). The General Secretary of TÜRÇEK (Interview 2011) added: 
“The EU funding has been an opportunity because in Turkey, the environment is not a 
priority and funding environmental activities is difficult”. In these cases, the EU has 
enabled environmental organizations. The EU has made the environment a priority 
and has allowed organizations to make projects on the environment.  
The EU introduced particular instruments to support civil society in order to 
contribute to the development of the implementation of environmental policy at the 
European level such as the DG Environment- ENGO Dialog Group (Kutter and 
Trappmann 2010). In following Central and Eastern European experiences, the 
Commission especially funded the environmentally-related subsequent programmes- 
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NGO Dialogue, New NGO Forum, Environment Forum (2009-2012) and now the 
“Development of the ENV.net in Western Balkan and Turkey: giving citizens a voice 
to influence environmental processes reforms for closer EU integration” programme. 
On behalf of Turkey, the TEMA was selected and has participated in these 
programmes. In the context of this programme, TEMA has established partnerships 
with the European environmental organizations. In this case, the EU programs have 
promoted cooperation between actors and facilitated the connective impact. 
 Overall, civil society organisations are dependent on foreign funding, and in 
this context, environmental organisations welcomed the EU financial and technical 
assistance. However, the EU’s civil society strategy and its implementation is 
extensively criticised. Environmental organisations have raised their objections 
towards the EU’s civil society strategy and its implementation through projects. For 
example, calls for projects, selection criteria, implementation processes and 
procedures received strong criticism. 
For instance, the Project Coordinator of the DD (Interview 2011) claimed:  
The Commission guidelines are too strict and bureaucratic. You spend too much time 
and energy on formalities. The EU always acts according to project guidelines, but 
sometimes you cannot simply apply what is on the paper. Its format definitely is too 
restricting and you end up with very inefficient decisions and actions  
 
The project coordinator further emphasized: 
Now we are more skeptical towards EU projects. It is true that we completed 
successful projects together, but the EU does not take our aims into consideration. We 
want to work on specific issues on nature, not the general issues on environment. This 
is what we need in Turkey now! There are urgent issues that Turkey’s environment 
immediately needed, but the EU does not pay attention to these issues. 
 
 As a result, the analyses of the compulsory pathway of the EU influence 
indicate two main outcomes. On the one side, it has caused legislative changes in 
environmental laws, which in turn affect the operation of environmental civil society. 
On the other side, financial assistance has strengthened their capacity and shaped their 
agendas. Yet, in the post-2005 period implementation problems have surfaced and 







6.2.2. Enabling Pathway 
 
The EU does not only perform a direct influence on civil society development 
and environmental NGOs in Turkey. Similar to women’s NGOs, the enabling 
pathway has empowered environmental NGOs. In this case, environmental NGOs use 
the EU as an instrument of legitimization, and justify their decisions or actions by 
referring to EU requirements and directives on the environment and norms. 
The EU has emerged as an important reference point in this respect, both 
providing a positive example to emulate and setting standards for environmental 
NGOs in Turkey. Although there is an increasing awareness of environmental issues 
and values, ecological issues often fall to the bottom of the list of policy priorities. In 
this context, environmental NGOs have referred to the EU’s environmental policy and 
acquis to push the state to follow environmental priorities. These NGOs have found 
new ways to repackage their priorities, initiatives and policy recommendations so that 
their agenda appears to fit more closely to the EU environmental policy; thus, EU 
membership can be used in a repeated manner to convince state officials to put real 
resources into environmental programs. In this way, environmental NGOs in Turkey 
utilize the EU framework both for political persuasion and manipulation. 
Through this mechanism, environmental actors have enhanced the legitimacy 
of the positions that they promote. My interviews and the press releases from 
environmental NGOs show that this role of the indirect effect of the EU has been used 
extensively by environmental NGOs in Turkey. 
An example of the enabling impact on environmental NGOs is the positive 
reference to the EU accession process in order to justify its policy positions on water. 
The DD has framed its opinion on water policies in relation to the EU.  
The DD acknowledges that the harmonization process with the European Union 
constitutes a significant opportunity for a more rational use of water resources 
through reviewing Turkey’s water policy. The Nature Association is ready to provide 
the necessary public opinion support to the Turkish government and the European 
Commission within the framework of these main principles for rewieving Turkey’s 
water policy, carrying out necessary scientific studies and creating  water legislation.  
                                                                                                 (DD- Opinion on Water).  
 
Also, there is an important incident in which environmental NGOs used the 
EU as a framework against the state. In 2003, the Turkish government prepared a 
draft law known as the Nature Conservation and Biodiversity Law within the context 
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of the Global Environment Facility
27
 which supported the Biodiversity and Natural 
Resources Management Project. This law changed its name to the Nature and 
Biodiversity Conservation Law but had problems on several levels from its approach 
to its context-- including the abolishment of the natural site conservation status and 
the ignorance of the NGOs participation. All of the environmental NGOs that I 
interviewed participate in a network called the Nature Law Watch Initiative which 
monitors the nature law process in Turkey. In this context, it is possible to see the 
function of the EU as a legitimizer of environmental NGOs’ activism in preventing 
the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Law in its current status. A representative 
of TEMA (Interview 2011) pointed out that: 
We have been following this process from the beginning and argue that the Nature 
and Biodiversity law is not in line with the EU’s environmental acquis. On the 
contrary, its approach is against the EU environmental regulations from its method of 
preparation to the context of the law. 
 
An interviewee from the DD (2011) emphasized: 
When you look at various environment chapters in the EU progress reports, the EU 
continuously highlights the importance of nature protection and biodiversity. The 
current status of the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Law abolishes a great body 
of legislation about Natural Sites, which is also highly important for the contribution 
to the Turkish Nature 2000 network.  
 
Therefore, from time to time, environmental NGOs use the EU framework to 
perpetuate and justify their claims, and use the EU as a reference point in 
environmental NGOs in a new way to repackage important environmental issues in 
Turkey.  
 On different issues, environmental NGOs have referenced the EU directives 
on the environment (e.g. the EU Habitats Directive, EU nature conservation 
legislation- Natura 2000) and the requirements of fulfilling the environmental acquis 
to pressure the government. Accordingly, as in CEE (Kutter and Trappmann 2010), 
environmental NGOs have used EU rules to mobilize support for different issues. 
However, as discussed elsewhere (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2005), the enabling impact, 
and, thus, legitimization of the EU is dependent on two further conditions: the 
commitment of the government to fulfill EU conditionality and the importance of 
                                                        
27
 Global Environment Facility includes the UN Development Fund, the UN Environmental Program 
and the World Bank, and provides funding to environmental civil society organizations working in the 
area of biodiversity conservation and climate change. 
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issues on the EU-Turkey agenda. Since 2007, the credibility of the EU membership 
perspective has declined and the reforms have slowed down in Turkey. As a result, 
the EU’s enabling impact has weakened. As a representative of the TEMA (Interview 
2011) puts it “The EU perspective is not only important for TEMA to follow green 
policies but also for the environment of Turkey. Nevertheless, the EU is not a focal 
point for TEMA’s activities in every occasion, the EU has been significant from time 
to time according to institutional and country’s (Turkey) priorities”. Therefore, as 
İçduygu argues, civil society actors “retain their EU perspective”, but they do not use 
the EU as a legitimization device for every occasion (İçduygu 2011: 338). The 
importance of issues on the agenda of EU-Turkey relations also has been a significant 
condition for the EU’s enabling impact. When an environmental issue is a priority in 
the EU-Turkey agenda, NGOs can reference EU reports and statements of EU 
officials to promote their own standpoints vis-à-vis the Turkish government. For 
instance, further negotiations on the EU’s environment and climate change chapter 
and participation in various environmental conventions may provide additional 
benefits for the NGOs (e.g. The Aarhus Convention- the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to justice in 
environmental matters). 
  
6.2.3. Connective Pathway 
 
 This section will specifically show that the EU’s impact on environmental 
civil society is ambivalent and shaped by certain characteristics of the past. The EU 
has promoted impacted civil society in two ways. First, Turkey’s EU accession 
process has facilitated interactions between actors. Secondly, as a way to promote 
cooperation among civil society actors, the EU has mainly used projects and joint 
activities that are affiliated with those projects. EU programmes have made 
cooperation with other organizations a condition for funding (See also Chapter 3, 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). The following part provides evidence on the ways in which 
the EU fosters environmental civil society to cooperate with the state institutions, to 
get involved in policy processes, and empower networks both with other 




Internal Networks-Society Society 
 
Historically, environmental movement has been active but similar to other 
issue areas it has been divided. However, in contrast to women’s movement 
environmental movement unable to unite and prioritize environmental issues. The 
following section will examine the dynamics between the EU and environmental 
NGOs in Turkey. 
The EU accession process has triggered the formation of internal networks 
between environmental organisations. Another important initiative within the context 
of the EU accession process is the establishment of platforms and joint activities. A 
good example of how environmental NGOs used internal networks is the 
establishment of ABce.  ABce was established by the TEMA, the DD, the ÇEKÜL 
and the Buğday Association, and represents predominant actors in the environmental 
civil society from diverse environmental backgrounds. Nevertheless, ABce dissolved 
and was an unsuccessful initiative in Turkey. 
The Representative of TEMA stated: 
Our relationship with other environmental NGOs is developing. We work together on 
the EU projects, we cooperate and we learn how to work together. Of course, 
compared to the EU practices our relationship is very underdeveloped. Networking 
and alliances are improving among environmental civil society organizations. We 
established ABce in order to follow the EU accession negotiations and to contribute to 
chapters on agriculture and environment. But… as you see what happened? It didn’t 
work out.  
                                                                                                (Interview TEMA, 2011).  
 
The Project Coordinator of the Buğday Association added: “ABce was an attempt to 
support the EU accession process and to develop cooperation among environmental 
NGOs, but it was a very unsuccessful initiative.” (Interview Buğday Association, 
2012). 
 The EU has also promoted participation in internal networks through its 
projects. The requirement of cooperation in EU programs has resulted in some 
alliances, such as the development of environmental federations among civil society 
organizations. Environmental NGOs also benefited from the EU accession process 
and established platforms to follow EU negotiations and contribute to environmental 
policies. However, cooperation in environmental civil society is still limited and the 
extent of change is not significant in Turkey. 
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  An example of how the EU has promoted cooperation among environmental 
NGOs has been explained by one of the prominent environmental NGOs in Turkey as 
follows: 
As the General Secretary of TÜRÇEK (Interview 2011) explains:  
We generally have conflicting interests and competition, we do not know how to 
work and how to produce together. However, in some instances, we manage to 
change this culture of competition through EU projects.  TÜRÇEK completed a 
project with other environmental NGOs and we set up an environmental federation. 
This is a success story for us.  
 
This one-year EU-supported project was completed in collaboration with 8 
East Black Sea Region NGOs, under the coordination of the TÜRÇEK. KarDoğa: 
The Cooperation Network Pilot Project on Nature Conservation in the Black Sea 
Towards the National Nature Conservation Network was an EU-supported project 
that was implemented in 2011 under the Empowering Civil Participation at the Local 
Level program to enhance “the institutional capacity of civil society organizations, 
strengthen participatory democracy at the local and national levels, and to encourage 
dialogue among the state, civil society organisations and the private sector” (Central 
Finance and Contracts Unit 2008: 3). The project entailed training seminars for local 
organisations and a workshop between state institutions and local environmental 
organisations. Consequently, the pilot project strengthened cooperation among local 
as well as national organisations, fostered an information exchange and 
communication, and promoted dialogue with state institutions. However, 
environmental organisations emphasized that most of the joint activities and projects 
completed under EU-funded projects did not continue regularly following the 
completion of the project (Interviews TEMA, DD, TÜRKÇEK). 
  As a result of this project, participating NGOs established the first 
conservation nature federation in the Black Sea region, strengthened cooperation 
among local as well as national NGOs, fostered information exchange and 
communication, and contributed to environmental policy making in Turkey. 
However, joint activities and projects completed under EU-funded projects did not 








  The EU’s civil society policy approach promotes partnership between the state 
and society. In this context, the EU has facilitated the formation of a second type of 
internal network between the civil society and state in Turkey. As indicated in an 
earlier section, there are different modes of interaction between the state and civil 
society. Historically, both state institutions and civil society organizations have been 
skeptical towards each other and the interaction has been shaped under this negative 
perception. The state and environmental NGOs have worked together in various 
contexts since the 1990s, but the relationship has been shaped by the state’s attitudes 
and receptiveness towards these actors. This tradition is also reflected in the EU 
accession context as well as projects; the EU has not changed certain tendencies in 
this relationship. 
  The EU accession process has developed consultation between civil society 
and state institutions. For instance, since 2009 the Ministry for EU Affairs holds 
regular meetings with civil society organisations. As noted by Turkish policymakers, 
civil society meetings not only inform civil society about the recent developments in 
Turkey’s EU negotiation process, but also promotes dialogue through exchange of 
information between the ministry and civil society (Interviews Ministry for EU 
Affairs, Expert Directorate and Director of Civil Society Communication and Culture) 
However, most of the organisations complained that the selection criteria for these 
meetings remain ambiguous and participation in the meetings has been symbolic 
(Commission of the European Communities 2013: 11; Paker et al. 2013: 767). One 
environmental organisation, for example, noted, “This is not real participation. We are 
not involved in decision-making processes. But were we there? Yes, we were” (Paker 
et al. 2013: 767). 
  The EU programs have made partnership with state institutions a condition for 
funding. A representative of the TEMA Foundation illustrated the cooperation 
between the NGO and state under the EU projects as follows: 
As a condition of the EU projects, we need to cooperate with Ministry of 
Environment and Forest in order to implement our projects. Especially in big projects 
we need to collaborate with various public bodies. During the course of these projects, 
we have experienced both cooperation and conflict. For example, we generally have a 
conflictual relationship on the status of hydroelectric power plants, but for other 
issues we do cooperate. One thing is clear: we start to work more efficiently together 
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under the EU projects. At the end, our relationship is still fragmented but at least we 
do have dialogue now  
                                                                                                  (Interview TEMA 2011). 
 
A good example of how the EU has established internal networks between the 
environmental NGOs and the state is the cooperation under the EU programs.  
In relation to these programs, the Project Coordinator of the DD described the 
relationship between the state and the DD (Interview 2011) as follows: 
We have a strange relationship with the state. We work with public institutions, and 
local authorities as a part of the EU projects. From time to time we work with the 
Ministry of Environment and Forest, and from time to time we are in conflict with the 
Ministry of Environment and Forest. As you can imagine, on investment issues we 
fight with each other, because the environment is always a secondary issue for the 
state. The EU projects facilitated more cooperation with the state, but still our 
relations are differentiated across environmental issues and different public bodies  
 
  According to the environmental acquis, Turkey has to comply with the EU’s 
environmental and climate change legislation and has to prepare the list of sites for 
the Natura 2000 network and legislation on nature protection in the context of the EU 
accession process. Furthermore, many chapters of acquis communautaire are based 
on the existence of active NGOs within the policy areas. It is justified on this basis 
that there should be a working relationship between the civil society and the public 
sector. The project between the state and Nature Association was conducted under 
this logic. With the collaboration of the Turkish Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry, the Nature Association implemented its project to boost the Natura 2000 
protected areas network in Turkey. This project was implemented with the idea of 
Improving Co-operation Between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening 
the NGOs’ Democratic Participation (Commission of the European Commission, 
2003). The project aimed to strengthen “the NGOs democratic participation level and 
the ties between the public sector and the civil society within the framework of EU 
alignment process” (Commission of the European Commission 2003:1). The total 
budget of the EU funded project is 48,278,047 Euro. Project activities included 
education work undertaken within the key biodiversity areas; national working group 
meetings; and inventory conducted on the key biodiversity areas in Turkey. The main 
objective was to develop the technical capacity on nature conservation and integrate 
environmental civil society actors in the decision-making processes on nature 
conservation. For this purpose, the Nature Association and state institutions work 
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together at various levels.  
As a result of this project, the DD’s Policy Coordinator, states that: 
This partnership was highly important and productive. It was also a crucial step in 
complying with legislation on nature protection within the context of the EU 
candidacy process. As a result of this project, the book on the key biodiversity areas 
will provide data for adhering to conditions such as Natura 2000 protected areas 
network in the EU accession process. We also hope that this will reflect  the Turkish 
Nature Conservation Policy. (Buğday Association Press Releases). 
 
   Overall, the partnership requirement of the EU programs has resulted in an 
effective partnership between the state and the society. Although environmental 
NGOs contribute to policymaking and work closely with state institutions through EU 
programs, environmental NGOs still play a marginal role in environmental policy 
making. The EU accession process has also opened avenues for consultation between 
the state and civil society. However, most of the NGOs have complained that their 








  The existence and use of external networks has been another important factor 
of the EU’s impact on civil society development. The EU also actively promotes the 
participation of civil society actors in transnational networks and European umbrella 
organizations. It is expected that civil society organizations will learn to promote 
dialogue and networking among nationally based environmental NGOs, and will 
transfer EU practices to the national level (Interview Delegation of the European 
Union, Sector Manager Environment 2011). At other times, participation in these 
external networks will allow Turkish environmental NGOs to use their membership to 
obtain information, provide contact points, and learn from their experiences. 
Furthermore, in EU programmes, developing external networks has also been a 
condition for funding. 
  Another important example of how environmental NGOs have benefitted from 
external networks is the participation of environmental NGOs in the European 
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Environmental Bureau (EEB), an important environmental umbrella organization at 
the EU level. For example, membership in the EEB at the EU level has provided an 
opportunity to develop relations between Turkish environmental NGOs and European 
environmental NGOs. In European governance, the EEB describes its objective as 
follows: “to protect and improve the environment of Europe and to enable the citizens 
of Europe to play their role in achieving this goal” (EEB 2010). The EEB Mission 
Statement further highlights that “The EEB is the environmental voice of European 
citizens, standing for environmental justice, sustainable development and 
participatory democracy. We want the EU to ensure all people a healthy environment 
and rich biodiversity” (EEB 2010: 2). The EEB (2010:3) describes its role in the 
enlargement process as follows: “we provide information about existing and 
upcoming policies, inform EU decision makers about the views and demands of our 
members and seek their support, as well as working in coalitions with other 
organisations to have our views accepted”. 
  The TEMA and the Buğday Association are members of EEB and regularly 
participate in meetings. Representative of the TEMA (EEB 2010: 5)  said: “The EEB 
gives us the possibility to participate in experts’ meetings and workshops where we 
can share our expertise and raise awareness on the most important environmental 
issues”. 
  The EEB incorporated these NGOs fully into their own work and gave them 
an opportunity to take part in all EEB decision making. This means that the EEB 
opens transnational space to environmental actors. These societal actors started to 
expand their activities and acquire different roles through cooperation. For example, 
participating environmental actors have the opportunity to take part in the decision 
making on environmental policy. 
 The EU has intended to encourage the participation of environmental NGOs in 
European umbrella organizations in order to develop learning through interaction. 
Although environmental NGOs work with European umbrella organizations, these 
experiences have not transferred into the domestic contexts. Unlike women’s NGOs, 
there are no cases of simultaneous policy initiations. Furthermore, environmental 
NGOs have not efficiently used the EEB to pressure the government to pass green 
legislation in Turkey.  
  At the same time, in EU programmes, formation of external networks has been 
a condition for funding. For example, the Development of the ENV.net in Western 
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Balkan and Turkey: Giving Citizens a Voice to Influence Environmental Processes 
Reforms for Closer EU Integration builds on the experiences of the previously EU-
funded project, the Environment Form, with a prime objective of building 
constructive dialogue among NGOs (Interview TEMA 2011). 
 
6.3. Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact 
 
 I argue that the EU has an ambivalent effect on environmental NGOs in 
Turkey and have presented evidence that moderate environmental activism and lack 
of cooperation between environmental civil society organizations, relationship with 
the state and limited connections with the external networks has led to ambiguous EU 
influence. The role of legacies is crucial particularly in the connective pathway and 
has affected the Europeanization outcomes of the environmental NGOs. In the case of 
environmental NGOs, legacies of the past act both as constraining (e.g. the weak 
environmental activism and lack of cooperation among environmental civil society 
actors limits Europeanization outcome) and facilitating (e.g. the relationship between 
state-society in some instances pave the way for cooperation) factors of the EU’s 
impact. This part on historical legacies will demonstrate how historical trajectories 
matter for the development of environmental NGOs and the EU impact by 
considering the case of environmental NGOs in Hungary as a plausibility probe. 
 Hungary became a EU member state in 2004, and has been subject to 
accession conditionality like Turkey. The impact of the EU on environmental NGOs 
seems to be stronger there than in Turkey. During the pre-accession process, 
environmental NGOs in Hungary did not only benefit from the EU’s financial 
assistance, policy rights and legitimization power, but also environmental legislation 
played an important role in the environmental protests in Hungary. Above all, 
Hungarian environmental NGOs have collaborated with the state in certain fields and 
resisted the state in others, and utilized the transnational as well as EU environmental 
networks. 
 First, the presence of active environmental civil society that fosters 
collaboration among civil society on the basis of environmental issues facilitates the 
EU impact. Contrary to Turkey, Hungary has a dynamic environmental movement, 
which used a EU context as an opportunity for mobilization and to promote 
environmental issues and raise environmental awareness. During the communist rule, 
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environmental movements were more tolerated groups compared to the political 
parties. In the last years of the communist rule, Hungary’s relatively free regime in 
CEE did not prevent development of a large Danube movement opposing the 
construction of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros dams and other environmental activism at 
the local level and among university students (Hicks 2004: 217). Furthermore, 
participation in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, 
allowed activists to pressure their governments and form independent groups (Carmin 
and Hicks 2002; Hicks 2004). Environmental groups had mobilized public support for 
change during the collapse of the communist rule and Hungarian environmental 
NGOs were the key players in the democratic transition in the 1980s (Hajba 1994; 
Hicks 2004:218). The EU pre-accession context has provided an opportunity for 
environmental NGOs in Hungary, and EU biodiversity legislation played a key role in 
one of the most historic environmental protests in Hungary (Börzel and Buzogány 
2010 a: 724). The construction of a NATO radar locator on Zengő Hill, an important 
natural preserve in southern Hungary, mobilized protest groups during the EU 
accession process. The local environmental NGOs joined with large Budapest-based 
activists from Greenpeace Hungary and Védegylet (Protect the Future). In the words 
of Börzel and Buzogány (2010a: 724) “… the highly polarized Hungarian public 
sphere put its ideological differences aside to prevent the destruction of a common 
good”. The domestic pressure from the environmental groups and society together 
with the danger of breaching EU environmental law stopped the government from 
constructing the locator on Zengő Hill (Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a). Yet, the green 
movement in Turkey, which incorporates actors from very different backgrounds, 
does not have strong activism and is unable to collaborate on environmental issues. If 
there had been mobilization on the basis of “a common good” as in Hungary, rather 
than differences and the use of EU context accordingly, the EU impact would have 
been stronger on environmental NGOs in Turkey. In Turkey, divided environmental 
civil society together with weakening of the EU power has been a constraining 
condition for the EU impact. 
 Second, the presence and use of mechanisms to promote dialogue with the 
state institutions, and existence of an active environmental mobilization to push the 
state facilitate the EU’s impact. The interaction between the state and civil society 
may take many forms ranging from cooperation to conflict to cooption (Aydın 2005). 
After the collapse of the communist rule in Hungary, the significance of the 
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environmental movement weakened. For instance, former environmental activists 
take official positions in the Environmental Ministry in Hungary (Hicks2004). 
Although the interests of the environmental NGOs and the state clash from time to 
time, during the EU accession process, the environmental NGOs were strengthened 
from the EU processes. Unlike Turkey, environmental NGOs used the EU context and 
established networks during the implementation of the EU biodiversity policy.  The 
environmental NGOs network CEEWEB for Biodiversity was founded by 
environmental groups in CEE and offered a training program for local administrations 
(Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a). The Hungarian National Alliance of Conservationists 
trained judges on the new biodiversity legislation. 
Similarly in Turkey, there are also cases where environmental civil society as 
well as the state has benefited from this partnership. For example, mutual information 
exchange and technical knowledge allows environmental NGOs to engage in policy 
making. For instance, the DD has cooperated with the Ministry of Environment at the 
policy level to meet the objectives of the Habitat Directive and designate Special 
Areas of Conservation and Special Protection Areas under the Wild Birds Directive. 
At the same time, the Nature Association has taken legal action against the State 
Hydraulic Works. In addition, traditionally, the state has had selective dialogue with 
civil society organizations in Turkey. The selective dialogue usually paves the way  
 
for cooptation where the state has a tendency to incorporate NGOs into the decision 
making process in order to control them. The EU’s approach to civil society 
development is based on a partnership interpretation of civil society. For this reason, 
the balanced and cooperative relationship between the state and society has acted as a 
good foundation for the EU’s impact.  The cooperative relationship between the state 
and civil society has been a facilitating condition for the EU’s impact. 
Lastly, the presence and effective use of the transnational connections 
stimulates the EU impact on environmental NGOs. The EU’s accession process has 
provided opportunities for civil society to participate in external networks. Although 
the environmental civil society established transnational links before interacting with 
the EU (e.g. Bergama movement) and established relations with the UN, the 
environmental civil society did not make use of these transnational connections. 
However, in CEE including Hungary, the EU process and financial assistance 
facilitated the formation of regional networks such as Justice and Environment and 
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CEEWEB for Biodiversity. While the former provided detailed legal analysis on the 
implementation of biodiversity law, latter operated under the supervision of the 
European Habitat Forum and established links between nature conservation NGOs 
and the European Commission (Börzel and Buzogány 2010a: 727). 
In Turkey, environmental civil society has established external networks and 
cooperated with international NGOs. Although there are few NGOs that have 
participated in these networks after Turkey’s candidacy for the EU, there is no further 
cooperation, or transfer of policies and experiences to the domestic level. In Turkey, 
environmental NGOs do not utilize strategies and use these networks regularly. If 
there had been well-established relations with the external networks in Turkey, 
environmental NGOs would have impacted more from the EU processes. Inefficient 
experience of the environmental civil society with external networks has functioned 
as a constraining factor for the EU’s impact. 
 
6.4. Conclusion  
 
 Environmental governance has been at the heart of EU policymaking. I argue 
that the EU impact has been ambivalent on environmental civil society. This chapter 
demonstrated that similar to other issue-based NGOs, the EU has enhanced the 
capacity and legitimized the positions of the environmental NGOs in Turkey. More 
importantly, it has drawn attention to the role of historical legacies in shaping the 
Europeanization outcomes of environmental civil society. 
The evolution of the environmental movement shows that environmental 
activism was moderate prior to EU interaction. In general, the status of green activism 
is neither strong nor weak, and the state has perceived environmental organizations as 
“harmless” compared to human rights organizations. Nevertheless, the mode of 
interaction between the state and environmental NGOs has been volatile. After EU 
interaction, the environmental civil society has been affected by the EU-driven 
processes. Although the EU has impacted environmental civil society in various ways, 
the EU’s impact has been ambivalent. 
The analysis of the empirical evidence reveals that the extent of the EU’s 
impact has depended on factors such as the status of activism, the cooperation 
between environmental actors, the state-society relations, and the existence of 
transnational connections. These have been important determinants of the EU impact 




HUMAN RIGHTS CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY 
 
Since Turkey’s application for candidacy, human rights issues have become an 
essential precondition for accession to the Union and human rights NGOs are critical 
in the advancement of international human rights as well as the norm-creation 
processes. The accession process has both directly and indirectly resulted in 
increasing EU pressure and monitoring states’ policies towards human rights issues. 
In this context, human rights NGOs represent an interesting case for comprehending 
the possibilities and constraints of the EU’s role in the transformation of civil society. 
I argue that Europeanization of human rights NGOs is less likely when 
historical legacies function as a constraining condition of the EU impact. First, the 
broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society primarily dealt with the 
question of how the EU has changed political opportunity structures in candidate 
countries in favor of civil society (See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion). 
This strand of the literature has profoundly studied the compulsory and enabling 
pathway of the EU influence. Yet, the connective pathway that captures a web of 
relations between actors and their interaction is widely mentioned, but not yet 
comprehensively and systematically investigated. 
Second, the literature on human rights in Turkey has also surveyed the 
relationship between the EU and human rights organizations. While some of them 
explicitly analyzed the EU’s influence on human rights organizations (Duncker 2007; 
Alemdar 2011; Öner 2014), others have studied the relationship in a wider framework 
in relation to human rights (Plagemann 2000; Arat 2007; Çalı 2007). Duncker has 
highlighted the diverse landscape of human rights NGOs in Turkey and their 
conceptions of rights as well as their reactions to the European process. Duncker 
(2007:55) has argued that “competition over funding and medial representation 
increases” with the EU funding, and both western orientated and Muslium human 
rights groups use the European process to advance their goals and have integrated “an 
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EU dimension into their discourse”. At the same time, she pointed out criticism of 
western values that civil society actors voiced and “the struggle about the definition 
power of what human rights actually are” (Duncker 2007:56). Öner (2014) has 
evaluated the perceptions of Turkish civil society after the deterioration of EU- 
Turkey relations in the fields of human rights, freedom of speech and media freedom 
and concluded that civil society organizations still use the EU as a reference point and 
a normative context. Therefore both studies have investigated the compulsory and 
enabling influence of the EU, yet, there is no analysis of the connective pathway of 
the EU impact. Only Alemdar (2011) has assessed the relationship between human 
rights institutions, the state and the EU by employing boomerang and spiral models 
and showed the main weaknesses of these models. Therefore, in contrast to others, 
she has analyzed the relationship between the state and human rights actors during the 
accession process, but she mainly concentrated on the interaction with the state. To 
date, the literature has not sufficiently examines connective pathway of the EU 
influence on human rights organizations along with the in-depth analyses of the other 
mechanisms of the EU impact. 
  The present study on human rights NGOs aims to fill these gaps and 
contribute to both strands of literature by providing an extensive examination of the 
EU impact on human rights NGOs. I argue that the EU’s pressure on human rights 
NGOs has failed to stimulate deeper change and is constrained by the legacies of the 
past. The findings demonstrate that different and selective understandings of rights 
between human rights NGOs, confrontational relations and limited cooperation 
between the state and the human rights actors, and the minimal use of transnational 
connections have constrained the EU’s impact. I support this argument with an 
original case and show the importance of historical legacies in the explanation of the 
EU impact. 
The examination of a compulsory and enabling pathway demonstrates similar 
findings across different sectors of civil society. Although I present an analysis of 
both pathways in the context of the human rights civil society, most of the discussion 
will revolve around the connective pathway that led to differential outcomes of 
Europeanization. As I have shown throughout this thesis and in each empirical 
chapter, studies on civil society have judged the EU influence on the way that it has 
altered the legal context in which civil society actors operate, and how this has 
legitimized their actions. I will also demonstrate issue specific empirical evidence on 
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these aspects, yet, this thesis judged the EU impact on the basis of its power to 
influence policies and interact between actors. I will show how interaction between 
domestic factors and EU factors led to limited impact on human rights NGOs. Lastly, 
I will show how legacies matter and function as a constraining condition of the EU 
impact. 
Before moving to the empirical section, it is important to understand how I 
define human rights civil society. This chapter concentrates on human rights NGOs in 
Turkey. Similar to other types of issue areas in Chapters 5 and 6, human rights NGOs 
in Turkey are not homogenous and cover various types of organizations. This study 
looks at different organizations in various human rights categories such as state 
torture, minority rights, cultural rights, and rights of disadvantaged sectors of the 
population. Within this broad grouping, most of the organizations have particular 
connections with Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Most of the analysis will be centered on 
the Kurdish question, because there is a crucial human rights dimension as a result of 
the excessive use of powers, and significant consequences of the state-induced 
internal displacement (Kurban and Ensaroglu, 2010; Cengiz and Hoffmann 2013). As 
a human rights problem, the Kurdish issue involves two central dimensions. On the 
one hand, the issue has a domestic dimension. The Kurdish ethnonationalism is 
constituted as one of the main obstacles of the Turkish democracy and 
democratization process (Gunter 1997; Özbudun 2000; Somer 2005). On the other 
hand, it has been a significant issue in the context of the EU-Turkey relations. 
Turkey’s Kurdish problem is connected to various human rights violations in Turkey 
such as restrictions on freedom of expression, torture, arbitrary killings, 
disappearances, displacement problems and prohibitions on using the Kurdish 
language. Various EU progress reports highlight that there are “serious shortcomings 
in terms of human rights and protection of minorities” (Commission of the European 
Communities 1998b; 1999a). 
 To understand human rights civil society and the specific characteristics of 
development, I will also introduce other civil society actors dealing with human rights 
issues including trade unions, bar associations, grassroots associations, and identity-
based Kurdish associations. However, the examination of the EU’s impact will be 
based exclusively on human rights NGOs. 
I have separated the chapter into four parts. First, I will present an historical 
development of human rights civil society to show particular characteristics that have 
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molded the human rights movement in Turkey. This part demonstrates essential 
features of human rights civil society and argues that traditionally, human rights civil 
society has had a conflictual relationship with the state, only recently developed 
cooperation across human rights actors and does not use mechanisms of transnational 
connections effectively. The second part applies a pathway model of the EU influence 
and shows various aspects of the EU impact on human rights civil society. The third 
part illustrates the function of historical legacies to account for the EU impact by 
invoking a counterfactual case. These results show that historical legacies that 
function as constraining conditions may limit the EU impact. The last part 
summarizes the findings and looks at the implications for the EU’s civil society 
approach from the human rights civil society in Turkey. 
 
7.1. Major Developments in Human Rights Civil Society  
 
This section scrutinizes the history of human rights civil society and different 
human rights issues that have been part of this movement and points out sector 
specific characteristics of the human rights NGOs in the pre-1999 era. I will 
demonstrate that in different periods of the history, human rights civil society has 
been vocal, but compared to the women’s movement (See Chapter 5 for detailed 
description), the human rights movement has been unable to mobilize around human 
rights issues due to diverging understanding of human rights, has been less 
cooperative both with human rights actors and state authorities, and less connected 
with external networks. 
Human rights have long history in Turkey. The idea of human rights dates 
back to the Ottoman Empire with reference to minorities, was severely undermined 
during the Kemalist period and revolved within the boundaries of class struggle as 
social justice in the 1960s. In the 1970s, state sponsored systematic torture became an 
intrinsic part of the military regime. However, until the 1980s, human rights were 
regarded as a marginal issue, and only dealt with in leftist circles. Human rights 
activism has peaked as a consequence of a military coup, in response to the severe 
state repression, torture and death in the 1980s. The 1990s was characterized by 
increasing violence against the Kurdish population, and the Kurdish question has 
become a central issue for the mobilization of the human rights movement. During 
this period, human rights activism has centered on different aspects of the Kurdish 
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problem. Alongside with the Kurdish problem, other human rights issues- LGBTT 
rights, hate crimes- emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. Although the human rights 
agenda has changed and expanded throughout the different periods of history, the 
Kurdish question has remained as the primary focus in the debates on human rights in 
Turkey. 
 
7.1.1. Human Rights Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923) 
 
 Historically, a comparison of women’s and environmental civil societies with 
the human rights civil society shows that the development of human rights 
organizations is a more recent phenomenon both globally and domestically. In 
contrast to women’s and environmental fields, there were no associations that dealt 
with human rights issues in the Ottoman era. Although it is not possible to talk about 
human rights activism in the Ottoman period, neither in associational nor in grassroots 
form, some scholars claim that the idea of “human rights” entered into the discussions 
and was present mainly in reference to “minority rights” (Aral 2004; Falk 2007; 
Kabasakal-Arat 2007:2). It is argued that “Ottoman heritage exhibited high degrees of 
tolerance for non-Muslim religions, and included the conferral of an impressive 
degree of autonomy upon religious and ethnic minorities, by way of the millet 
system.” (Falk 2007: xvi). Their lives and properties were protected by the Ottoman 
state and minorities had certain rights such as the right to speak their own languages, 
to enjoy their religious freedom, to set up foundations, and to have education (Aral 
2004: 475). Nevertheless, these protections were only applicable to non-Muslims-
Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews- and this was a very narrow interpretation of 
rights, since the Ottoman state denied various rights of other distinct groups such as 
the Kurds (Kabasakal -Arat 2007). During the Ottoman period, human rights were 
understood in the context of “minorities” and were restricted to a particular range of 
issues. Thus, this communitarian understanding of human rights where human rights 
was defined, understood and justified in relation to religious communities were 
prescribed in the Ottoman years (Grigoriadis 2015) and continued to shape the 
understanding of minorities and human rights throughout the different periods of the 
Turkish history. In this context, no minority status was granted to the Kurds. 
As outlined in the previous chapters, an inherited characteristic from the 
Ottoman era was the controversial relationship between the state and human rights 
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civil society. The strong state tradition has inhibited the development of civic activism 
and rights. Chapter 4 demonstrates that state is strong in the coercive and arbitrary 
sense rather than in regulative and distributive powers (Kalaycıoğlu 2002; Çelik 2010; 
Kaliber and Tocci 2010) and has influenced civil society. In the case of human rights 
issues, the state has perceived any activity as threatening, divisive and harmful for its 
unity. This perception and the conflicting interests among actors have further impeded 
the development of a cooperative relationship between state institutions and human 
rights civil society. Moreover, this negative perception that dates to the Ottoman 
Empire has shaped the state’s understanding of rights. The relationship between the 
state and human rights organizations is the most controversial among issue areas 
discussed in this thesis. The following sections will show different dimensions of the 
controversy. 
 
7.1.2. Human Rights Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party 
Period (1923-1980) 
 
In the early Republican period and during the transition to the multi-party 
system, there were severe human rights violations in Turkey. During the early 
Republican period, there was excessive control by the CHP over the state apparatus. 
In this period, there were several Kurdish uprisings, and left wing opposition groups 
were repressed for being traitors, sectarians and religious fundamentalists. The 
Kemalist idea of forming a national identity had drastic consequences on the human 
rights situation since those attempts led to assimilationist and discriminatory practices 
by the state. This strong Kemalist tradition also imposed a “particular model of 
Turkishness” (Seckinelgin 2004: 174), which in turn conflicted with the rights of 
different groups. Since Kemalism neglected the existence of different cultural 
identities, any organizations that were not motivated by Kemalist principles were seen 
as traitors (bölücüler) rather than being seen from a civil society perspective 
(Seckinelgin 2004: 176). Considering this understanding, Kurdish uprisings of the 
1920s and 1930s in the eastern and southeastern Kurdish populated regions were 
perceived as a threat to the nation state (Kaliber and Tocci 2010: 195). In this context, 
the relationship between the state and human rights organizations has been extremely 
problematic and difficult to sustain. Civic activism questioning the Republican order 
was considered as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state and to Kemalist 
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ideology, and was harassed by the state. Overall, human rights activism was restricted 
and not developed in the early Republican years. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of World War II, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights promoted the formation of domestic human rights organizations 
(Plagemann 2001; Çalı 2007) and associations of human rights directly interested in 
these issues were established by members of the political parties. The first human 
rights association was founded by a group of state elites, diplomats and academics 
following the formation of the UN in 1945 (Plagemann 2001; Çalı 2007). The 
Association for Human Rights and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms was 
established by the members of the CHP. In response to this development, the 
opposition party, the DP, established the Association for the Protection of Human 
Rights. As Çalı argues “these organizations were primarily products of the 
corresponding instrumental motives of the government and opposition parties to 
conform to the new international order” and the human rights understanding mainly 
reflects positions of the political parties with which they were affiliated (Çalı 2007: 
219). Associations survived for only a short time and were shut down following the 
accusations that they had leftist tendencies. Therefore, attempts to institutionalize 
human rights issues failed at an early stage. As Plagemann correctly points out, 
“demanding human rights was seen as a propaganda weapon for communists and 
enemies of the state, and as interference in Turkish internal affairs” (Plagemann 
2000:434). This perception of human rights organizations as “enemies of the state” 
and what Elise Massicard labelled the “enemies of unity” (cited in Çelik 2010) has 
shaped the rights understanding in Turkey. 
In the 1960s, following the military coup, the 1961 Constitution made 
extensive references to human rights and to the protection of civil and political rights. 
Furthermore, the constitution defined Turkey as a state based on human rights and 
new categories of rights such as economic and social rights were introduced 
(Kabasakal-Arat 2007). The 1961 Constitution was a very liberal constitution. 
However, class politics was the defining feature of the time, and human rights were 
understood within the boundaries of class struggle as social justice rather than as a 
maintenance of minimum standards for all (Kabasakal-Arat 2002; Çalı 2007). 
Following the deterioration of the relationship between the left and right wing groups, 
in 1971 the military stepped in and left-wing activists alongside right-wing groups 
were imprisoned and tortured and poor conditions became systematic. In response to 
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these violations, international human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International publicized human rights violations and informed the public about the 
poor conditions in Turkey. In 1974, cooperation between the Turkish left and 
Amnesty International led to the foundation of the Turkish branch of Amnesty 
International that conducted investigations into the human rights violations (Çalı 
2007: 220-221). However these initiatives remained limited and did not develop any 
substantial measures to prevent rights violations in Turkey. Equally important was the 
armed insurgence of the PKK in the 1970s, which deteriorated the relations between 
the Turkish state and the majority of Kurdish society. 
 
7.1.3. Human Rights Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999) 
 
 In 1980, the human rights movement gained momentum both inside and 
outside of Turkey. As Grigoriadis argues, a sharp deterioration in the record of human 
rights in Turkey was one of the key characteristics, which was inherited from the 
1980-1983 military regime (Grigoriadis 2015). Communism and Kurdish 
secessionism were two main threats that were reflected as pretexts for the 1980 
military coup. The highly restrictive and authoritarian 1982 Constitution limited 
fundamental rights and freedoms and restricted space for the civil society. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, several articles in the 1982 Constitution and Law of 
Associations gave the state absolute authority to stop and control activities of 
associations and political parties. Furthermore, rights of minorities were restricted 
under the 1982 Constitution. For example, Article 42 banned education in any 
language other than Turkish. The 1980 coup resulted in excessive human rights 
violations by the state and as a consequence, two different types of human rights work 
developed in Turkey (Plagemann 2000:434). On the one hand, international 
organizations such as Amnesty International, the Federation of Human Rights and the 
International Commission of Jurists passed on information regarding the human rights 
violations in Turkey to the public and highly publicized cases of violations. On the 
other hand, protests in prisons supported by the relatives and friends of prisoners led 
to the development of domestic human rights activism. It is in this context that human 
rights awareness started to increase and organizations such as the Human Rights 
Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği- İHD) and the Support Association for Families 
of Detainees and Prisoners (Tutuklu ve Hükümlü Aileleri Yardımlaşma Derneği) were 
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founded in Turkey (Plageman 2000: 434-435). The İHD deserves more attention since 
it is the main organization that has survived from its establishment. It started as a 
solidarity movement that consisted of relatives and friends of leftist prisoners that 
campaigned for general amnesty and against the situation in prisons and the death 
penalty (Plagemann 2000; Çalı 2007). The state had strict control over these 
organizations and human rights organizations suffered heavy repression such as the 
arrest of its members, legal proceedings, attacks on and closure of its offices, and 
deaths. The very nature of human rights created confrontation with the state. Human 
rights organizations resisted against the state and defined their role in opposition to 
the state, because in most cases the rights violator was the state itself. However, in the 
Turkish context, since the Ottoman period, controversial relations between the state 
and human rights organizations has been more pronounced and the political reflex of 
the state still plays a defining role in the evolution of human rights organizations. 
 Turkey’s entry into the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in 1987 played an important role in the articulation of state repression within 
the framework of international human rights law and the legitimization of human 
rights organizations (Çalı 2007: 222). When Turkey recognized the right to 
individually petition the ECtHR in 1987, the ECtHR became a litigation center, and 
there was a rapid increase in the number of petitions (Kurban 2008: 3).  As Kurban et 
al. rightly claims, “it was initially for Kurds that the European human rights law 
offered an alternative arena for rights-based litigation” (Kurban 2008: 3). As I will 
show in the following section, human rights organizations play a critical role in 
publicizing human rights violations and in defending the rights in European courts. 
Although Turkey has participated in the international human rights regime, the state 
considers the human rights movement as dangerous to its survival, a characteristic 
that dates back to the Ottoman era, and has developed a suspicious and negative reflex 
towards human rights actors dealing with the Kurdish question. 
In the 1980s, the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK further 
polarized human rights organizations and accelerated the conflict both between 
human rights actors and the state. During the 1980s, violence was a key element of 
the Kurdish question, and the state essentially denied the existence of a Kurdish 
problem and repressed civil society actors mainly in the Kurdish populated regions. 
The polarization in Turkish politics has particular consequences for the human rights 
organizations. Human rights organizations defined their role and their understanding 
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of rights within the boundaries of existing divisions-Kemalist, Kurdish, Islamist, 
leftist, liberal. Therefore, ideological divisions are always superior to human rights 
issues. The controversy over different human rights issues- the Kurdish problem, 
LGBTT rights- indicates the continuation of this feature in Turkey. 
In addition to international human rights organizations, the Turkish asylum 
seekers who lived in Europe have cooperated with domestic human rights 
organizations and have played a significant role in the internationalization of human 
rights issues and in the establishment of international connections both with European 
and international organizations. The connections were established through these 
groups. For example, Casier shows that immigrants and refugees stay connected with 
their countries and shape the homeland agenda through the mobilization of 
immigrants’ and refugees’ associations (Casier 2010). Although human rights NGOs 
have established these connections with international organizations, international 
human rights NGOs and various governments, only particular domestic human rights 
NGOs such as İHD use these connections and the use of external networks is not 
widespread across the human rights movement. 
In the 1990s, domestic human rights organizations grew not only in 
quantity/number but also in the breadth of their activities. Initially, human rights 
activism focused on helping the victims of the military coup. However, the increasing 
violence in the South East and the intensive armed conflict between the state security 
forces and the PKK led to serious human rights violations in the region. In this 
context, human rights organizations not only concentrated on helping victims of the 
military coup, but also focused on rights violations that were associated with the 
different dimensions of the Kurdish question. For instance, the İHD dealt with the 
many violations against the fundamental human rights and freedoms. The İHD has 
been one of the principal organizations that has addressed the Kurdish question as a 
human rights issue since the mid-1990s. During the mid-1990s, the İHD focused on 
violations of civil and political rights toward the Kurdish population and campaigned 
for freedom from discrimination (Çalı 2007: 224). Additionally, in the late 1990s, the 
İHD campaigned for the enjoyment of cultural rights for citizens of Kurdish origin. 
In the 1990s, the spectrum of human rights issues was expanded. The Human 
Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı- TİHV) was founded by 
the İHD. Its main goal has been to provide treatment and rehabilitation for victims, to 
document human rights violations in Turkey, and more recently, to carry out projects 
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on the prevention and investigation of torture. The Association for Human Rights and 
the Solidarity for Oppressed (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği, 
Mazlum-Der) was originally founded to work against discrimination on religious 
grounds. Mazlum-Der has become a leading voice in framing religious beliefs as a 
human rights issue. The Kurdish issue and the situation in Southeast Anatolia are 
important to the organization. Mazlum-Der has campaigned for the cultural rights of 
the Kurds on the basis of a multi cultural nation-state (Plagemann 2000: 452). The 
Immigrants’ Association for Social Cooperation and Culture (Göç Edenler Sosyal 
Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği- Göç-Der) was established in 1997 to conduct 
research on the socio-economic and socio-cultural situation of the Kurdish people 
living in Turkey, who are forcibly displaced due to armed conflict. They have 
released extensive reports on forced displacement-related concerns. The Children 
Under One Roof Association (Çocuklar Aynı Çatı Altında Derneği-ÇAÇA) was 
founded to provide assistance for at-risk children living in Diyarbakır. The detailed 
examinations of the constitutions and the mission statements and publications of the 
these human rights NGOs in Turkey demonstrate that all of these organizations dealt 
with general human rights violations, most of them specialized in different issue areas 
within the Kurdish question, and expanded the understanding of the human rights 
issue in Turkey. Hence, the Kurdish question reflects various human rights violations 
that have consequences in the political, economic and cultural domains. Therefore, 
throughout the 1990s, the human rights agenda has been expanded in Turkey where 
organizations do not solely focus on promotion of individual rights but also collective 
rights. In the 1990s, human rights organizations have not only reflected major human 
rights issues in Turkey, but they have also contributed to democratization and active 
citizenship. 
Since the 1990s, the cooperation among human rights organizations has 
accelerated, but remained limited among few organizations due to diverging 
understanding of human rights. Within the political developments of the 1990s, the 
İHD has cooperated and allied with both unions and new social movements such as 
the feminist and environmentalist movements. Initially, human rights organizations 
(e.g. the Mazlum-Der and the İHD) undertook petition campaigns and protested poor 
prison conditions together (Çalı 2007:225). They supported each other’s activities and 
collaborated on various themes such as the arbitrary use of force, civil and political 
rights, discrimination, and violation of the freedom of religion. According to Çalı, 
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another important consequence of human rights activism has been the dialogues 
among divergent groups and individuals such as the left-right, Turkish-Kurdish, and 
Islamist-secular on the basis of “the minimum non-negotiable standards of the 
existence of a political community” (Çalı 2007:227). Nevertheless, as emphasized, 
cooperation among human rights groups has been limited due to the diverging 
understanding of rights among these groups. For example, the İHD has developed 
within leftist circles and has been criticized due to its extensive focus on the Kurdish 
question. Similarly, most of the Kemalist organizations that identified themselves as 
human rights actors refuse to cooperate with Mazlum-Der. Mazlum-Der as a 
conservative Islamic human rights NGO has rejected cooperating on LGBTT rights. 
More recently, an important advance in the field of human rights organizations 
has been the emergence of human rights platforms and the development of solidarity 
among various actors. Most of the human rights organizations have established 
platforms in different issue areas to raise awareness of critical human rights problems 
in Turkey. These platforms act independently and improve solidarity between 
organizations. For instance, there are issue specific platforms such as the Migration 
Platform to support social solidarity and address the problems of victims of forced 
migration. In relation to the Migration Platform, representative of Göç-Der (Interview 
2012) explained how platforms improve relations and lead to successful outcomes:  
Forced migration is one of the critical aspects of the Kurdish problem and has had 
severe consequences. By establishing this platform we not only raise our voices and 
solidarity, but our voices are stronger together. We highlight common problems, 
exchange good practices and we work together on resolution of these problems. The 
output is very successful.  
 
Important social matters such as nationalism, xenophobia, military coups and 
antimilitarism have led to the establishment of platforms by human rights defenders 
(Çetin 2008:48). 
In the 1990s, the institutionalizing and monitoring of human rights policy 
started first with the foundation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Human 
Rights Investigation Commission, and later in 1994 with the establishment of the 
State Ministry Responsible for Human Rights. 
Similar to other policy areas, in the case of human rights policies, the 
institutionalized state machinery is not monolithic and is composed of different 
actors, agencies and institutions. As Çalı illustrates, these institutions have complex 
and overlapping sets of mandates (2007: 230). In this context and due to the nature of 
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human rights issues, human rights NGOs have a complex engagement and often-
confrontational modes of interaction with different state institutions. To put it 
differently, human rights NGOs cooperate with some institutions but most of the time 
are in conflict with others in addressing human rights policies/issues. The relationship 
between the state and human rights NGOs generally occurs in the form of conflict and 
cooption. 
Human rights organizations have been engaging in policy making by 
delivering various services but often have been constrained by the state’s approach to 
these organizations. This is another demonstration of continuity in the relationship 
between the state and human rights groups where these groups have been seen as 
rivals rather than partners throughout different periods of history. For instance, 
organizations work closely with the Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights 
Investigation Commission and provide services. The mandate of this commission is 
regarded as the most independent and trusted by these organizations (Çalı 2007: 230). 
However, this commission lacks enforcement, and cooperation with other agencies is 
limited.  Interaction between state institutions and human rights NGOs is very 
restricted. Both the state institutions and human rights NGOs were suspicious to 
collaborate with each other during the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, the dominant mode of interaction between the state and human 
rights NGOs was conflict. For instance, when the İHD criticized the state approach 
towards the Kurdish question and stated that “the association regards Kurd problem as 
one of the basic democracy and human rights problems in Turkey” (History of İHD 
2008), members were seen as separatists that threatened territorial integrity. The head 
of the İHD Diyarbakır Branch said that the state brought legal proceedings to the 
association and to its members (Interview İHD 2012). The İHD’s branches frequently 
suffered from pressure, surveillance and closure of offices. 
It was only in the late 1990s when Turkey was declared a candidate for 
membership that the state approach began to change towards human rights issues. As 
Tocci explains, “a rights-based approach to its solution began to emerge” (Tocci 
2005). Before that, granting rights was seen as a form of discrimination of national 
identity and a threat for the territorial integrity. In this context, human rights NGOs, 
with respect to the Kurdish issue were traditionally perceived as constituting threats to 
Turkey’s national security. For instance, the EU’s policy towards human rights issues 
has been strongly criticised by Kemalist elites as it has been seen as disruptor of 
 182 
internal affairs and threat to the unity of the Turkish state and subjected to accusations 
of separatism (Dagi 2001; Rumford, 2001;Sugden 2004). 
 
7.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact  
 
This section analyzes how historical legacies and EU factors impact human 
rights NGOs in Turkey. In all categories of the EU influence, the EU has impacted 
civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its accession context 
and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society. 
The examination of a compulsory and enabling pathway demonstrates similar 
findings across different sectors of civil society. Similar to other issue areas, the EU 
has altered the legal context in which civil society actors operate, and has legitimized 
human rights NGOs. Several laws such as broadcasting in Kurdish have passed 
regarding the human rights issues. Although human rights civil society benefitted 
from these legal changes, implementation related problems have surfaced during the 
post-2005 period. In relation to legitimization power of the EU, human rights NGOs 
have referenced the EU norms to legitimize and broaden the discussion of human 
rights issues in Turkey. 
In connective pathway, Europeanization outcomes on human rights NGO have 
been weak. First both EU context and programs have failed to change the relationship 
between human rights NGOs. These organizations still have diverse understanding of 
human rights. Second, the EU has limited influence on the relationship between the 
state and society. One way to demonstrate the EU influence is to examine the 
interaction between the national human rights institutions and the human rights 
NGOs. The relationship with the Human Rights Presidency under the Prime 
Minister’s office, and boards in the presidency (from 2002 onwards), the interaction 
with provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards (from 2002 onwards), and 
the draft law process on the foundation of the National Human Rights Institutions 
(from 2010 onwards), and later, the period after the establishment of this institution 
(from 2012 onwards)- represents three empirical cases of the restricted EU impact on 
the state and society relationship. Last human rights organizations have not used 
external networks sufficiently. The next section demonstrates the outcomes of the EU 
impact on human rights NGOs, and the role of historical legacies as a constraining 




7.2.1. Compulsory Pathway  
 
In the EU accession process, the issue of human rights and democratization 
constitutes the most important aspect of the EU’s enlargement policy. In order to help 
Turkey comply with the Copenhagen criteria, and to ensure the promotion and 
protection of human rights, the EU uses various instruments. 
 The first pathway in which the EU affects civil society is the compulsory 
impact. As has been shown in relation to the other empirical chapters, compulsory 
impact is performed through the acquis communautaire and the financial incentives. 
It is a mechanism that occurs on the grounds of conditionality. However, the 
compulsory impact could lead to various-often related but different- outcomes. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this is one of the challenges of the adaptation of the 
theoretical framework to civil society. 
Firstly, the compulsion takes place in the accession process by pressuring the 
state to comply with the EU legislation. The EU, in this way, has pointed out 
constitutional, legal reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Through this 
mechanism by pressuring the Turkish state, the EU has indirectly shaped the 
functioning of civil society organizations. This has created an opportunity for these 
organizations, and enables them to follow and prioritize their agendas. Therefore, 
civil society actors were not forced directly by the EU, but the EU empowers and 
enables these actors by forcing the Turkish government. For example, the 
Copenhagen criteria, alongside the law on associations, required extensive reforms 
from Turkish governments in many areas. One of the crucial areas that is repeatedly 
indicated in the progress reports is Turkey’s poor human rights records and legal 
framework on the freedom of assembly. Therefore, since the Commission’s first 
report, human rights issues and legislative reforms in relation to the civil society has 
been at the center of the assessment of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. 
These pressures on the Turkish government have resulted in the major constitutional 
and legislative reforms regarding human rights issues, and have impacted civil society 
actors. 
One of the most important outcomes of the Europeanization of human rights 
NGOs has been the major constitutional and legislative reform related to the human 
rights issue and functioning of civil society. As a consequence of the EU pressure, 
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starting from 2001, a series of reforms were made concerning human rights issues. 
For example, the removal of the state of emergency in Kurdish regions in 2002 had 
positive impact on the functioning of civil society actors in southern Turkey. In 
Diyarbakır, most of the human rights organizations said that restrictions on the 
freedom of association and expression were eased with the removal of the state of 
emergency (Interviews İHD, TİHV, ÇAÇA, KAMER, Mazlum-Der). Therefore, the 
EU’s pressure on the Turkish state has not only changed the legislation but also 
created a positive atmosphere for the functioning of the civil society. The new Law on 
Associations eased language restrictions in the activities of associations where they 
can use foreign languages in their non-official correspondence. Furthermore, the 
provision of broadcasting in Kurdish made improvements in human rights. The 
reform process in Turkey is a good illustration of the compulsory impact where the 
EU’s conditionality on the Turkish state in relation to the human rights issues-Kurdish 
problem- has created an enabling environment for the human rights organizations. 
Although the constitutional and legal amendments made various changes in 
relation to the human rights and the law on associations, problems continued to be 
observed in their implementation. For instance, NGOs that promote cultural identity 
and particular religions still face bureaucratic restrictions and are not able to register 
(Altan-Olcay and İçduygu 2012: 167). Moreover, the post-2005 period and downturn 
in EU-Turkey relations have undermined the developments in the field of human 
rights. Human rights activists highlight that “in parallel to the deterioration of EU-
Turkey relations there has been a decrease in human rights standards and a sharp 
increase in human rights violations, which has crippled their effectiveness and ability 
to influence policy” (Kaliber and Tocci 2010: 203; Kaliber 2014:41). 
 More importantly, the amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law
28
 have 
directly affected and imposed constraints in the field of freedom of association, 
assembly and expression. As Yıldız and Muller rightly affirm, the broad definition of 
terrorism has targeted organizations as “terrorist organizations”, and therefore 
criminalized their members and activities (Yildiz and Muller 2008:66). This has direct 
influence in the activities of human rights actors in the Kurdish populated regions. 
Most civil society activists such as human rights defenders, trade unionists journalists, 
lawyers have faced arrests because, as the representative of the İHD in Diyarbakır 
                                                        
28
 A new Anti-Terror Law was introduced in 2003 to replace the 1991 law. However, in 2006 it was 
amended following the criticism that the 2003 law had weakened the state in its fight against terrorism. 
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acknowledges, “anything can count as ‘terrorist activity’ and undermine both our 
individual rights and collective activities” (Interview İHD 2012). The new 
amendments to the Anti-Terror Law made in 2012 and 2013  tackle the narrow 
conceptualization of terrorist activity. Yet, implementation problems have continued 
to influence human rights NGOs negatively. 
The measures on anti-terror legislation and their relationships with human 
rights have been subject to discussions both on the EU level and among EU member 
states. The first terrorist attacks on the United States of America in September 2001, 
then the atrocities in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 and recently the Paris 
attacks have spurred debates on anti-terror legislation around the world. As a response 
to the 9/11 attacks, EU member states have reacted differently to security threats and 
have introduced new laws that induced discussions whether the new legislative steps 
curtail other fundamental freedoms in these societies (Haubrich 2003). Equally 
important has been the EU’s response to security threats following the 9/11 attacks. 
The EU has taken a variety of measures, including introduction of European Arrest 
Warrant, designed to simplify surrender procedures within the EU’s territorial 
jurisdiction. Yet many commentators and international human rights NGOs have 
criticized EAW procedures and its commitment to obey human rights law. For 
example, Amnesty International’s report entitled Human Rights Dissolving at the 
Borders? Counter-terrorism and EU Criminal Law, questioned European Arrest 
Warrant goals and addressed three fundamental issues from the perspective of human 
rights and liberties. The report suggested that failure to agree on a precise definition 
of terrorism as a basis for framing EU law, a lack of judicial reviews by the European 
Court of Justice and dealings with third countries caused serious concerns for 
fundamental freedoms and liberties (Amnesty International 2005). The Report 
emphasizes “Human rights are often portrayed as a potential barrier to effective 
protection from “terrorist” acts rather than a pre-requisite for genuine security… it is 
in the breach, not in the respect of human rights, that security is put at risk” (Amnesty 
International 2005: 2). Therefore, anti-terrorist measures within the EU are vaguely 
defined and discrepancies exist within EU member states. This in turn undermines the 
EU’s credibility and its transformative power on civil society. The section on a 
connective pathway discusses the paradox between the EU, Turkish anti-terror 
legislation and civil society in detail. 
 186 
Secondly, the EU performs compulsory impact through funding. As discussed 
before, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU impact is extremely 
complicated. The outcome of funding could belong to other categories of the EU 
impact- compulsory, enabling and connective. Since the late 1990s, the EU has 
provided funding to human rights civil societies that participated in awareness of 
human rights issues on an ad hoc basis (e.g. MEDA Program), enhanced capacities 
(e.g. Civil Society Development Program) and protected and promoted human rights, 
pursued the development of human rights policies and support for human rights 
defenders (e.g. EIDHR). The EIDHR is the principal mechanism of support for civil 
society activities in the promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries 
(EIDHR is examined in depth in Chapter 3). It is important to note that the call for 
proposals in relation to human rights civil society supports the EU’s policy priorities.  
The main priority areas covered empowerment of civil society in its action in a broad 
area of human rights. This area included the fight against torture and impunity, 
improved access to justice, human rights education and training programs, enhancing 
political representation and participation in organized society, particularly for 
underrepresented groups including women, LGBTT, Roma and youth (Council of the 
European Union 2009). 
As emphasized before, financial assistance is compulsory if it forces civil 
society actors to undertake projects according to EU’s priority areas. For example, a 
human rights activist stresses that “Our organization is new. Our main problem is the 
funding. When there are calls for proposals from the EU, sometimes we realize that it 
is not our exact area of activity. Sometimes we want to conduct other projects. 
Nevertheless, we do not have so many opportunities for funding. In those cases, we 
adapt our area according to the EU priorities in the call for proposals.” (Interviewee 
Pembe Hayat). This is an indication of the compulsory impact where organization has 
adapted the area of activity according to EU priority areas. 
Nevertheless, evidence on human rights NGOs illustrates that compulsory 
impact, in many cases, has not been effective. Similar to other types of issue areas, 
human rights NGOs claim that the application procedure is always too bureaucratic 
compared to other types of international funding, and in some cases priority areas do 
not correspond with their fields of expertise (Interviews İHD, TİHV, Göç-Der 2012).   
For example, the İHD President (Interview 2012) complained that:  
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The EU programs are too complex and bureaucratic. The EU should abandon empty 
formalities. We are not an association that is only based on projectionism. We do not 
apply to programs only for funding. For example, if our area of expertise does not 
match the EU priorities in the call for applications, we simply do not apply to these 
programs. 
 
At the same time, EU programmes may provide an opportunity to promote 
human rights NGOs’ agendas and empower their policies. In this way, the EU enables 
these organizations. For instance, under the EIDHR Programme, in order to combat 
torture and impunity, human rights NGOs completed various projects such as 
Strategic Mapping of Torture in Turkey (Helsinki Citizens Assembly- Helsinki 
Yurttaşlar Derneği-hYd), Review of Legislation on Torture and Implementation of it 
During the EU Harmonization Process in Turkey and Training Providing Legal 
Service and Raising Public Awareness in Order to Prevent Torture (TİHV), and No 
for Silence: Establishing Effective Collaboration and Methods to Fight Against 
Torture and Impunity (İHD) (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey 
2008). A representative of the TİHV (Interview 2012) said that “issues of human 
rights are highly sensitive, and lack of financial resources have always been an 
obstacle for us. Although it is too complex, the EU funding has been helpful in many 
ways. When there is a call for application in our area of expertise, it is a great 
opportunity for us to support our activities”. In this case, the EU has enabled these 
organizations since the priority areas in the calls for proposals perfectly fit with their 
agendas. 
 EU programs also promote partnerships among organizations. For example, 
under the EIDHR Program, the TİHV completed a project titled “Effective Protection 
of the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Other Persons in Need of 
International Protection”. The overall objective of the project is  “to protect the rights 
of persons in need of international protection by contributing to the national 
implementation of international norms protecting these rights” (Delegation of the 
European Union to Turkey [c]). Within this project, the TİHV has established a 
partnership with the Van Women’s Association (Van Kadın Derneği- VAKAD). 
Trainings were organized with Van-based organizations and meetings were held in 
exchange for information. Therefore, in this instance, the EU has facilitated 
partnerships between civil society organizations. Collaboration between human rights 
NGOs is an example of connective impact. 
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 Recently, by using Foucault’s conception of neo-liberal governmentality, 
Mühlenhoff (2014) offered an analysis of EU civil society funding through the 
EIDHR documents and its discursive impact in Turkey. In following Laclau and 
Mouffe, she has presented the discursive concept of hegemony and shows that the 
EIDHR supports NGOs of a liberal narrative yet by means of a neo-liberal 
governmental power. She argues that the EU, and EIDHR programs in particular de-
politicizes the NGOs and the neo-liberal governmentality constitute them as technical 
service providers rather than political actors (Mühlenhoff 2014). 
However, the EU impact does not occur only through funding and human 
rights NGOs are subjected to various EU influences. The EU funding is the most 
important instrument to influence civil society in the EU’s policy towards civil 
society. Yet, the EU accession process involves other mechanisms (both direct and 
indirect), which proceed in multiple ways at the same time. For example, one of the 
central finding is the de-politicization of the NGOs through the EIDHR.  Therefore, 
her concentration is on the EIDHR, which is only a particular type of program for 
civil society. She points out that EIDHR empowers civil society in a specific way and 
attributes certain functions to civil society organizations. Nevertheless, there are other 
programs and instruments for Turkish civil society such as IPA, Civil Society 
Dialogue I, II, III and the EU Civil Society Facility programs. Unlike EIDHR, these 
programs involve other types of activities such as training of NGOs, partnerships with 
state institutions, and partnerships with the European NGOs and participation in 
European networks, which can not only be interpreted as instances of de-
politicization. The EU has affected civil society through several processes such as 
formation of internal and external networks, legitimization, which all attributed civil 
society other functions in addition to a service provision. Moreover, domestic factors 
and characteristics of these movements are significant since they interact with the EU 
pressure and shape the Europeanization outcomes. Historically speaking, human 
rights NGOs use different ways to participate in the politics besides the EU funds. For 
example, as I will demonstrate in the next section, during the struggles against the 








7.3.2. Enabling Pathway 
 
Historically, Europe has been an important reference point for civil society. 
Europe, particularly the ECtHR has become a normative context for human rights 
groups. From 1999 onwards, human rights NGOs together with the ECtHR have used 
the EU as a reference point to legitimize their policies. Similar to other sectors of civil 
society in Chapters 5 and 6, the enabling pathway of the EU impact facilitated the 
empowerment of human rights NGOs. However, in the post-2005 era the impact of 
the EU has been weakened parallel to the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations. 
Traditionally, human rights NGOs were perceived as separatists and 
considered as a threat to national unity and security. As Çalı argues, “the state 
authorities characterize human rights movement as the marriage of “international 
traitors” with “international enemies,” and maintained a skeptical and suspicious 
attitude toward human rights organizations.” (Çalı 2007 :222). This case was 
supported by interviews, such as when the Human Rights Joint Platform (İnsan 
Hakları Ortak Platformu- İHOP) General Coordinator and human rights defender 
(Interview 2011) stated: 
For so long, our demands have been perceived as a threat to national unity and 
security. We had serious problems with the state authorities. They always thought that 
our attitude was offensive and separatist. There was not any other way to convince 
them. For this reason, from time to time we frame our demands in different ways 
especially by referring to the decisions of the ECtHR. In the past, officials considered 
us as traitors; now this has started to change. 
 
 In this context, both the EU and the ECtHR were regarded as key actors in 
providing positive examples to emulate and for the rising credibility of the human 
rights NGOs. The EU accession period provided opportunities for human rights 
NGOs to raise different human rights issues in relation to the EU in order for them to 
pressure the state. In this way, human rights NGOs have increased their credibility 
and legitimacy. Similarly, through the ECtHR, organizations exert influence on the 
state. Human rights NGOs now advance their reforms by referring to the decisions of 
the ECtHR and the EU context. Framing these issues in relation to the EU empowers 
human rights NGOs and provides leverage to defend and justify their claims. 
Therefore, similar to other organizations, human rights NGOs in Turkey use the EU 
frame both for political persuasion and manipulation. 
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An example of the enabling impact on human rights NGOs is the reference to 
the EU’s progress reports as a means to raise concerns about the human rights 
situation, publicize violations and pressure the state to change legislation. In a press 
release, İHD raised the concerns on freedom of thought and expression in Turkey.  
In relation to the freedom of thought and expression, the association said that: 
It’s clear that existing legislation is being used to force investigations, open lawsuits 
and give punishments in this area. It can be seen that the judicial decision-making 
mechanism does not have an independent and libertarian-minded conception of law 
and lack democratic culture. The 2007 EU progress report stresses that obstacles to 
freedom of expression are increasing. (Human Rights, The Kurdish Issue and Turkey, 
2009). 
 
 In a similar vein, in the opening speech of the 15
th
 general assembly of the 
İHD, President Öztürk Türkdoğan once again emphasized that “we need to focus on 
the process of membership to the EU which is the important dynamic in the 
democratization process of Turkey.” (Opening Speech of the 15th General Assembly 
of IHD, 2010). In relation to this membership process, the İHD President said that 
“the İHD supports the EU perspective and the Copenhagen criteria for the 
democratization process in Turkey. We strongly believe that EU values and 
democratic culture could promote human rights norms and our objectives in Turkey.” 
(Interviewee İHD, 2012). 
Similarly, the ÇAÇA refers to the EU accession process to promote its policy 
on children and to raise awareness about children’s rights.  
The ÇAÇA President (Interview 2012) has stated that:  
When we look at the legislation on children rights in Turkey we can easily pinpoint 
that we are too away from meeting international standards. The main reason is the 
perception in the country on children’s rights. We emphasize that our expectation 
from the EU process is to comply with the legislation on children’s rights. We can use 
the EU acquis to change our legislation in a positive way and reflect it to  children’s 
rights.  The EU accession process is a key dynamic for rights and democratization in 
Turkey  
 
 Another illustration of the enabling impact is the reference to the EU progress 
reports to publicize the current situation on the prevention of torture and ill treatment 
and pressure the state to follow the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture. Activist and member of TİHV Diyarbakır said:  
The state said that there is no torture and ill treatment anymore. Is it really the case? 
Can we really say that there is no torture anymore? Not, at all! There might be a 
downward trend in systematic torture in the Diyarbakır prison such as falaka (beating 
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the soles of feet) or electric shocks. But torture has not disappeared; on the contrary, 
now there is another dimension- psychological torture. You can also see various 
examples in the EU progress reports. The law is there (referring to the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention Against Torture) but what about the implementation?      
                                                                                 (Interview TİHV Diyarbakır 2012).  
 
The 2012 Progress Report verified this by concluding “ As regards prevention 
of torture and ill treatment, despite the positive downward trend in reports of torture 
and ill treatment in places of detention, law enforcement officers continued to resort 
to force and, particularly in unofficial places of detention, this is cause of concern. 
There was little progress in tackling impunity” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2012: 72).   
These cases show that human rights NGOs have used the EU framework to 
justify their decisions, actions and policies. These cases also demonstrate that in 
practice the enabling impact of the EU empowers human rights NGOs in Turkey in 
relation to the state. By referring to different EU practices and experiences, human 
rights NGOs pressure the Turkish state to pursue necessary reforms and make 
arrangements in relation to human rights issues. 
As discussed elsewhere, legitimization and empowerment depends on the 
condition of the commitments of the government and the salience of issues on the 
agenda of EU-Turkey relations (Rumelili and Boşnak forthcoming). It is now widely 
accepted that the credibility of EU membership has declined in Turkey. As a 
consequence, the EU as a legitimization device has become less attractive to human 
rights organizations. Although human rights NGOs clearly indicate that they still 
support and are in favor of the EU perspective, they do not use the EU as a 
legitimization device for every occasion. During my fieldwork and interviews most of 
the human rights organizations emphasized that they only use the EU framework 
when their working priorities intersect with the EU agenda. 
 
7.3.3. Connective Pathway 
 
 This section illustrates how the EU has intended to promote cooperation 
between/among actors through the partnership principle. The EU has exerted 
influence through its accession context and financial assistance. I provide evidence to 
show that the outcome of the EU impact has been limited compared to other sectors of 
the civil society. Particularly, I will show how the Europeanization of human rights 
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NGOs has been constrained by domestic factors. 
Internal Networks- Society- Society  
  The human rights movement has been vocal in promoting and protecting 
human rights in Turkey. Similar to other sectors of civil society, human rights civil 
society is divided. Yet, contrary to women’s NGOs (see Chapter 5), human rights 
NGOs are unable to unite and mobilize on the basis of human rights issues. 
 The EU has promoted the cooperation between human rights NGOs. The 
following section from Turkey’s human rights scene shows how the EU has been 
unable to facilitate fruitful cooperation between actors and the consequences of such 
interaction. First, the accession process has flourished consultation and cooperation 
between civil society actors. In the case of women’s and environmental NGOs, 
platforms have been established between issue based NGOs around a common cause- 
to take an active role in the accession process. While women’s NGOs have 
established EWL Turkish coordination, and environmental NGOs have formed ABce, 
human rights organizations have failed to collaborate efficiently on the EU related 
issues. Nevertheless, an important development in cooperation among the human 
rights area has been the establishment of the İHOP by prominent human rights 
organizations in Turkey. The İHOP was founded in 2005 as an independent platform 
to share information between four human rights NGOs. The Human Rights Joint 
Platform initially was composed of İHD, TİHV, hYd, Amnesty International Turkey 
and Mazlum-Der. TİHV and Mazlum-Der are not affiliated with the İHOP but still 
participate in some meetings in their fields of expertise. In recent years, new members 
-İHAD and İHGD- joined the İHOP. Human rights NGOs in the İHOP share the 
belief that the Turkish state should democratize and fulfill its fundamental obligations 
of protecting human rights and freedoms. For this purpose, the İHOP has defined its 
mission as “empowering the capacity, components, general impact of the human 
rights movement in Turkey and general impact of it” (İHOP Mission). The İHOP 
General Coordinator has stated that 
our objective is to create a participatory and pluralistic environment, to empower 
cooperation between human rights actors that will allow us to participate and 
influence decision making processes and policies in Turkey. More importantly, the 
İHOP conducts research and releases monitoring reports on human rights issues. For 
example, in order to monitor legislative developments in Turkey against the ECtHR 
standards, we conduct a project titled the Human Rights Monitor to monitor human 
rights policies and practices in Turkey  
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                                                                                                 (Interviewee İHOP 2012)  
 
The İHOP has conducted various EU programs. Additionally, the İHOP draws 
attention to the new areas of rights and promotes cooperation in different thematic 
fields through various coalitions and initiatives such as the Coalition for International 
Criminal Court in Turkey, and the Justice for Children Initiative. 
The EU has also used projects to promote collaboration among human rights 
NGOs. The General Coordinator of the İHOP (Interview 2011) expressed it as 
follows:  
Human rights NGOs used to cooperate before establishment of the İHOP, but we had 
ad hoc meetings. Through the İHOP, we learn and share our experiences more 
successfully with each other.  The EU projects help us enhance cooperative relations. 
We conduct a variety of EU projects and establish networks and alliances on different 
thematic fields. Our collaborative project on mapping discrimination is a good 
example. 
 
The İHOP carried out this EU supported project with a group of human rights 
activists. The project is an information/network analysis mapping of discrimination in 
Turkey. These maps focus on different cases of discrimination and illustrate the 
interaction of key persons and institutions (Discrimination Maps). 
Therefore, the İHOP represents a successful case of cooperation and 
interaction in the human rights area. One of the impediments of closer cooperation 
has been a differing understanding of human rights. As Duncker argues, the 
discussions on freedom of religion and homosexuals’ rights show different 
conceptualizations of rights in Turkish politics (Duncker 2007). For instance, in 2007, 
Mazlum-Der, a conservative organization, left the İHOP over the controversy on the 
issue of homosexuality. 
Another example of the different understanding of rights and the lack of 
cooperation is the debates about the abolition of Article 301. For example, the EU has 
paid particular attention to freedom of expression as one of the fundamental human 
rights. The EU Progress reports and EU officials have criticized the legal practices in 
relation to the freedom of expression, and warned Turkey to take necessary initiatives 
to bring the legislation in line with the acquis and EU standards. In this way, the EU 
has exerted pressure on the Turkish government to abolish Article 301 in the Turkish 
Penal Code under which several journalists, human rights defenders, writers, and 
academics have been prosecuted for the crime of “insulting Turkishness”. Although 
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there was extensive public debate about the abolition of Article 301, and human rights 
organizations all opposed the article, they failed to come together and pressure the 
government to abolish the article. For example, human rights NGOs made press 
statements
29
, criticized the content of the law individually, and urged the government 
to comply with the European standards. However, they failed to campaign against 
Article 301 in solidarity. Feray Salman, human rights activist said that “ there is no 
common human rights language and understanding in the human rights movement” 
(Interviewee  İHOP 2012). 
 
Internal Networks- State-Society  
 
As noted in various chapters, there are different levels of interaction between 
the state and civil society. Traditionally, the development of a state and society 
relationship has been shaped by coercion where the state continuously interferes with 
these organizations. From the beginning, the state does not recognize the rights and 
demands, and the interaction has been predominantly negative. In some cases, the 
state and human rights organizations have cooperated, but selective understanding of 
the rights towards these organizations has shaped the interaction. The state’s approach 
also has been reflected in the EU projects, and the projects have failed to change 
certain understandings of the state’s actions towards these organizations. The 
relationship is not consistent, and in some cases human rights organizations and state 
institutions cooperate. In other contexts, the relationship is too fragile and they reject 
cooperation with each other. 
 The president of the İHD explained the relationship between NGOs-state as 
follows: 
We have a difficult relationship with the state institutions. For EU projects, we need 
to cooperate in some instances, but this cooperation is a more symbolic 
“cooperation”. It depends on the timing. There are some periods when we have a 
more constructive relationship and other times when we have a more conflictual 
relationship.  We do suffer from heavy pressure especially in relation to the Kurdish 
problem. Our understanding of rights is completely different from each other.   
                                                                                                  (Interviewee İHD, 2012)  
 
                                                        
29
 The İHD and Mazlumder have made various press statements to support the abolition of Article 301; 
Amnesty International campaigned against Article 301.  
 195 
  An empirical record shows that the relationship between the state and human 
rights organizations have been controversial and manifests in a variety of ways in the 
Turkish case. The following section explain it through concrete examples. There are 
two main ways to show how the EU has limited impact on human rights 
organizations. 
 
 National Human Rights Institutions and Human Rights Organizations  
 
 The EU has exerted pressure on Turkey to initiate human rights reforms and 
integrate societal actors into these processes. Although Turkey established various 
governmental institutions previously to deal with human rights, there was no 
permanent and genuine institutionalization processes that internalized human rights 
norms. The EU accession process has triggered the foundation of human rights 
institutions. Starting from 2001, several state bodies were set up in Turkey to monitor 
and promote human rights. The EU has not only supported institutionalization to align 
with the acquis or with European standards but also intended to foster a constructive 
relationship between the human rights organizations and the state. However, the 
relationship between state bodies and human rights NGOs is yet another 
demonstration of the continuation of their controversial relationship in terms of 
different approaches to the understanding of rights-universal versus particular-, and 
policymaking –participatory versus restrictive. 
First, in the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey established governmental human 
rights bodies such as the Human Rights Presidency, the High Human Rights Board, 
the Human Rights Consultation Boards and the Investigation Boards to enforce 
human rights in Turkey. These bodies were expected to complement each other. The 
Human Rights Presidency in the Prime Ministry is authorized to monitor the 
legislation; High Human Rights Board is an inter-ministerial committee to make 
proposals to strengthen rights policies and is composed of representatives of the 
Ministries of Interior, Justice and Human Rights; the Human Rights Consultation 
Board is designed to function as a permanent forum of exchange of opinions between 
the Government and NGOs; finally the Investigation Board is expected to conduct 
investigations in  human rights abuses (Commission of the European Communities 
2001b: 21). 
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Therefore, the Human Rights Consultation Board was established as a 
consequence of the direct pressure from the EU to comply with the Copenhagen 
Criteria and to develop the dialogue between the state and civil society. It is important 
to understand the structure and composition of this body. The structure was different 
and independent from the Human Rights Presidency, but nevertheless associated with 
the Presidency. The Human Rights Consultation Board was composed of three main 
actors- NGOs, experts and representatives from ministries under the office of the 
Prime Minister. Members from human rights civil society actors both established 
human rights NGOs such as Mazlum-Der, TİHV, other NGOs that are close to 
government (GONGOs) and professional organizations, and independent experts 
mainly from universities. According to the legislation, there needs to be regular 
consultation every 3 months. The president of the Human Rights Consultation Board 
was Prof. İbrahim Kaboğlu who was elected in the first meeting; the Human Rights 
Consultation Board established 13 different work groups to prepare reports on those 
issues (Oran 2014). 
The Minority and Cultural Rights Work group published a report on minority 
rights in 2004 and urged the government to think about alternative conceptions and 
perceptions of minorities. However, the report caused severe reactions both from the 
government and GONGOs and led to the dissolution of the Human Rights 
Consultation Board following the rejection by the Human Rights Presidency. In 2005, 
the president resigned. After the publication of the report, the Human Rights 
Consultation Board was dissolved and legal proceedings started against the two 
principal authors of the report. Several EU Progress Reports (from 2005 onwards) 
noted that “Since the publication of a report on minority rights in Turkey in October 
2004, the Human Rights Advisory Board under the Office of the Prime Minister - a 
body composed of NGOs, experts and representatives from ministries – has not been 
operating” (Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 21). 
Therefore, this mechanism became ineffective in promoting the state and 
society relations. Overall, the independence of the Board was brought into question 
and human rights NGOs refused to collaborate with the government afterwards. 
This incident shows that human rights NGOs has been constrained by the 
state, and extensive understanding of human rights has not flourished in the Turkish 
context. Moreover, the reactionary approach against the report on the basis of “threat 
to unity” and “traitors” shows how inherited characteristics of the past are still evident 
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in the state and society relationship. This is also a demonstration of the diverging 
understanding of rights between civil society actors. The crises of the report was also 
fuelled by the GONGOs, whereas the prescribed notion of minorities contradicted 
with their understanding. 
Second, the interaction between provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights 
Boards and the human rights organizations that started in 2002 shows that a lack of 
cooperation as well as the existence of negative perceptions towards each other 
continue to shape this relationship between actors. As a part of human rights 
institutionalization, Turkey has established the Human Rights Boards in 81 provinces 
to provide training on human rights, processing applications on human rights 
violations, providing state-sponsored services and visiting places of detention. 
Human rights NGOs point out the complex and ineffective institutionalization 
of these bodies. Starting from 2001, these bodies have increased extensively, but their 
mandates, effectiveness and reliability remain a cause of concern for human rights 
NGOs (Interview İHD 2011; 2012, Mazlum-Der 2011; 2012). For instance, the EU 
Progress Report in 2003 noted that “the number of sub-provincial Human Rights 
Boards was increased from 831 in 2002 to 859 in 2003 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2003b: 25), and the complex structure of institutional framework further 
strengthened when “the number of provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights 
Boards increased from 859 to 931 in 2004 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004b: 32).  Despite the rise in numbers, the number of applications to 
these bodies remains low. For example, the representative of the İHD said that they 
have more applications of human rights violations compared to these bodies and this 
is the an indication of low trust towards these institutions (Interview İHD 2012).  
We still receive an enermous number of applications from individuals, and they do 
not. What does this mean in terms of human rights, and the reliabilty of these 
institutions? There is no trust in the understanding of the rights of  these institutions   
                                                                                                   (Interview İHD 2012)  
 
This is also verified by the EU Progress reports where the numerous reports 
highlight  the low number of applications to the Boards.  For example, Progress 
Report 2005 noted that “From October 2004 to March 2005, the Human Rights 
Presidency and the provincial Human Rights Boards attached to the Presidency 
received complaints of human rights abuses from 565 individuals. This figure 
represents less than one complainant per board, suggesting limited awareness of the 
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existence of the boards and/or low levels of trust” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005b: 107). 
Human rights NGOs also criticized the composition and independence of the 
boards, and refused to participate in these boards. Initially boards included members 
of the security forces (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 27). This 
contradicts with the understanding of rights of the human rights NGOs since security 
forces have been key violators of the rights in the Southeast and their approach to the 
Kurdish question is well known through military means. Security forces have long 
perceived the Kurdish problem as a security problem and threat to the unity of the 
Republic. They have long used military means to solve Kurdish problems rather than 
granting rights to the Kurdish population. On the contrary, two prominent human 
rights NGOs such as the İHD and Mazlum-Der perceive the Kurdish question not as a 
security problem but the main human rights and democratization problem of Turkey. 
Although the new Law on Association removes representativeness of the security 
forces from the boards, two major human rights NGOs- İHD and Mazlum-Der- still 
refuse to participate because of the independence of the boards. These boards are 
chaired by the Governors and include participation from the Governors’ 
administrations. Consequently, the boards have been brought in question by human 
rights organizations in Turkey. For example, in its press statement, Mazlum-Der 
described the issue as follows: 
The main source of the problem is the internalization of the dominant culture by the 
Boards chair/ members (referring to the Governors and the Governors’ 
administrations) that embrace/view human rights violations as the management 
practice.  
                                                                                       (Mazlum-Der Press Statement) 
 
Therefore, the provincial and sub-provincial boards are accorded no, at best 
little credibility by human rights NGOs. This fact also supported by the 2005 Progress 
Reports where effectiveness of the boards brought into the question depending on 
“the approach of the deputy governor chairing them” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005b: 107). 
 Third, the process during the preparation of the draft law on the establishment 
of the National Human Rights Institutions and later, the period after the establishment 
of this institution indicate the limited cooperation and consultation with the human 
rights NGOs. 
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 As indicated above, several bodies have been established as a part of the EU 
accession process to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights. 
Nevertheless, the institutional framework indicated that none of the bodies are 
independent and therefore, not in line with the UN Paris Principles. The EU Progress 
Report 2008 emphasized, “The institutional framework for human rights promotion 
and enforcement does not meet the independence requirement and lacks financial 
autonomy and transparency” (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 12). 
The following year, the Commission emphasized that “efforts are needed to 
strengthening the institutional framework on human rights, in particular as regards the 
establishment of an independent human rights institution and of an Ombudsman” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2009: 15). Following the pressures from 
the EU, in February 2010 a draft law on the establishmentof the Turkish Independent 
Human Rights Institution was submitted to the Parliament. 
 A sub-committee was established to review the draft law under the 
Parliamentary Commission to Investigate Human Rights violations. Twelve human 
rights NGOs and organizations
30
 were invited by the government and opinions from 
the NGOs were discussed. Human rights NGOs  objected to the draft law as it failed 
to meet international standards, particularly the independency and financial autonomy 
criterion in line with the Paris Principles and expressed that they were ready to 
cooperate with the government institutions to prepare a new draft on the basis of the 
Paris principles. The EU also encouraged  the government “to bring it into line with 
the UN framework, in particular as regards the independence and functional 
autonomy… and …to conduct this process in close consultation with NGOs” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2010: 17).  The following year, the EU 
stressed that the draft law did not comply with the UN Paris principles, in particular 
as regards to independence and functional autonomy- accountability, appointment of 
members, requirements of pluralism and gender balance of staffing, and greater 
cooperation and involvement of civil society was needed (Commission of the 
European Communities 2011: 21). However, despite all the criticism and the warning 
to integrate the stakeholders into the processes, the government failed to take it into 
                                                        
30 These are: hYd, İHD, TİHV, Mazlum-der, Amnesty International Turkey, Foundation for Society 
and Legal Studies (Toplum ve Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı-TOHAV), the Union of Turkish Bar 
Associations, bar associations of Ankara, İzmir and Diyarbakir, the Hacettepe University Human 
Rights Center, and Turkey Autistics Support and Education Foundation (Türkiye Otistiklere Destek ve 
Eğitim Vakfı- TODEV ) that were invited to participate the meeting held on 18 April 2012. 
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consideration.  
The process and the establishment of the human rights institutions indicate 
that the controversial relations between the state and the civil society have still been 
the key characteristics of Turkish politics. 
 
State and Human Rights Organizations and Defenders 
In Turkey, the EU has not changed the relationship between the state and 
human rights NGOs. Traditionally, the state has intervened in the activities of civil 
society actors. While intervention in the civil society has not been peculiar to human 
rights NGOs, and has existed across all sectors of the civil society, compared to 
women’s and environmental NGOs, the state intervention into the activities of human 
rights NGOs and defenders has been widespread and evident in the following ways. 
First, historically speaking, criminalization of the activities of the human 
rights NGOs and defenders has been evident extensively throughout the different 
periods in Turkish politics. Previous sections have shown this pattern in different 
periods; the following section shows that the EU accession process has failed to 
change this. 
Several EU reports have criticized the judicial harassment and criminalization 
of the human rights NGOs and defenders and their activities such as limitation of 
freedom of expression, arbitrary arrest, investigations, discrimination and violence. 
Civil society actors, especially those that concentrate on human rights 
questions have been subjected to severe pressures, close monitoring, restriction of 
their activities and rights-censorship of press releases and closure of associations. 
This is illustrated by the several investigations and the high number of court cases 
brought against them. For example, EU progress report 2003 estimated that there are 
500 cases pending against human rights defenders (Commission of the European 
Communities 2003b: 33). 
For instance, different branches of the İHD were closed and opened several 
times. According to reports, between October 2003 and August 2004, 98 court cases 
and investigations were brought against the İHD (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004b: 42). Since 2004, 50 court cases and various investigations have 
been launched to the İHD (Commission of the European Communities 2005b). The 
 201 
majority of cases were related to press conferences and the work of human rights 
defenders. 
 Most of the LGBTT associations have faced legal proceedings and threats to 
personal safety which have had a negative influence on the work of human rights 
defenders. For instance, Lambda İstanbul Solidarity Association in 2009 and the 
LGBTT Black Pink Traingle Association in 2010 have both faced closure  on the 
basis of the violations of rules on morality and Turkish family strucure. This also 
shows the difference and restrictive understanding of rights which contradicts the 
universal rights, and the freedom of association. The EU Progress Report criticized 
“the court’s ruling made the legality of the association conditional on not 
"encouraging lesbian, gay, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual behavior with the 
aim of spreading such sexual orientations"; this is not compatible with the EU's 
rejection of homophobia and its anti-discrimination standards” (Commission of the 
European Communities 2009:19). 
 National security and public order were used and restricted the freedom of 
association. Furthermore, the 2006 amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law 
introduced new constraints for human rights associations and defenders in terms of 
freedom of expression and association. The broad definition under the Anti-Terror 
Law restricted activities and targeted legal and non-violent organizations as “terrorist 
organizations” (Yıldız and Muller 2008: 66). As discussed before, Anti-Terror 
legislation has also been a cause for concern in EU countries and EU member states 
have different reactions on the Anti-terror law. These practices have also constrained 
the EU’s credibility where in some instances the EU itself has lacked the legal 
framework to assure the protection of human rights. 
The new law has contradicted the freedom of association and expression. High 
numbers of investigations have been launched against human rights defenders, trade 
unionist, journalists, lawyers, children and politicians (Commission of the European 
Communities 2010-2014). For example, members of the İHD, Göç-Der Diyarbakir, 
have been arrested as part of the KCK-PKK operations. Muharrem Erbey, the 
president of the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakir and vice president of the 
national Human Rights Association were arrested under KCK operations. The 
representative of the İHD in Diyarbakır said that the “detention of Muharrem Erbey 
was a consequence of his work as a human rights defender and lawyer inhuman rights 
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projects, seminars, workshops and press statements - all interpreted as terrorist 
propaganda” (Interview İHD 2012) 
Similarly, the General Secretary of Göç-Der Diyarbakır was arrested and 
accused of being a member of “an armed, illegal organization”. Organizing a visit to 
an evacuated village for a group of foreigners which was one of the main activities of 
the association- to raise awareness on displacement - were accusations for the 
member of terrorist activities and propaganda (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network 2011: 35). 
These cases illustrate that the relationship between the state and human rights 
organizations are still shaped by the past legacies where the state perceived human 




Partnership between the state and society is also promoted through EU 
programs. As evident in previous chapters, the EU’s civil society policy has been 
motivated by the partnership principle. In this way, through its projects and activities, 
the EU has facilitated the formation of an internal network between the state 
institutions and civil society actors (See Chapters 5 and 6 for various examples in 
different issue-areas). However, in relation to the human rights organizations, the EU 
has used the EIDHR to strengthen and develop the capacities of human rights actors 
and involve them in the making, implementation and monitoring of human rights 
policies. As emphasized, this instrument has been employed only for human rights 
actors, but worked in connection with other mechanisms of the EU impact. In relation 
to the state-society relationship, every call for projects includes ‘associates’, but not 
partners. The associates involve “national public-sector institutions, municipal 
authorities and unions of municipal authorities, city councils, “muhtars” and local and 
national media” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey 2011: 8). Therefore, in 
contrast to other civil society programs, in the EIDHR the project’s associates are 
affiliated with the state institutions that seem to play a reduced role in the project 
cycle. Higher educational institutions, international organizations, independent 
political foundations and other civil society organizations sharing a border with 
Turkey can be considered and act as partners (Delegation of the European Union to 
Turkey 2011: 8). 
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The following example will demonstrate how the EU promotes partnerships 
between the state and society. The EU’s progress reports continuously emphasize 
deficiencies in children’s rights such as enrollment rates in compulsory education, 
child labor, poor social protection and care services for children, the level of child 
poverty, violence against children, early marriages, and arrested children in the 
prisons (Commission of the European Communities 2013). In Southern Anatolia, 
children are living under severe conditions and are affected by these problems due to 
the Kurdish problem. Hundreds of children have been detained, tried, and convicted 
in Diyarbakır courts. In realizing these problems and helping to raise awareness of 
children’s issues, prominent human rights organizations such as the İHD, TİHV and 
local NGOs undertake different EU projects on different dimensions of the these 
problems. 
With the collaboration of various institutions, ÇAÇA implements an EU 
project to raise awareness for at-risk children living in Southern Anatolia. The project 
also aims to strengthen the capacity and the ties between the public sector and civil 
society within the EU accession process (ÇAÇA 2005: 2). In the conclusion of the 
project, ÇAÇA highlights that “the project has failed to develop intended results in 
relation to developing the relationship between the institutions” (ÇAÇA 2005: 3). 
The ÇAÇA (Interview 2012) Coordinator highlights the main problem in the 
projects as follows: 
The main problem is the state’s perception against rights-based issues. For instance, 
children who are living and facing severe problems in Southern Anatolia are not 
considered in the context of rights and democratization.  Rather, these issues 
constitute a serious security threat to the existence of the state. Cooperation existed 
but importance of rights is neglected. 
 
The EU programs themselves do not lead to cooperative relations, because at 
the same time the state is continuing to interfere with the activities of human rights 
organizations. Therefore, the EU’s influence on human rights NGOs has been 
restricted by domestic factors. 
 
External Networks  
 
 The existence and use of external networks has been another detrimental 
factor in the EU’s effect on civil society development. In the EIDHR programs, the 
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EU has encouraged partnerships with international NGOs. Although the partnership 
has promoted ties with the countries “sharing a border with Turkey”, organizations 
may also act individually without partner organizations. Therefore, there is no strict 
conditionality on establishing partnerships with European civil society organizations.  
The outcome of the transnational relations is that human rights organizations 
have established one-to-one relations with international human rights organizations. 
They not only conduct projects, but also establish informal relations to transfer 
information on human rights violations in the country. For instance, the İHD has 
conducted projects with the Netherlands’ state-sponsored and administered Matra 
Programme that aims to support Turkey’s EU accession and to improve human rights 
conditions in Turkey (Call for project proposals for Matra and Human Rights 
Programme 2014). 
Another example how human rights organizations could benefit from external 
networks is the participation of human rights organizations in Euro-umbrella 
networks. The relationship between domestic human rights organizations and 
European umbrella organizations are at the embryonic stage. There is no wide 
participation in these networks. All of the organizations noted that due to the EU 
accession process, European officials from various networks visited and exchanged 
knowledge, but most of the contact between organizations and EU networks only 
takes place through official visits. 
 The European Association for the defense of Human Rights is composed of 
leagues and associations defending human rights in EU countries. It is one of the 
prime Euro-umbrella networks on human rights issues, and is a partner with the 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Together they work closely with 
other European networks to fight for the respect of human rights, such as with the 
European Civic Forum, the European Liasion Committee on Services of General 
Interest, the European Network Against Racism, the Human Rights and Democracy 
Network, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), and the NGO 
platform on asylum and migration. Human rights organizations in Turkey have 
connections with EMHRN and FIDH. 
 The EMHRN is a significant umbrella organization on human rights issues at 
the EU level. For instance, membership in the EMHRN has played a significant role 
in improving relations with their European counterparts through learning their 
experiences and discussing the issues of human rights practices. The EMHRN 
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describes its mission as  “to promote and strengthen human rights and democratic 
reform within its regional mandate through civil society networking and cooperation” 
(Mission, Values & Objectives). 
The İHD and hYd are members of EMHRN and participate in its activities. 
Most of the human rights organizations said that they follow the activities of different 
European and international networks, but they do not participate in activities due to 
insufficient financial and human resources (Interview İHAD 2011). 
 
7.3. Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact 
 
I argue that compared to women’s and environmental NGOs, the impact of the 
EU on human rights NGOs has been more limited. I have provided evidence that 
different understanding of rights in the societal sphere, controversial relations with the 
state and the limited use of the transnational connections have led to the weak 
influence of the EU.  My analytical framework implies that if certain factors of the 
past had been different (domestically strong human rights activism, more receptive 
state- society relations, and good transnational relations), the impact of the EU on 
human rights NGOs would have been different. Historical trajectories have become 
important factors particularly in the connective pathway and have influenced 
Europeanization outcomes of human rights NGOs. In this case, historical legacies act 
as constraining factors of the EU impact. In this section, I will show how legacies 
matter for the development of human rights NGOs and the EU impact by a 
plausibility probe involving the experience of human rights NGOs in the Czech 
Republic. The Czech Republic is a good illustrative case due to a well-known history 
of the human rights movement that has a relatively cooperative relationship with the 
state and well-established connections with external networks. 
In its 1998 first Progress Report on the Czech Republic, the European 
Commission concluded that “The Czech Republic continues to fulfill the Copenhagen 
political criteria although continued attention needs to be focused on the situation of 
the Roma in Czech Society” (Commission of the European Communities 1998a:42). 
The most important human rights problem in the Czech Republic was minority rights 
and discrimination against the Roma. Yet, discrimination against the Roma was 
constructed as a social and cultural problem, not as a human rights issue in the Czech 
Republic (Swimelar 2008: 511). The pre-accession process strengthened the position 
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of the human rights organizations on minority issues, and through the EU 
conditionality and framing, enabled them to change the discourse on the Roma from a 
cultural problem to a human rights issue. 
First, the existence of a strong human rights civil society that promotes 
cooperation among civil society actors in favor of human rights issues facilitates the 
EU impact.  In the Czech Republic, following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act
31
, 
there was strong human rights activism of diverse constituencies on the basis of the 
principles of fundamental rights and well-connected external networks before the EU 
candidacy process.  The adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and its human 
rights norms created an opportunity for the dissent activists across Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union to perform independent activity and commitment to human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (Thomas 1999; 2001). In Czechoslovakia, Helsinki human 
rights norms mobilized the emergence of a grassroots movement, and establishment 
of an informal platform. Charter 77 was established in 1977 as a principal societal 
actor in rights activism and mobilized the public around basic principles of the human 
rights issues. For example, the Charter presented itself as a “free informal, open 
community of people of different convictions, different faiths, and different 
professions” (Thomas 2001: 177), and recognized the primacy of human rights as the 
basis of political activism despite their ideological differences. The mobilization 
around human rights discourse played a key role in strengthening and legitimizing 
human rights movement in Czechoslovakia. 
In contrast, in the context of the Kurdish problem of Turkey, organizations 
that identified themselves as human rights organizations were unable to mobilize on 
the basic principles of rights due to the diverse constituencies. If there had been 
mobilization on the basis of human rights rather than their ideological differences in 
Turkey, through the accession process, the human rights NGOs would have played an 
important role in the human rights policies as a partner (rather than rivals of the state). 
In Turkey, the existence of a deeply divided civil society sphere has been a 
constraining condition for the EU impact. 
Second, the existence and use of mechanisms to promote dialogue with the 
state bodies and the presence of strong human rights mobilization facilitate the EU’s 
                                                        
31 The detente between superpowers led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 which 
included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms alongside non-intervention in internal 
relations. The Helsinki Accord explicitly recognized human rights norms and international monitoring 
mechanisms. 
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impact. The nature of the human rights issues led to the specific kind of relationship 
with the state. Since the state is the main violator of the rights and source of 
repression, the human rights organization has defined its role in opposition to the 
state. Therefore, they are principle actors that resisted the repressive regime, and play 
an important role in bringing attention to rights violations both domestically and 
internationally. The very nature of human rights organizations led to such intervention 
from the state. For example, initially Helsinki had failed to comply with the human 
rights norms, and the Communist party state followed a strict policy of repression and 
confrontation with Czechoslovak society (Thomas 1999; 2001). However, as Thomas 
demonstrated, alongside with other factors (economic factors, leadership), the 
Helsinki Final Act catalyzed an extensive change in state-society relations in Eastern 
Europe (Thomas 1999; 2001). The ratification of the respective human rights 
conventions strengthened the human rights defenders. 
For instance, during the candidacy period in the Czech Republic, the EU 
pressure did not lead only to establishment of the national human rights institutions, 
such as creation of an Ombudsman (Public Defender of Rights) but also the 
development of more cooperative relations between the state and human rights 
organizations. During the pre-accession process, the consultation process on the 
establishment of an Ombudsman involved active participation of human rights 
organizations. Human rights organizations actively contributed to the process by 
formulating opinions, attending the frequent meetings with the authorities, engaging 
in public debates, participating in the policies on human rights issues. Whereas in 
Turkey, the EU accession process has not led to the development of cooperative state-
society relations in the human rights field. For example, the national human rights 
institutions were established without consultation with the human rights organization, 
and authorities have neglected their opinions. If there had been more cooperative 
relations between the state and society in Turkey, human rights NGOs would have 
participated in and have been strengthened more from the EU process. 
Lastly, the existence and use of transnational networks facilitates the EU’s 
impact on human rights NGOs. In the case of Eastern Europe, following the Helsinki 
Act, human rights organizations established well-connected networks and were 
assisted by Western countries. The transnational networking between Charter 77 and 
other Helsinki Watch organizations and governmental agencies both in Western 
Europe and the U.S made human rights conditionality a central component for the 
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economic reform in the East bloc (Thomas 2001) and empowered the human rights 
groups. 
During the EU accession process, Czech human rights organizations and 
activists activated these networks, as well as Euro-umbrella networks to pressure the 
state on the promotion of Roma rights, and constructed Roma as a human rights issue. 
The EU, through its euro-umbrella organizations, has created opportunities for human 
rights NGOs in the Czech Republic to pressure the state, and empower the human 
rights organizations as key actors in the EU process and governance. For example, 
Romani International NGOs such as the International Romani Union in Prague, and 
the Roma National Congress in Hamburg empowered and pushed for the policies on 
Roma rights. If there had been well-established relations with the external networks in 
Turkey, human rights NGOs would have put more pressure on the Turkish state on 




The previous sections showed that EU has limited impact on human rights 
organizations. While compulsory and enabling pathways led similar effects across 
different sectors of civil society, connective pathway created diverse outcomes. 
Human rights organizations has developed their capacities with EU funding but at the 
same time criticized the EU funding. In case, enabling impact human rights NGOs 
have used EU as a legitimization device, yet post-2005 developments and 
deterioration of EU-Turkey relations have weakened the influence of enabling 
pathway. 
This chapter also showed that in the case of human rights civil society, 
legacies have functioned as constraining conditions of the EU impact. In particular, a 
lack of sustainable cooperation among actors, confrontations between the state and 








I started this thesis by exploring the relationship between Europeanization and 
civil society and discussed the impact of Europeanization on civil society 
development and the role of civil society organizations in advancing Europeanization. 
My study examined EU impact across different segments of civil society and found 
that the EU has a differential impact on civil society in Turkey. This outcome that 
emphasizes the diverse impact of the EU is puzzling in light of the existing 
approaches to Europeanization of civil society, and hinted at a new perspective, 
critical engagement and re-evaluation on how the EU impacts civil society. By 
providing in-depth analysis of mechanisms and their interplay with domestic factors, I 
re-examined “the transformative power of European integration”. 
Building on this observation, I argued that the EU impact on civil society 
cannot be understood without analyzing the dynamic interactions between the EU and 
responses of the civil society actors in Turkey. Therefore, Europeanization is not 
understood as a linear process whereby a top-down agenda set by the EU influences 
civil society. It is, on the contrary, both an interactive and dynamic process, where 
domestic civil society actors, policies, political cultures, and traditions re-interpret EU 
influence at the domestic level and interactively shapes Europeanization outcomes. 
Furthermore, I argued that the EU has a differential impact as well, suggesting 
varying levels of Europeanization of civil society across issue areas in Turkey. 
Finally, I provided a legacy-based explanation to account for varying degrees of EU 
impact, and argued that historical legacies that shaped domestic conditions along with 
external factors mattered for understanding the Europeanization outcomes in Turkey. 
To model the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I proposed to incorporate the 
concept of historical legacies as deep conditions into the studies of Europeanization of 
civil society to explain the differential impact of the EU across different issue areas, 
and examined its empirical implications from several dimensions. 
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 In this last chapter I review the theoretical and empirical findings of my 
research and discuss its contributions. I also discuss implications and limitations of 
the study. My findings open venues for new research agendas and I conclude by 
discussing possible directions for further research. 
 
8.1. Overview of the Research Findings 
 
My theoretical framework in Chapter 2 started with an overview of a rapidly 
expanding social science research agenda seeking to define, assess and measure the 
Europeanization of civil society in CEE and Turkey within the context of the EU 
enlargement. The state of the art in the Europeanization of civil society literature, 
deriving from various theoretical backgrounds and a broader literature on the 
“generations of Europeanization” perspectives, reveals that the EU’s impact is 
“transforming”, “strengthening” or “weakening” civil society. Therefore, the literature 
is characterized by multiple understandings of civil society, Europeanization 
processes, and outcomes. Yet, this research agenda is still dominated by the 
dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and neglects the role of domestic 
factors in understanding the relationship between the EU and civil society. Only 
recently a small but growing body of research has been investigating the significance 
of domestic-level factors from different angles (Alpan and Diez 2014; Aydın-Düzgit 
and Kaliber forthcoming). In line with the recent studies in the field, I have 
contributed to the academic debates examining the EU impact on the development of 
civil society, and showed the importance of the simultaneous processes and interplay 
between the EU and domestic-level factors by focusing on three sectors of civil 
society, women, the environment and human rights. I argued that in-depth 
examination of the EU impact through a structured comparative study across different 
sectors of civil society and an explanation of the differential impact of the EU has 
been absent in the studies of Europeanization. Drawing on in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and careful process-tracing, I demonstrated that the EU’s impact on civil 
society has not been uniform across different sectors of civil society, and that the 
historical legacies of women’s, environmental and human rights organizations in 
Turkey have shaped the EU’s impact in those areas. I emphasized that the EU has 
impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its 
accession context and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society. 
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The pathways of EU influence and the associated outcomes cannot be understood 
without taking into account these interconnected and complex dynamics of 
Europeanization. 
To understand the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I used a pathway 
model that has been employed to study the impact of the EU on border conflicts (Diez 
et al. 2006; 2008)
32
. The pathway model of EU impact focuses on the direct and 
indirect impact of the EU, and identifies different mechanisms of influence, which are 
theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological institutionalism in the broader 
literature. The model through the categories of compulsory, enabling and connective 
pathways clearly expresses diverse but interconnected forms of the EU influence and 
allowed me to capture the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU 
involvement. I applied this model to civil society, and used analytical categories to 
explore the EU impact on civil society in Turkey. In the Europeanization of civil 
society literature, most of the analyses of the EU impact have focused on compulsory 
and enabling pathways while inadequate attention has been paid to the connective 
pathway of the EU impact. In three empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), I 
showed that the findings of the connective pathway of EU influence is innovative 
both in terms of understanding the interactions between various actors and the 
differential impact of the EU across different sectors of civil society. I presented 
extensive empirical evidence to highlight the differences in connective impact across 
three issue areas. Finally, in order to explain the differential outcomes of the EU 
influence on civil society, I incorporated the concept of historical legacies in the 
explanation of the Europeanization of civil society. I have conceptualized legacies as 
path-dependent processes in tune with the positions of Historical Institutionalists. My 
findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show that the historical legacies as a domestic factor 
play a pivotal role in explaining the Europeanization outcomes. 
The methodological section at the end of Chapter 2 elaborated my 
methodological framework, and mapped out the key variables in the study of 
Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. In following actor-oriented approaches to 
civil society I operationalized civil society mainly as NGOs in different policy 
domains. The concept of historical legacy in broader terms was/is conceived as 
                                                        
32
 As I show in Chapter 2, in the Europeanization literature, there are different conceptualizations of 
pathways of the EU influence and the classification by Diez et al. share considerable overlap in the 
conceptualization of the EU impact with most of the literature in the Europeanization field. 
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“inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present”(Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 
2010). This was a useful starting point to define historical legacy in the context of 
civil society in Turkey. Building on this definition and using various criteria, Chapter 
4 identified “which past matters the most” (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010) in 
the case of civil society in Turkey. In judging the EU impact, I based my analysis not 
only on the operation of NGOs but also on policies. 
I conducted a total of 53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives in İstanbul, Ankara 
and Diyarbakır in addition to extensive analyses of documents of EU, civil society 
organizations and the Turkish state. This research provided me with rich empirical 
data to understand the functioning of civil society, the connections between actors, 
detailed knowledge of principle issue areas, and the relationship with the EU. 
In order to operationalize Europeanization analysis, I used multiple methods 
such as periodization to identify the main turning points in the history of civil society 
and to provide a road map for the long-term analysis across cases; process tracing to 
capture an understanding of civil society before EU involvement and to observe 
domestic and European level developments; long-term analysis to show continuities 
and changes and to identify historical legacies in civil society, and finally a 
plausibility probe to demonstrate how legacies matter in the explanation of the 
Europeanization outcomes. The empirical chapters -Chapters 5, 6 and 7- employed 
these methods in a complementary way. 
 In Chapter 3, I argued that the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil 
society, and when assessing the EU impact it is important to understand the EU policy 
towards civil society - its rationale, instruments, key policy actors and the interactions 
between actors. In the EU’s approach to civil society, civil society is an agent of 
democratization and Europeanization, and a partner in European Governance. Despite 
this particular conceptualization of civil society, EU member states have been shaped 
by a twin-track approach to civil society through projects in civil society programs  
and by diverse understanding and structures of civil society (strong versus weak civil 
society), different traditions of state-society relationships (cooperative versus 
controversial versus weak state), and diverse types of participation (formal versus 
informal). An analysis of EU policy documents showed how the EU has employed 
Turkey in the context of enlargement. 
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 In Chapter 4, I employed long-term analysis by identifying critical junctures 
and traced the development of civil society in Turkey. I traced the development of 
civil society to identify historical legacies in relation to civil society, which is 
understood as the inherited aspects and characteristics of the past relevant to the 
present. Detailed investigation of civil society since the Ottoman period highlighted 
the inherited characteristics of civil society and particular aspects of the past that 
shaped civil society in Turkey. I identified six key legacies that matter for the analysis 
of EU impact: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been 
chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive environment characterized 
by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an 
important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an 
ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the 
presence of diverse connections with external networks. I argued that these legacies of 
the past still shape civil society, its relations with different actors, and the impact of 
the EU. 
 In empirical chapters, I explored how the EU impacted women’s (Chapter 5), 
environmental (Chapter 6) and human rights (Chapter 7) civil society by focusing 
primarily on NGOs. I followed the same format in the three empirical chapters. To 
address this question in the relevant issue area, I first traced the development of 
different sectors of civil society throughout history to envisage key aspects and 
characteristics of women’s (Chapter 5), environmental (Chapter 6), and human rights 
(Chapter 7) civil society in Turkey. Following this analysis, I scrutinized the debates 
on the relationship between the EU and civil society in specific issue areas to 
illustrate how the literature tackled my research question. Analysis revealed that while 
there was a substantial study in terms of compulsory and enabling pathways, and 
similar findings, the previous literature has not paid adequate attention to the 
connective pathway of the EU impact. I then provided new evidence for the 
differential impact of the EU across different sectors of civil society, and finally 
demonstrated the role of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact by 
employing counterfactual reasoning. 
 The findings of the compulsory and enabling pathways of the EU influence 
showed similarities across all issue areas. I reached two main conclusions on the 
compulsory pathway of EU influence, and argued that the EU impact is ambivalent. 
My conclusion has pointed out not only similar findings within the Turkish context, 
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but results share considerable similarities with CEECs. In the Turkish context, first, it 
has enforced a substantive change in the domestic legal framework governing the 
operation of civil society in Turkey, but in the post-2005 period implementation-
related issues have emerged as significant obstacles. Second, EU civil society 
assistance has strengthened the capacity and visibility of civil society, and shaped 
their agendas according to EU priorities and diffused a “project culture” and 
professionalization in their activities. However, evidence showed that civil society 
actors have reacted and criticized EU funding programs. 
Evaluation of the enabling pathway of the EU influence in issue areas revealed 
that civil society frequently uses the EU conditionality, standards, and norms as 
reference points in promoting various policy initiatives in Turkey. I showed how 
different actors used the EU as a “legitimization device” in different issue areas. The 
enabling pathway of the EU impact led empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the 
state, but this effect has been very vulnerable to fluctuations and downturns in EU-
Turkey relations. 
The key finding in Chapter 5 is the stronger degree of Europeanization of 
women’s civil society that is accomplished when the EU meets facilitating historical 
legacies. I showed that historically, the women’s movement has been strong and 
active in Turkey, has established connections with the Turkish state to get involved in 
decision-making processes and women’s civil society has prioritized women’s issues 
such as violence despite their differences and formed transnational links with external 
networks. I also provided evidence on how the EU has enabled women’s civil society 
to further their relations with the state institutions, to make a policy initiation, and to 
develop, build and empower networks both with other civil society actors and 
transnational networks. Lastly, I illustrated how legacies matter and have functioned 
as a facilitating condition of the EU impact. 
In the second empirical chapter of the thesis, Chapter 6, I demonstrated that 
the EU impact has been ambivalent on the environmental civil society. I showed that 
traditionally, environmental activism has been moderate, it established relationships 
with the Turkish state to get involved in policymaking processes but has been 
constrained by the state’s approach to these organizations. Environmental civil society 
has been unable to develop effective cooperation and alliances, and has formed 
limited transnational networks. I argued that while the EU has provided opportunities, 
the moderate status of the green movement and activism and the weak cooperation 
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among environmental actors to develop a green tradition have functioned as a 
constraining condition of the EU impact. Furthermore, controversial relations between 
the state and society and the limited participation in European networks have led to an 
ambivalent impact of the EU on environmental civil society. Finally, I showed the 
role of legacies in the Europeanization of environmental civil society in Turkey. 
The findings of Chapter 7 demonstrated that the Europeanization of civil 
society is less likely where historical legacies function as a constraining condition for 
the EU impact. Historically, human rights civil society has had a controversial 
relationship with the state, only recently developed cooperation across human rights 
actors, and do not use mechanisms of transnational connections effectively. The 
examination of the EU impact demonstrated that the different and selective 
understandings of rights between human rights NGOs, confrontational relations and 
limited cooperation between the state and the human rights actors, and the minimal 




 This thesis makes several contributions both at the theoretical and empirical 
levels to our understanding of the Europeanization of civil society. Theoretically, I 
argued that the effect of the EU on civil society development cannot be properly 
understood without analyzing the interaction between the domestic and EU level 
factors. Europeanization studies that do not incorporate historical legacies, which 
characterize the state of the art in the literature (with the exception of Ciratus and 
Schimelfenning 2010), are likely to result in an incomplete assessment of 
Europeanization outcomes, since the EU and civil society actors at the domestic level 
have an interactive and dynamic relationship, and the impact of the EU is shaped by 
the reactions, understandings, and traditions of civil society organizations. To address 
this, I put forward a new theoretical framework that builds on the pathway model of 
the EU impact. My theoretical extension and re-interpretation of a concept of legacies 
takes full advantage of the peculiarities of civic actors in multiple ways such as state-
society, society-society, the transnational aspect and their interactions with the EU. It, 
therefore, comprehensively showed unique characteristics of civil society and the web 
of relations among actors in Turkey. In this respect, it shares important similarities 
with the governance literature. However, research on governance mainly employed a 
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policy –oriented perspective to study how European policy influences domestic 
NGOs in a specific field (Börzel and Buzogany 2010 a, b). This study primarily 
analyzes civil society as a unit of analysis and focuses on the ways in which they are 
shaped by the processes of Europeanization in several ways. 
 The theoretical framework and ample empirical evidence presented in this 
thesis highlight that the EU impact on civil society is ambivalent and differential, and 
historical legacies have shaped the Europeanization outcomes of civil society. Thus, 
the differential impact of the EU on civil society development can be explained by the 
historical legacies across different sectors of the civil society in Turkey. The 
simultaneous recognition of EU- and legacy-related factors is a theoretical innovation 
with implications for the study of Europeanization, civil society, and the enlargement 
process. 
The EU aspect - the pathway model of the EU impact - highlights complex 
and complementary mechanisms of the EU impact in multiple levels and allowed me 
to assess the EU impact more comprehensively across different levels. The pathway 
model of the EU impact has been widely used in the literature. However, until now 
studies have focused on some aspects of the EU impact in relation to civil society, 
mainly on changes in the legal framework and how civic actors used the EU 
framework as a way of legitimizing mobilization. In their assessment, civil society 
has either been treated as a broad category and includes various types of civil society 
actors or as an issue-based actor. The vague definition of civil society complicates the 
assessment of the EU impact since different civil society actors have different 
trajectories with various institutions, and can produce diverse outcomes when they 
interact with the EU. Moreover, studies have neglected in-depth analyses of EU 
impact on state-society relations, development of the public sphere, and the 
relationship between transnational networks and European civil society, which 
reflects different dynamics of Europeanization. Comparative systematic assessment of 
different issue areas over different periods provided me with rich empirical material 
and interesting findings. My work highlights the importance of networks –both 
internal and external- and comparative analysis across different issue areas as another 
avenue of research and contribution to study the EU impact on civil society. 
The domestic aspect of this framework stresses that historical legacies have 
played a pivotal role in Europeanization processes. Civil society actors with divergent 
past experiences would respond differently to EU pressures. In Chapter 2, the 
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theoretical framework shows that the EU is more likely to produce a stronger impact 
with facilitating legacies of the past. For example, women’s civil society has 
facilitating historical legacies such as more cooperative state-society relations, strong 
women activism, and established transnational relations. This in turn, creates a 
stronger EU impact. In contrast to women’s civil society, in human rights 
organizations, historical legacies have functioned as a constraining condition of the 
EU impact. For example, legacies such as the controversial state-society relationship, 
an ideologically divided public sphere and inconsistent use of transnational networks 
have constrained the EU impact. Therefore, historical legacies matter for the EU 
impact and civil society actors are active agents; they respond and reinterpret these 
processes. 
My thesis highlights the importance of domestic-level explanations to 
understand Europeanization outcomes and thus responds to the critiques of biased 
towards EU-level explanations at the expense of other factors. This approach -
integration of historical legacies into Europeanization explanations- can be applied to 
other policy domains to show the responses of actors and the role of legacies in 
Europeanization outcomes. The historical legacies of civil societies that are 
operationalized by the level of mobilization, the tradition of state-society relations, 
and the extent of the transnational connections can be applied to other countries - 
member states, candidate countries, and the wider neighborhood- to examine the EU 
impact on civil society development. I expect to find strong EU impact if historical 
legacies of civil societies under analysis have a cooperative state-society relationship, 
advanced-level activism, a tradition of cooperation among civil society and advanced 
connections with external networks. 
The empirical analyses that I followed in this thesis contribute to the literature 
beyond understanding the implications of my theory. Most studies of Europeanization 
on civil society focus on the empirical relationship between Turkish political reform 
and EU funding and civil society without paying attention to a detailed examination 
of different dimensions of impact on different sectors of civil society and how EU 
pressures interact with domestic conditions. 
The extensive interviews -53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews- 
with EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives shed light on the 
processes through which the EU has shaped their rights, resources and, formation of 
internal and external networks. Empirically, the EU impact is analyzed through an 
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examination of single areas; therefore, comparability between cases and 
comprehensive qualitative assessment is a much-needed contribution in studies on the 
Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. 
 
8.3. Policy Recommendations and Limitations 
 
 To start with policy recommendations, the findings of this research have 
particular recommendations on EU’s civil society policy particularly along two 
dimensions. 
 First, my findings show that historical legacies have played an important role 
in Europeanization outcomes. Thus, a legacy-based approach outlines legacies of the 
past that can both enable and constrain the EU’s influence. Similar to other studies in 
the field (Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010b), I also have shown that the EU 
has provided several opportunities to civil society. The main finding of these studies 
is that when civil societies have weak capacities, actors are unable to benefit from the 
EU’s opportunities. 
The key instrument of the EU’s approach to civil society is the transfer of 
funds. It is expected that through accession context and programs, which involve 
capacity development activities, civil society would develop its capacity and therefore 
will play an instrumental role in the EU accession process. For example, as Chapter 3 
extensively analyzed the Civil Society Development Program in Turkey chiefly 
motivated by this premise (if the EU provides resources to civil society, it will 
develop the capacities). However, resources do not simply empower these actors.  
These actors are embedded in a historical context and how they use and perceive the 
EU influence are shaped by their past traditions and experiences. Therefore, the first 
lesson learnt is that the EU should actively design policies that consider domestic 
peculiarities and a/the historical context. History matters, and the EU should shift 
towards more tailor-made civil society policy. The “One size fits all” approach simply 
does not work in all contexts. 
  The second policy recommendation, closely related with the first one, is that 
the EU should promote a “notion of ownership” in its civil society programs. In the 
Turkish context, the EU has two main civil society programs, namely capacity 
building and development (e.g. Civil Society Development Program) and dialogue 
programs (e.g. Civil Society Dialogue I, II and III). Several interviewees have 
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indicated that these programs have not taken into account Turkey’s domestic 
peculiarities. In all sectors of civil society, interviewees have criticized the “top-down 
approach” of the EU. For example, in the EU programs there are activities to develop 
socialization and transfer technical knowledge between the EU and Turkish civil 
society. Within the context of these programs, EU experts frequently travel to Turkey 
and conduct projects together with the Turkish civil society. However, these experts 
generally do not know the Turkish agenda, the priorities of these organizations and 
their policy traditions.  Therefore, the role of civil society has remained negligible in 
these processes. If the EU designs activities and the content of these programs 
together with civil society, actors would not only be more empowered from these 
processes but also feel a sense of belonging to these programs. 
  There are two main limitations that need to be further discussed. The first one 
relates to the tautological fallacy of the legacy-arguments. Most of the scholars in the 
field have recognized that such arguments risk producing “excessively shallow 
explanations” (Kitschelt 2003: 68) because it is difficult to identify factors that are not 
historical legacies (Meyer-Sahling 2009; Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010; 
Wittenberg 2013). In this respect, all outcomes that are identified are results of causal 
factors in the past. And, as Wittenberg (2013: 9) explains, “all outcomes are legacies 
in the causal sense”. Thus, legacy explanations do not render themselves into very 
causal analysis. I am fully aware of this fundamental problem of legacy explanations, 
and in order to minimize this problem I take the legacies as deep conditions of the EU 
impact. This means that legacies are not the primary cause of the explanations; rather, 
they shape the current conditions as deep factors. Furthermore, I emphasize that 
legacy-based explanations complement other studies in the field and give them more 
historical emphasis. Therefore, I do not suggest replacing other explanations in the 
Europeanization studies. Rather, I stress that it will provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the EU influence. This is also in line with the studies that 
incorporate historical legacies in the explanation of Europeanization
33
. As I elaborated 
in Chapter 2, these studies have used the concept of historical legacies in different 
ways but emphasize that historical legacies cannot be completely independent from 
variables in the classical sense. 
                                                        
33
 See special issue on Europeanization and Legacies in Europe-Asia Studies 62 (3). 
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 Although I acknowledge challenges of legacy-based explanations, I think 
benefits of such explanations outweigh shortcomings in the context of the current 
study. To emphasize, the main contribution of my thesis is the finding that the EU has 
a diverse impact on different segments of civil society. In Chapter 2, I have shown 
that there is extensive work on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. In all of 
these assessments, students of Turkish studies have not analyzed different issue-areas 
of civil society. Thus, they either argue that the EU has a transformative or limited 
impact on civil society. Yet, there is no structured comparison between issue areas. 
This study has not only systematically analyzed EU influence on different sectors of 
civil society, but offered an explanation why such difference occurs.  A detailed 
examination of civil society development has indicated that one of the most important 
factors is historical legacies. Historical legacies explain diverse EU outcomes on civil 
society. This is a value-added contribution of the legacy explanations. 
  The second one is the relevancy of my thesis in light of political 
developments since 2005. Between 1999 and 2005, Turkey has undertaken several 
reforms in various domains and there was optimism about the transformative power 
of the EU in these processes. However, the post-2005 period is characterized as the 
deterioration in the EU-Turkey relationship and “disenchantment by both sides” 
(Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber forthcoming). Both internal (e.g. consolidation of AKP’s 
power after its second election victory in 2007 and declining Turkish public support 
for the EU membership) and external factors ( the veto of the Republic of Cyprus on 
the opening of new chapters, the Eurocrisis and the rise of far right political parties) 
have played a role in the downturn of the EU-Turkey relations (Aydın-Düzgit and 
Kaliber 2016; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007; Öner 2013). Given these 
developments, is it still relevant to raise questions about the role of the EU and its 
transformative power on civil society in Turkey? 
 In Turkey, the relationship between the civil society and the EU has been 
extensively studied. The findings show that the EU has an impact and transformative 
power on civil society, yet since 2005 the EU’s power is more limited than before 
(See section 2.1.3 Europeanization of civil society in Turkey). In these studies, civil 
society analyses come in different forms, but one similarity they share is the 
assessment of the EU impact through organized and institutionalized civil society 
actors. For example, Rumelili and Boşnak (2015: 135) found that the EU impact has 
been “significant in extent, limited in scope to a small subset of Turkish NGOs”. As 
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described in the methodology section, although NGOs have connections with 
movements and local civil society actors, an examination of the EU influence does 
not incorporate a non-organized and less institutionalized form of civil society. This is 
a general problem and a fundamental challenge for the students of Turkish studies. 
Furthermore, recent political developments have signaled two major trends in 
the studies of Turkish civil society. First, the AKP’s consecutive general election 
victories have further consolidated its power and created its own civil society. As 
Kaya (2015) rightly points out, under the rule of the AKP faith –based voluntary 
organizations and charities have become prominent. These organizations are mainly 
GONGOs and coopted by the AKP and used instrumentally to support its policies. 
Second, in response to the authoritative AKP’s policies and “Erdoğan’s way of 
ruling” non-organized forms of participation have been key to understanding recent 
dynamics in Turkish civil society. The experiences of the Gezi movement in May 
2013 and Ballot and Beyond (Oy ve Ötesi)34 in 2014 highlight the importance of civic 
and political participation. However, so far the relationship between Europeanization 
and faith-based voluntary organizations and civic initiatives has not been adequately 
studied. Turning on to the key question, it is critical to examine the EU impact on 
civil society, because Europeanization is still a relevant phenomenon in civil society, 
though its impact is mostly concentrated on the NGOs. 
 
8.4. Directions for Future Research  
 
In this thesis I introduced a framework for understanding the relationship 
between the state of civil society and Europeanization outcomes. While I explored the 
implications of this framework from several angles, the analyses presented here can 
be seen as the beginning of a broader research agenda. In this section I highlight some 
of the areas that warrant further investigation. 
One of the most exciting future tasks is the exploration of the mechanisms 
through which different civil society actors such as interest groups, grassroots 
organizations, local groups as well as new policy areas are shaped by the 
Europeanization dynamics. This is much needed within the single case study 
                                                        
34
 It started as a civil platform by volunteers to improve the reliability of the electoral processes in 
Turkey. In March 2014, Oy ve Ötesi became a civil movement and participated in a civil observation of 
the election pools with its 30,000 volunteers. In April 2014, it was reorganized as an association 
(Korkmaz 2015). 
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countries and across the different countries. As discussed in the previous section, so 
far most of the studies have focused on institutionalized civil society actors. 
Comparing different civil society actors and different policies will expand our 
understanding of the Europeanization of civil society. 
The Gezi Events signaled the importance of a less institutionalized form of 
mobilization, the existence of an “unorganized” civil society and raised discussions in 
the public sphere. This opens another avenue to researchers to conduct a study on the 
Europeanization of the public sphere in Turkey and its transformation. Research on 
the understanding of the public sphere in Turkey, its transformation, and its 
relationship with Europeanization shape our understanding of interactions of the civic 
actors in a wider space and its implications for civil society in Turkey. 
Another direction in which the interrogation of this study can be continued is 
to map out in detail the EU’s civil society policy, its rationale, objectives, main policy 
agents and instruments through a comparative analysis across countries to 
comprehend our understanding of the policy both at the EU level and in implications 
on different countries. It would be very fruitful, for example, to design a comparative 
study on the basis of the characteristics of the civil society, and state-society relations 
in an old member state, a new member state, a candidate country and a country from 
the European Neighborhood. We need to further understand similarities and 
differences across cases and the role of the EU’s civil society policy in these 
countries. 
To conclude, in this thesis I revisited one of the most enduring themes of study 
in Europeanization studies. My endeavor was both a challenge and an opportunity, as 
the large body of existing work implied that the relationship between the state of the 
civil society and Europeanization outcomes was not comprehensively understood 
despite the scholarly interest. I have offered a theoretical account to understand this 
relationship and reached an original conclusion for the studies on the Europeanization 
of civil society: the EU impact on civil society is differential, and it is possible to 
observe this with a careful consideration of legacy-related factors at the domestic 
level. While my analyses explored various implications of my argument, the 
mechanisms considered are quite complex, and there are many avenues for further 
research. I hope that the comparative framework that I put forward will form the 





A.1 TOPIC GUIDE  
 
General Questions on the Organizational Structure- Organizasyon Yapısı 
 
1. Could you present yourself and your personal history in this organisation 
briefly?  
Kısaca kendinizi tanıtır ve kişisel sivil toplum geçmişinizden bahseder 
misiniz? 
 
2. What are the main objectives and activities of your organisation/ 
association/platform/union? Have the aims changed since the establishment of 
the organisation and if so, why?  
Dernek olarak başlıca amaç ve etkinlikleriniz nelerdir? Kuruluşundan sonra 
amaç ve etkinliklerinizde herhangi bir değişikilik var mı? Varsa, neden? 
 
3. When I look at your activities, I can see that you work 
on___________________  various fields and undertake different projects and 
campaigns. How do you evaluate/see your activities in comparison to other  
women/human rights/ environment organisations? 
Sizin çalışmalarınıza baktığımız zaman sizin ___________________ alanlarda 
projeler/kampanyalar yaptığınızı görüyoruz. _______’nin genel kadın/ insan 
hakları/çevre örgütleri içindeki rolünü bu alanlarda nasıl görüyorsunuz?  
 
4. What is your vision about the EU Accession process?_______’nın Avrupa 
Birliği katılım süreci ile ilgili görüşleri nelerdir? 
 
EU: an opportunity or obstacle? AB sizin için bir fırsat mı yoksa sınırlayıcı bir 
unusur mu?  
AB sizin için ne ifade ediyor?  
 
5.    Has there been any change in your institutional/organisational structure after 
the 1999 Helsinki summit?  
1999 Helsinki Zirvesi sonrasında  yapısal değişikliklere gidildi mi?  AB’ye 
 224 
uyum için somut olarak neler yapıldı? Yapısal değişikliklere gidildi ise, 
değişiklikler nelerdir? 
 
Compulsory Impact- AB Katılım Süreci ve AB Mali Yardım Programları  
 
1. Do EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission etc.) play any role in 
your official organization policy?Sizin bir STK olarak politika oluşturmanızda 
AB kurumlarının (parlamento, komisyon vs) rolü var mı? AB’ye adaylık 
sürecinin elinizi güçlendirmesi söz konusu mu? 
 
2. How is your organisation funded? How would you describe current funding? 
Kaynak olarak sağladığınız 100 lira, hangi kaynaklardan ve ne oranda (%) 
geliyor.  
 
3. Have you applied for external funding? If no, why? Herhangi bir AB fonu için 
başvuruda bulundunuz mu?  Eger bulunmadıysanız, 
 
- Neden başvuruda bulunmadınız? 
 
4. Why did you apply for external funding? Neden AB fonuna başvuruda 
bulundunuz? 
 
5. Could you please describe your experience with this process? Biraz bu 
süreçten bahseder misiniz?  
 
6. Would you apply again- If yes/no, why? AB fonuna tekrar başvurmayı 




1. How does the EU impact certain debates in relation to your organisation? Is 
there any reference to the EU in your debates?  Sizce, AB belirili konulardaki 
kamuoyu tartışmalarını etkiledi mi (örneklendir)?  Etkiledi ise,  
 
- Nasıl etkiledi? Belirli konularda tartışmalar var mı? AB’ye referans var 
mı?  
 
2. How do you use the EU in your activities (legitimisation) Siz örgüt 
faaliyetlerinizde AB ile ilişkiyi nasıl kullanıyorsunuz? 
 
Connective Impact 
1. Do you collaborate with other NGOs in your area (ask for both NGOs and 
INGOs) ? If yes, 
- Which ones and why?  
- How frequent are these relations? 
- What are the issue areas/ projects?  
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 (AB ülkelerinde STK’larıyla) işbirliğiniz/iletişiminiz var mı (AB mali yardım 
programı çerçevesinde ya da dışında)? Eğer varsa, 
- Hangi örgütlerle işbirliği içerisindesiniz? Neden bu örgütler? 
- İletişiminizin sıklığı nedir? 
- İşbirliği yaptığınız alanlar veya projeler var mı?  
 
2. Do you collaborate with other NGOs in EU countries? If yes, 
 AB ülkelerinde STK’larıyla, AB mali yardım programı bağlamında (ortaklık),  
isşbirliğiniz/iletişiminiz var mı? Eğer varsa, 
- How do you choose your partners? Ortaklarınızı nasıl buluyor  ya da nasıl 
seçiyorsunuz? 
- Do you face any difficulties in the course of the projects? Proje süresince 
ortaklarınızla karşılaştığınız zorluklar nelerdir? 
- Do you still collaborate after you complete the projects? Proje 
tamamlandıktan sonra ortaklarınızla işbirliğine devam ediyor musunuz?  
- If no, why?  Eğer etmiyorsanız neden ? 
 
3. Is your NGO a member of any network or umbrella group? STK ağı veya 
şemsiye kuruluşa üye misiniz (AB’de ve Türkiye’de)?  
 
4. Are you member of other international platforms? AB platformları dışında 
hangi uluslarası platformlara dahilsiniz? 
 
5. Does your NGO have experience  working with governmental actors? If 
yes/no 
 
- Reasons for collaboration or lack of collaboration? 
- How would you evaluate these relations? Positive- negative? 
- How does EU impact these relationships? 





A.2 List of Civil Society Organization Interviews 
 
Index No Name of the 
Institution 
 
Position of the 
Interviewee 



























5 TEMA  14 April 2011 İstanbul 
6 ÇEKÜL Project 
Coordinator 
20 April 2011 İstanbul 





26 April 2011 İstanbul 









9 Mor Çatı Volunteer 27 September 
2011 
İstanbul 
10 Kadın Haklarını 
Koruma Derneği 
Vice President 15 October 
2011 
İstanbul 
11 The Socialist 
Feminist 
Collective 
Volunteer 17 October 
2011 
İstanbul 




Vice President 18 October 
2011 
İstanbul 































17 İHD President 25 October 
2011 
Ankara 
18 Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 









19 Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 







20 Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 
















22 Human Rights 
Research 
Association 
Vice President 26 October 
2011 
Ankara 






24 Delegation of 
European Union 
To Turkey 
 26 October 
2011 
Ankara 































28 Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 
of Family and 
Social Policies 
KSGM 
Expert 27 October 
2011 
Ankara 
29 Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 
of Family and 











31 Flying Broom Volunteer 28 October 
2011 
Ankara 
32 TKB Vice President  28 October 
2011 
Ankara 
 Pink Life Volunteer 28 October 
2011 
Ankara 





 28 October 
2011 
Ankara 





35 hYD  01 November 
2011 
İstanbul 
36 Women for 
Women's Human 
Rights 
Volunteer 16 November 
2011 
İstanbul 
37 Amargi Kadın 
Akademisi 
Volunteers 25 January 
2012 
İstanbul 



















41 STGM Representative 21 May 2012 Diyarbakır 
42 Diyarbakır Bar 
Association 
President 22 May 2012 Diyarbakır 
43 İHD Diyarbakır 
Branch 




Representative 23 May 2012 Diyarbakır 




Representative 23 May 2012 Diyarbakır 
45 KAMER Volunteer 23 May 2012 Diyarbakır 
46 Selis Kadın 
Derneği 
Volunteer 24 May 2012 Diyarbakır 





48 Göç-Der Volunteer 24 May 2012 Diyarbakır 
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